Legea din 4 octombrie 1991, privind stabilirea unor condiţii pentru exercitarea anumitor funcţii în organele şi organizaţiile de stat din R.F.C.S., R. Cehă şi R. Slovacă

(Sinteză)

 Adunarea Federală a RFCS a hotărât asupra următoarei legi:

 Paragraful I

1.     Prezenta lege stabileşte unele condiţii pentru exercitarea funcţiilor ocupate prin alegere sau numire:

a)    În organele administraţiei de stat a RFCS, R. Cehe şi R. Slovace;

b)    În armata cehoslovacă;

c)     În Serviciul Federal de Informaţii Secrete, Inspectoratul Federal al Poliţiei, Inspectoratul Poliţiei Palatului Prezidenţial;

d)    La Cancelaria Preşedintelui RFCS, Cancelaria Adunării Federale, Cancelaria Consiliului Naţional Ceh, Cancelaria Consiliului Naţional Slovac, Cancelaria Guvernului RFCS, Cancelariile Guvernelor R. Cehe şi R. Slovace, Cancelaria Tribunalului Constituţional al RFCS, Cancelariile tribunalelor constituţionale ale R. Cehe şi R. Slovace, Cancelariile tribunalelor supreme ale RFCS, R. Cehe şi R. Slovace, în Prezidiul Academiei Cehoslovace de Ştiinţe şi al Academiei Slovace de Ştiinţe;

e)     La Radiodifuziunea cehoslovacă, cehă şi slovacă, televiziunile cehoslovacă, cehă şi slovacă, agenţiile de presă cehoslovacă, cehă şi slovacă;

f)      În întreprinderi de stat, organizaţii de stat, societăţi pe acţiuni, unde cel mai mare număr de acţiuni îl are statul, în întreprinderi de comerţ exterior, în organizaţii ale căilor ferate cehoslovace, în instituţii financiare, la Banca de Stat Cehoslovacă.

 2.     Prin funcţiile prevăzute la paragraful I, alin. 1, lit. b) se înţeleg, în armata cehoslovacă şi Ministerul Federal al Apărării, funcţiile ocupate de cei cu grad de colonel şi general şi funcţiile de ataşat militar.

 3.     Prin funcţiile prevăzute la paragraful I, alin. 1, lit. f) se înţeleg funcţiile de conducători de organizaţii şi cadrele de conducere din subordinea acestora.

 Paragraful II

1.     Pentru exercitarea funcţiilor menţionate la paragraful I este necesar ca, în perioada 25.02.1948 - 17.11.1989, cetăţenii respectivi să nu fi fost:

a)        Lucrători la Departamentul Securităţii Naţionale, în sectorul Securitatea Statului;

b)       În evidenţele Securităţii Statului ca rezident, agent, proprietar de locuinţă conspirativă, informator sau colaborator ideologic al Securităţii Statului;

c)         Colaborator al Securităţii Statului;

d)       Secretar al organelor de conducere ale PC din Cehoslovacia şi PC din Slovacia (de la comitet raional în sus), membru în prezidiul acestor comitete, membru al CC al PC din Cehoslovacia şi PC din Slovacia, membru al Biroului sau al Comitetului PC din Cehoslovacia pentru conducerea activităţii de partid din R. Cehă, cu excepţia celor care au deţinut aceste funcţii în perioada 1.01.1968 - 1.05.1969;

e)         Lucrător al organului de partid din cadrul Departamentului Securităţii Naţionale;

f)         Membru în gărzile patriotice;

g)        Student la Şcoala Superioară F. E. Dzerjinski, de pe lângă Consiliul de Miniştri al URSS pentru cadrele Securităţii Statului; student al Şcolii Superioare a Ministerului de Interne al URSS, pentru cadrele Securităţii Statului, student al Şcolii Secundare, de pe lângă Ministerul de Interne al URSS, aspirant sau participant la cursurile  institutelor menţionate cu durată de peste trei luni.

 2.     În anumite cazuri, Ministerul Apărării Naţionale al RFCS poate anula condiţiile de la alin. 1, lit a), în măsura în care aplicarea acestor condiţii ar dăuna unor interese ale securităţii staului şi nu ar influenţa scopul prezentei legi.

  Paragraful III

1.     Pentru exercitarea funcţiilor, conform paragrafului I, în Ministerul Federal de Interne, în Serviciul Federal de Informaţii, în Inspectoratul Federal al Poliţiei şi în Inspectoratul Poliţiei Palatului Prezidenţial, se solicită ca, în perioada 25.02.1948-17.11.1989, cetăţeanul respectiv să nu fi fost:

a)    Lucrător al Departamentului Securităţii Naţionale, în cadrul Securităţii Statului, Sectorul Contrainformaţii;

b)    În funcţia de şef de direcţie sau în funcţii superioare în aparatul securităţii statului;

c)     Student la Şcoala Superioară F.E. Dzerjinski, de pe lângă Consiliul de Miniştri al URSS, pentru cadrele securităţii statului, la Şcoala Superioară a Ministerului de Interne al URSS pentru cadrele securităţii statului, la Şcoala Superioară Politică a Ministerului de Interne al URSS pentru cadrele securităţii publice (Miliţiei), aspirant sau participant la cursurile acestor institute, cu durată de peste trei luni;

d)    Secretar sau membru al Comitetului PC din Cehoslovacia, la Departamentul Securităţii Naţionale al RFCS şi R. Slovace sau lucrător al Departamentului Securităţii Naţionale, încadrat la Direcţia pentru educaţie politică, activitate culturală şi de propagandă a Ministerului Federal de Interne.

 2.     În cazuri justificate, ministrul de interne al RFCS, directorul Serviciului Federal de Informaţii Secrete şi directorul Inspectoratului Federal de Poliţie pot anula condiţiile prevăzute la alin. 1, lit a), în măsura în care aplicarea acestor condiţii ar dăuna unor interese importante ale securităţii statului şi dacă în felul acesta nu este influenţată prezenta lege.

 Paragraful IV

1.     Situaţia menţionată la paragraful II, alin. 1, lit. a) şi b), este dovedită de cetăţean printr-o adeverinţă eliberată de Ministerul Federal de Interne.

2.     Situaţia menţionată la paragraful II, alin 1, lit c), este dovedită de cetăţean printr-o adeverinţă eliberată de Ministerul Federal de Interne.

3.     Situaţia menţionată la paragraful II, alin 1, lit. d) – g), este dovedită de cetăţean printr-o „declaraţie – pe cuvânt de onoare”.

4.     Înainte de ocuparea uneia din funcţiile menţionate la paragraful I, cetăţeanul este obligat să prezinte o declaraţie în care să arate că nu a fost şi nu este colaborator al nici unui serviciu de informaţii din străinătate.

Paragraful VI

1.     În locul cetăţeanului care urmează să deţină o funcţie din cele menţionate la paragraful I sau al cetăţeanului care deţine o asemenea funcţie la data intrării în vigoare a prezentei legi, Ministerul Federal de Interne solicită prezentarea adeverinţei în următoarele cazuri:

a)    Din partea organului căruia îi aparţine funcţia, dacă cetăţeanul este ales în această funcţie;

b)    Din partea organului care l-a numit pe cetăţean în funcţie, dacă cetăţeanul este numit în această funcţie;

c)     şeful organului sau organizaţiei respective atrage atenţia cetăţeanului că este obligat să îi prezinte adeverinţa în termen de 30 de zile după primirea acesteia;

Ministerul Federal de Interne trimite cetăţeanului adeverinţa în termen de până la 60 de zile de la data depunerii cererii, informând, totodată, pe cel care a solicitat adeverinţa.

 Paragraful VII

Preşedintele RFCS, Prezidiul Adunării Federale, Prezidiile Consiliului Naţional Ceh şi Consiliului Naţional Slovac, Guvernele RFCS, R. Cehe şi R. Slovace, procurorii generali ai RFCS, R. Cehe şi R. Slovace solicită Ministerului Federal de Interne eliberarea de adeverinţe privind persoanele pentru ocuparea funcţiilor pentru care factorii şi organele menţionate au dreptul să solicite aceste adeverinţe.

Ministerul Federal de Interne este obligat să satisfacă operativ aceste cereri.

 Paragraful VIII

Cetăţenii care au împlinit 18 ani au dreptul să ceară Ministerului Federal de Interne eliberarea de adeverinţe, conform paragrafului II, alin. 1, lit. a), b) şi c).

 Paragraful IX

Adeverinţa eliberată de Ministerul Federal de Interne este înmânată cetăţeanului. Această practică nu se foloseşte la adeverinţele solicitate conform paragrafului VII.

 Paragraful X

Adeverinţele şi datele cuprinse în acestea nu constituie secrete pentru scopurile urmărite de această lege şi pentru justiţie.

 Paragraful XI

Pentru verificarea datelor prevăzute la paragraful II, alin 1, lit. c) – g), se înfiinţează, pe lângă Ministerul Federal de Interne, o comisie independentă, având un preşedinte, vicepreşedinte şi membri.

Preşedintele şi vicepreşedintele sunt numiţi şi revocaţi de către Prezidiul Adunării Federale din rândul cetăţenilor care nu sunt deputaţi în Adunarea Federală.

 Paragraful XII

1.     Comisia poate dezbate un caz numai dacă sunt prezenţi preşedintele sau vicepreşedintele şi cel puţin 7 membri. Dezbaterile comisiei nu sunt publice.

2.     Cetăţeanului la care se referă dezbaterea trebuie să i se ofere posibilitatea de a cunoaşte toate dovezile, inclusiv materialele scrise privind persoana sa. În timpul dezbaterilor, cetăţeanului trebuie să i se creeze condiţii pentru a-şi expune opiniile cu privire la toate problemele care îl privesc.

Paragraful XIII

Comisia îşi începe dezbaterile, pe baza propunerii care:

a)    Poate fi făcută de cetăţeanul care a primit adeverinţa prin care este informat că face parte din persoanele menţionate la paragraful II, alin. 1, lit. c);

b)    Poate fi prezentată de un cetăţean care afirmă că nu este justă „declaraţia – pe cuvânt de onoare” a cetăţeanului care deţine una din funcţiile prevăzute la paragraful I;

c)     Poate fi făcută de organizaţia care se îndoieşte de veridicitatea „declaraţiei – pe cuvânt de onoare” a cetăţeanului care ar urma să deţină una din funcţiile menţionate la paragraful I.

În 60 de zile de la depunerea cererii, comisia prezintă dovada de constatare dacă cetăţeanul respectiv este una din persoanele menţionate la paragraful II, alin. 1, lit. c) – g).

Dacă în dovada de constatare se arată că cetăţeanul respectiv nu este persoana menţionată la paragraful I, alin. 1, lit. c), acest lucru se consemnează în toate evidenţele care rămân valabile în continuare pentru cetăţeanul în cauză.

 Paragraful XIV

Dacă un cetăţean nu îndeplineşte condiţiile pentru deţinerea funcţiei prevăzute la paragraful II, organizaţia la care este încadrat îi întrerupe contractul de muncă în 15 zile de la data când a aflat acest lucru, dacă cetăţeanul nu este transferat într-o altă funcţie decât aceea menţionată la paragraful I.

 Paragraful XV

Dacă procurorii sau anchetatorii procuraturii nu îndeplinesc condiţiile prevăzute la paragraful II pentru exercitarea funcţiei, li se întrerupe contractul de muncă.

 Paragraful XVI

În condiţiile prevăzute la paragraful XIV, alin. 1, organul competent propune suspendarea din funcţie a judecătorilor.

 Paragraful XVIII

Dacă un cetăţean constată că cele afirmate la adresa lui sunt nejuste, poate cere tribunalului să reexamineze conţinutul celor constatate, în termen de două luni de la primirea constatării. Este abilitat să reexamineze această constatare tribunalul regional de care aparţine cetăţeanul în cauză.

 Paragraful XIX

Este interzisă publicarea, fără acordul prealabil scris al cetăţeanului în cauză, a datelor menţionate în adeverinţa eliberată sau în dovada de constatare, publicarea adeverinţei şi a dovezii de constatare, precum şi a altor date folosite pentru redactarea acestora.

 Paragraful XX

Persoana, care în calitate de martor, cunoscător al situaţiei sau interpret, spune neadevăruri privind cazul în speţă, va fi pedepsită cu privarea de libertate până la trei ani sau cu amendă.

 Paragraful XXIII

Prezenta lege intră în vigoare la data promulgării şi îşi încetează activitatea la 31 decembrie 1996.

REPUBLICA ALBANIA

ADUNAREA POPULARĂ

 LEGE

 Nr. 8001, din 22.09.1995

 Pentru genocid şi crimele împotriva omenirii făcute în Albania pe durata dominaţiei comuniste pentru motive politice, ideologice şi religioase

 În temeiul art. 16 din legea nr. 7491, de la data de 29.04.1991 „Pentru dispoziţii principale constituţionale”, art. 1, 3, 6, 18 din legea nr. 7692, de la data de 31.03.1993 „Pentru un supliment la dispoziţiile principale constituţionale” , şi al art. 67 şi 74 din Codul Penal al Republicii Albania, având în vedere dorinţa de a accelera cazurile penale care se leagă cu crime împotriva umanităţii pentru motive politice, ideologice, sociale şi religioase, organizat şi aplicat de statul comunist în contrasens cu drepturile şi libertăţile fundamentale ale omului, prin violul fizic şi psihic, montarea, falsificarea sau manipularea datelor, aducându-se ca rezultat uciderea, închisoarea, deportarea şi expulzarea, ca şi dărâmarea masivă a instituţiilor şi obiectelor de cult

 ADUNAREA POPULARĂ A REPUBLICII ALBANIEI

A HOTĂRÂT

 Articolul 1

Organele Parchetului, în concordanţă cu dispoziţiile penale şi procedurale, se însărcinează de a iniţia imediat şi cu precedenta investigaţie activităţi care se leagă cu crimele împotriva omenirii aplicate în Albania pe durata dominaţiei comuniste pentru motive politice, ideologice şi religioase.

 Articolul 2

Autorii activităţii prevăzute în articolul 1 al acestei legi vor fi investigaţi şi judecaţi conform Codului de astăzi al Procedurii Penale.

 Articolul 3

Nu pot fi aleşi după aceasta la organele centrale şi locale ale puterii şi nici nu pot să fie numiţi în administraţia înaltă a statului, în sistemul judiciar şi în mass-media, până la 31 decembrie 2001, autorii, iniţiatorii şi executorii crimelor mai sus menţionate, care au fost până la 31 martie 1991: foşti membri ai Comitetului Politic Executiv (Biroul Politic în Albania)) şi ai Comitetului Central al PMA (Partidul Muncitoresc Albanez) şi ai PCA (Partidul Comunist Albanez), foşti miniştri şi foşti deputaţi ai Adunării Populare, foşti membri ai Consiliului Prezidenţial, foşti şefi ai Curţii Supreme, foşti procurori generali, foşti prim-secretari ai judeţelor, foşti angajaţi ai Securităţii Statului, foşti colaboratori ai Securităţii Statului, ca şi denunţătorii martori împotriva inculpaţilor la procesele politice, cu excepţia cazurilor când au acţionat împotriva liniei oficiale şi s-au retras singuri în mod public.

 Articolul 4

Se obligă Consiliul Miniştrilor de a derula actele legale şi de a aproba actele care decurg până la 15 decembrie 1995.

 Articolul 5

Această lege va intra în vigoare imediat.

 Decretat prin decretul nr. 1221 din 26.09.1995 al preşedintelui Republicii Albania, Sali Berisha.

 traducere neoficială

Ungaria

Legea XXVIII din anul 1994 privind controlul unor persoane care îndeplinesc funcţii importante şi Oficiul Istoric

 Pentru sprijinirea transparenţei vieţii statale democratice, Parlamentul adoptă prezenta lege:

Paragraful 1. – Este necesar să se controleze dacă persoanele prevăzute la Paragraful 2:

a)    au îndeplinit serviciul militar, în calitate de ofiţer deschis sau „strict conspirat” la Divizia III/III a M.I., la secţiile III/III a Direcţiei Generale de Poliţie a Capitalei sau ale direcţiilor de poliţie judeţene, respectiv la predecesoarele lor (Secţia de Poliţie Politică a Direcţiei Generale de Poliţie Budapesta a Poliţiei Maghiare de Stat, Secţia de Apărare a Statului a Poliţiei Maghiare de Stat, Autoritatea de Apărare a Statului a Ministerului de Interne, unităţile organice de luptă împotriva „Reacţiunii interne” ale Autorităţii de Apărare a Statului, Secţia IV de luptă împotriva reacţiunii interne din cadrul Ministerului de Interne, Secţia V de luptă împotriva reacţiunii interne a Direcţiei Generale de Anchete Politice din cadrul Ministerului de Interne); sau,

b)    au efectuat activităţi în folosul organelor enumerate la punctul a), şi anume:

-         dacă au semnat declaraţie de acceptare a unor însărcinări în cadrul unei reţele şi dacă au întocmit rapoarte, respectiv,

-         dacă au primit din partea acestor organizaţii drepturi băneşti, premii, înlesniri şi dacă au semnat declaraţie despre acceptarea unor însărcinări în cadrul unei reţele şi dacă au elaborat rapoarte, respectiv,

-         dacă figurează în evidenţele de reţea ale organelor enumerate la punctul a) şi dacă au primit de la aceste organizaţii drepturi băneşti, premii, înlesniri sau dacă au elaborat rapoarte, sau,

c)     dacă au îndeplinit în anii 1956 – 1957 serviciu în unităţile de menţinere a ordinei;

d)    dacă au îndeplinit funcţii politice sau de stat în care, pentru elaborarea deciziilor lor, au primit informări despre informaţii ce ţineau de însărcinările organelor definite la punctul a).

Paragraful 1/A. – Din punctul de vedere al executării prevederilor prezentei legi:

1.     Prin document şi evidenţă (în continuare, împreună: decument) trebuie înţeles documentul astfel cum este el definit prin Paragraful 3. lit. c) a Legii LXVI din anul 1995 (în continuare: Ltv) privind documentele publice, arhivele publice şi protecţia materialului din arhivele private.

2.     Persoană în cauză: orice persoană ale cărei informaţii personale figurează cu orice titlu în documentele aflate sub incidenţa legii.

 Paragraful 2. – (1) Controlul definit prin Paragraful 1. – cu excepţiile prevăzute în alineatul (2) – se extinde asupra tuturor persoanelor obligate la jurământ în faţa Parlamentului sau a preşedintelui republicii, respectiv la cele alese de Parlament.

(2) Controlul nu se extinde asupra acelor persoane ce îndeplinesc funcţii prevăzute în alineatele (1), (3) şi (4) şi care s-au născut după data de 14 februarie 1972.

(3) Controlul persoanelor prevăzute în alineatul (1) trebuie efectuat în următoarea ordine:

1. deputaţii

2. preşedintele republicii

3. membrii Guvernului

4. preşedintele şi vicepreşedinţii Curţii de Conturi

5. comisarul parlamentar al drepturilor cetăţeneşti şi adjunctul lui, comisarul parlamentar al drepturilor minorităţilor naţionale şi etnice, comisarul pentru protecţia informaţiilor

6. membrii Curţii Constituţionale

7. preşedintele Curţii Supreme de Justiţie

8. procurorul general

9. secretarii de stat

10. vicepreşedintele Curţii Supreme de Justiţie

11. adjuncţii procurorului general

12. preşedintele şi vicepreşedinţii Băncii Naţionale a Ungariei, membrii Consiliului de Emisie Monetară

13. preşedintele şi vicepreşedinţii Consiliului de Concurenţă Economică

14. preşedintele şi vicepreşedinţii Radiodifuziunii Ungare şi a Televiziunii Ungare, directorul general al Agenţiei Telegrafice Ungare

15. persoanele prevăzute în alineatul (1), care nu au fost enumerate la punctele 1 – 14.

(4) Controlul preşedintelui Oficiului Istoric şi a adjunctului lui trebuie efectuat înainte de numirea lor. Controlul angajaţilor Oficiului Istoric, la cererea scrisă a preşedintelui, trebuie efectuată în afara ordinii stabilite anterior.

 Paragraful 3. – În ceea ce priveşte demnităţile prevăzute la Paragraful 2. alineatul (3), controlul trebuie efectuat pe baza unei liste nominale, în ordine alfabetică a numelui, aptă de a permite identificarea, listă ce va fi elaborată de comisia prevăzută în Paragraful 5.

 Paragraful 4. – Abrogată de Hotărârea Curţii Constituţionale 60/1994 (24.XII). Abrogată de la 24.XII.1996

 Paragraful 5. – (1) Controlul este efectuat de o comisie compusă din doi sau mai mulţi – trei – judecători. Comisiile constau din judecători numiţi de către Parlament, la propunerea Comisiei pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului, cu aprobarea preşedintelui Curţii Supreme de Justiţie, pentru o perioadă determinată de către Parlament.

(2) În cazul în care un membru al comisiei este în imposibilitatea de a se achita de misiune, Parlamentul, conform procedurii prevăzute la alineatul (1) alege un nou membru. După dispariţia motivului care a dus la imposibilitatea de a se achita de misiune, însărcinarea noului membru al comisiei ia sfârşit.

(3) Judecătorul nominalizat ca membru al comisiei trebuie să-şi manifeste acordul pentru a fi propus.

(4) Judecătorul ales ca membru al comisiei nu poate judeca, raportul lui de serviciu fiind suspendat până la sfârşitul însărcinării. Perioada în care acest raport este suspendat se consideră a fi perioadă de serviciu.

(5) Comisia pentru controlul unor persoane care îndeplinesc funcţii importante figurează în bugetul general al statului la capitolul „Parlament”, subcapitolul „Organele Parlamentului”. În privinţa raporturilor de muncă ale membrilor comisiei se aplică prevederile Legii XXIII din anul 1992 privind statutul funcţionarilor publici (în continuare (Ktv), astfel încât membrul comisiei are dreptul la un salariu lunar echivalent cu de nouă ori baza de calcul a salariilor determinată prin legea anuală a bugetului, precum şi la un concediu suplimentar de cincisprezece zile lucrătoare. Drepturile patronale în privinţa membrilor comisiei sunt exercitate de către preşedintele Parlamentului.

(6) Membrii comisiei sunt independenţi şi subordonaţi exclusiv legii. Nici un membru al comisiei nu poate fi tras la răspundere în faţa unei instanţe sau altei autorităţi pentru fapte comunicate sau opinii exprimate în cursul îndeplinirii însărcinării, ceea ce nu scuteşte de obligaţia respectării normelor lagale referitoare la protecţia secretelor şi a informaţiilor personale.

 Paragraful 6. – (1) Ca membru al comisiei poate fi nominalizat doar un judecător, care nu a efectuat activităţi prevăzute la paragraful 1. şi nu a participat la elaborarea de sentinţe care au fost desfiinţate pe baza Legii XXXVI din anul 1989, privind repararea condamnărilor legate de răscoala populară din 1956, a Legii XXVI din anul 1990, privind desfiinţarea condamnărilor ilegale din perioada 1945 – 1963 şi a Legii XI din anul 1992, privind desfiinţarea condamnărilor pentru unele infracţiuni împotriva statului şi a ordinii publice, pronunţate în perioada 1963 – 1989.

(2) Înainte de a fi nominalizat, judecătorul în cauză trebuie să dea o declaraţie scrisă, în care să arate dacă a efectuat activităţi prevăzute în Paragraful 1., respectiv dacă a participat la elaborarea de sentinţe prevăzute în alineatul (1).

 Paragraful 7. – Controlul judecătorului nominalizat pentru a deveni membru al comisiei se efectuează de către Comisia pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului.

 Paragraful 8. – (1) Controlul definit de prezenta lege trebuie efectuat pe baza actelor care se referă la activităţile definite în Paragraful 1.

(2) Comisia, respectiv Comisia pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului, pe durata controlului prevăzut în Paragraful 7. poate studia, cu respectarea normelor legale privitoare la protecţia secretelor şi a informaţiilor personale, dar fără alte limitări, documentele referitoare la persoanele controlate, aflate în administrarea Oficiului Istoric, precum şi pe cele păzite la Ministerul de Interne până la predarea lor către Oficiul Istoric, încheiate până la data de 14 februarie 1990, respectiv poate cere acestor instituţii îndeplinirea obligaţiei de furnizare de informaţii.

(3) Ministrul de interne, ministrul apărării patriei şi ministrul fără portofoliu, însărcinat cu coordonarea serviciilor secrete, în propria sferă de competenţă, respectiv din documentele administrate de organele aflate sub controlul sau direcţia lui, este obligat să furnizeze informaţii, respectiv să permită studiul acestor documente comisiei, respectiv Comisiei pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului în ceea ce priveşte informaţiile şi documentele referitoare la persoanele controlate, astfel cum aceste informaţii şi documente sunt definite în Paragraful 1.

(4) Comisia, respectiv Comisia pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului, în vederea stabilirii identităţii şi a domiciliului persoanei controlate sau audiate în calitate de martor, poate cere informaţii referitoare la nume şi domiciliu din documentele definite în alineatul (3), respectiv din evidenţa datelor personale şi a domiciliilor cetăţenilor.

(5) Comisia, respectiv Comisia pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului, în privinţa persoanei controlate poate studia orice document referitor la cele definite în Paragraful 1.

(6) Membrii comisiei sunt îndreptăţiţi să ia cunoştinţă de toate acele informaţii calificate care se referă la activitatea definită în Paragraful 1. a persoanelor enumerate în Paragraful 2. şi să consulte documente ce conţin astfel de informaţii, cu respectarea normelor legale privitoare la nedivulgarea şi protecţia informaţiilor calificate. Persoanei audiate ca martor de către comisie – în ceea ce priveşte informaţiile necesare pentru control -, organul care a calificat informaţia nu îi poate refuza autorizaţia de divulgare a secretului de stat.

 Paragraful 9. – Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

 Paragraful 10. – Pe durata procedurii comisiei – dacă prezenta lege nu dispune altfel – se vor aplica prevederile Legii IV din anul 1957, privind regulile generale de procedură administrativă.

(2) Comisia anunţă persoana controlată în scris, neîntârziat, despre declanşarea procedurii de control şi totodaă îi comunică faptul că, la data menţionată în comunicare poate apărea în faţa comisiei pentru prezentarea propriului punct de vedere, respectiv că poate înainta comisiei în scris propriul punct de vedere. Până la o dată ce precede cu cel puţin 15 zile data prevăzută în comunicare, comisia informează persoana controlată despre informaţiile referitoare la activitatea definită în Paragraful 1., respectiv despre inexistenţa unor astfel de informaţii.

(3) Până la data prevăzută în comunicarea comisiei, persoana controlată are dreptul ca în termen de 15 zile să solicite comisiei un nou termen pentru prezentarea în faţa comisiei, respectiv pentru înaintarea punctului de vedere în scris.

(4) Dacă persoana controlată nu apare în faţa comisiei şi nici nu îşi prezintă punctul de vedere în scris, potrivit alineatului (2), comisia ia decizia prevăzută în Paragraful 14. pe baza documentelor aflate la dispoziţia ei.

 Paragraful 11. – (1) Dacă persoana controlată dovedeşte că nu îndeplineşte vreo funcţie din cele enumerate la Paragraful 2, ori a demisionat sau a cerut eliberarea din funcţie, controlul trebuie oprit imediat. Comisia anunţă neîntârziat persoana controlată despre oprirea controlului.

(2) Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

 Paragraful 12. – Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineartul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

 Paragraful 13. – Şedinţa comisiei este secretă, la ea poate participa, în afara membrilor comisiei, numai persoana controlată, respectiv reprezentantul ei împuternicit în scris, precum şi persoana citată de comisie pentru data stabilită conform Paragrafului 10., alineatele (2) şi (3).

 Paragraful 14. – Ca rezultat al controlului, prin decizie, comisia hotărăşte dacă persoana controlată a efectuat sau nu activităţi de felul celor stabilite în Paragraful 1. 

 Paragraful 15. – În decizia ei, comisia menţionează acele informaţii pe care şi-a bazat decizia şi le comunică neîntârziat persoanei controlate.

 Paragraful 16. – Comisia pronunţă deciziile prin vot secret, cu majoritatea voturilor.

 Paragraful 17. – Comisia stabileşte celelalte reguli ale propriei activităţi.

 Paragraful 18. – (1) Dacă în conformitate cu decizia comisiei, persoana controlată a efectuat activităţi de felul celor definite prin Paragraful 1., comisia îi solicită să demisioneze, respectiv să-şi ceară eliberarea din funcţie, în termen de 30 de zile, comunicându-i totodată că va face publică decizia după cea de a 15-a zi, calculată de la a 30-a scursă după pronunţarea deciziei. Comisia atrage atenţia persoanei controlate asupra faptului că împotriva deciziei se poate adresa justiţiei şi poate cere desfiinţarea ei. Dacă persoana controlată se adresează justiţiei introducând apel împotriva deciziei, instanţa procedează la judecarea cazului în afara ordinii stabilite. Şedinţa de judecată – dacă nici o altă măsură nu este necesară – trebuie stabilită pentru cel târziu a 30-a zi de la primirea de către instanţă a cererii formulate de către reclamant. Nu se poate introduce apel în privinţa celor conţinute în decizie, pentru lezarea drepturilor legate de persoană.

(2) Dacă persoana controlată nu demisionează sau nu îşi cere eliberarea din funcţie în termen de 30 de zile de la primirea deciziei care conţine solicitarea definită în alineatul (1), respectiv de la comunicarea sentinţei definitive de respingere a apelului împotriva deciziei, după cea de a 15-a zi de la împlinirea celor 30 de zile comisa face publică decizia ei, prin publicarea în Partea Personală a Monitorului Maghiar, respectiv o transmite Agenţiei Telegrafice Maghiare pentru a fi făcută publică.

 Paragraful 19. – (1) Persoana controlată poate face apel împotriva deciziei la Tribunalul Capitalei, în termen de 15 zile de la comunicarea acesteia.

(2) Procedura judecătorească va urma regulile referitoare la controlul judecătoresc (C. proc. civ. Capitolul XX).

(3) Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

(4) Introducerea apelului suspendă publicarea deciziei.

(5) Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

(6) Tribunalul comunică sentinţa definitivă comisiei.

(7) Tribunalul judecă apelul în şedinţă secretă.

 Paragraful 20. – (1) Dacă persoana controlată este solicitată să demisioneze sau să-şi ceară eliberarea din funcţie, dar în termen de 30 de zile de la comunicarea deciziei, respectiv în cazul procedurii judecătoreşti prevăzute la paragraful 19., în termen de 30 de zile de la comunicarea sentinţei definitive de respingere a apelului persoana controlată demisionează sau îşi cere eliberarea din funcţie şi despre acest fapt informează comisia în mod credibil în termen de 15 zile de la scurgerea celor 30 de zile, comisia nu face publică decizia ei.

(2) Comisia nu face publică decizia dacă, în urma procedurii judecătoreşti prevăzute la Paragraful 19, decizia a fost desfiinţată prin sentinţă definitivă.

 Paragraful 21. – Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1) Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996 .

 Paragraful 22. - Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

 Paragraful 23. (1) Comisia predă Oficiului Istoric, în termen de 30 de zile de la rămânerea definitivă a deciziei, respectiv a sentinţei judecătoreşti, documentele elaborate în cursul procedurii de control, câte un exemplar din decizie, din sentinţa judecătorească definitivă, precum şi din actele care atestă că persoana controlată a demisionat sau a cerut eliberarea din funcţie; Oficiul Istoric păzeşte şi administrează aceste documente în conformitate cu regulile stabilite de prezenta lege.

(2) Documentele aflate la baza procedurii comisiei – după scurgerea termenului prevăzut de alineatul (1) – trebuie retrocedate organului care le-a furnizat, care urmează să le administreze în conformitate cu regulile ce îl privesc.

(3) Documentele referitoare la activităţile definite în Paragraful 1. din prezenta lege nu pot fi casate.

 Paragraful 24. – Cheltuielile de funcţionare a comisiei, precum şi, legat de aceasta, cele apărute la organele stabilite prin Paragraful 8. al prezentei legi, ca urmare a studierii unor documente, respectiv a furnizării de informaţii, trebuie acoperite din bugetul central.

 Paragraful 25. – Abrogat prin Legea LXVII din anul 1996, Paragraful 16, alineatul (1). Abrogat din data de 31 august 1996.

 Paragraful 25/A. – (1) Oficiul Istoric păzeşte şi administrează:

a)    documentele elaborate de organizaţiile stabilite de Paragraful 1., punctul a) din prezenta lege şi, de asemenea, de către fosta Secţie Externă a MI, fosta Secţie Relaţii Internaţionale a MI, fosta Secţie de Securitate Internă şi fosta Secţie de Informaţii a Pazei de Graniţă din MI şi, de asemenea, documentele proprii, elaborate de către fosta Secţie de Evidenţă Operativă a Securităţii Statului, dacă aceste documente, la data intrării în vigoare a prezentei legi, nu sunt necesare Ministerului de Interne, Ministerului Apărării Patriei ş,i organelor lor sau serviciilor de siguranţă naţională pentru satisfacerea însărcinărilor prevăzute de normele legale în vigoare.

b)    alte documente ale fostei Divizii III din MI şi predecesoarelor ei, precum şi acele documente ale fostului Departamenmt de Informaţii al Statului Major al Armatei Populare din Ministerul Apărării Patriei şi a predecesorilor lui, care nu pot fi administrate – din cauza informaţiilor conţinute în ele – în vederea îndeplinirii misiunilor stabilite prin lege, de către serviciile de siguranţă naţională, precum şi

c)     documentele elaborate în urma procedurii comisiei stabilite conform Paragrafului 5. din prezenta lege.

 Paragraful 25/B. – (1) Oficiul Istoric este condus de un preşedinte.

(2) Preşedintele şi vicepreşedintele Oficiului Istoric sunt numiţi, respectiv eliberaţi din funcţie de către preşedintele republicii, pe baza propunerii primului ministru. Înainte de numire, persoanele propuse sunt audiate de Comisia pentru Siguranţă Naţională a Parlamentului, Comisia Juridică pentru Problemele Minorităţilor şi Afaceri Religioase, respectiv Comisia de Cultură şi Presă. Mandatul are o durată de şapte ani şi poate fi reînnoit o singură dată.

(3) Mandatul preşedintelui şi al vicepreşedintelui Oficiului Istoric ia sfârşit:

a) la scurgerea termenului legal,

b) prin demisie,

c) la moartea titularului,

d) prin eliberarea din funcţie de către preşedintele republicii, la propunerea primului ministru.

(4) Eliberarea din funcţie este obligatorie dacă preşedintele (vicepreşedintele):

a) devine nedemn sau incompatibil cu funcţia lui,

b) nu a declarat sau nu a eliminat motivul de incompatibilitate.

(5) Trebuie considerat ca nedemn pentru a îndeplini funcţia pe acel preşedinte (vicepreşedinte) care este condamnat pentru săvârşirea unei infracţiuni cu intenţie prin hotărâre definitivă a unei instanţe.

(6) Preşedintele (vicepreşedintele) poate fi considerat incapabil de a-şi îndeplini funcţia dacă:

a) din motive de sănătate nu îşi poate satisface îndatoririle de serviciu pentru o perioadă continuă de peste 90 de zile,

b) nu îşi satisface îndatoririle de serviciu din motive ce îi sunt imputabile lui.

 Paragraful 25/C. – (1) Nu poate fi preşedinte (vicepreşedinte) al Oficiului Istoric persoana care, într-un răstimp de zece ani înainte de data numirii, a fost membru al guvernului, secretar de stat, membru sau angajat într-un organ de conducere la nivel naţional al unui partid politic. Nu poate fi preşedinte (vicepreşedinte) al Oficiului Istoric nici persoana care a fost în serviciul fostei Divizii III a MI sau a predecesoarelor acesteia, ori a primit rapoartele acestora, respectiv a fost membru în formaţiunile de ordine publică în perioada 1956 – 1957 sau în Partidul „Crucea cu Săgeţi”.

(2) Preşedintele (vicepreşedintele) Oficiului Istoric nu poate exercita o profesiune remunerată, nu poate fi membru în conducerea unei societăţi comerciale sau în comisia de cenzori. Se exceptă de la prevederile prezentului alineat activităţile ştiinţifice, artistice şi cele ce cad sub incidenţa normelor de protecţie a dreptului de autor.

(3) Apariţia unui motiv de incompatibilitate trebuie anunţat neîntârziat primului ministru. Motivul de incompatibilitate trebuie eliminat în termen de 30 de zile de la numire, respectiv de la apariţia ei.

 Paragraful 25/D. – (1) Preşedintele Oficiului Istoric stabileşte propriul program, respectiv programul vicepreşedintelui, precum şi propria perioadă de concediu, ca şi perioada de concediu a vicepreşedintelui.

(2) În alte situaţii, preşedintelui Oficiului Istoric i se aplică regulile referitoare la secretarii de stat administrativi, iar vicepreşedintelui regulile referitoare la secretarii de stat adjuncţi, cu menţiunea că drepturile patronale, cu excepţiile prevăzute de prezenta lege, sunt exercitate de către primul ministru.

(3) Colaboratorilor Oficiului Istoric li se aplică dispoziţiile din Ktv.

 Paragraful 25/E. – (1) Atribuţiile Oficiului Istoric:

a)    cu limitările prevăzute de prezenta lege, asigură celor în cauză exercitarea dreptului de a lua cunoştinţă despre informaţiile referitoare la ei;

b)    asigură furnizarea către comisia definită prin Paragraful 5. al prezentei legi, respectiv către Comisia pentru Siguranţa Naţională a Parlamentului (Paragraful 7.), de informaţii şi documente necesare pentru desfăşurarea procedurii prevăzute în prezenta lege;

c)     cu condiţiile prevăzute în prezenta lege, asigură desfăşurarea activităţii de cercetare;

d)    asigură respectarea normelor de protecţie a secretelor în privinţa informaţiilor calificate pe baza Legii LXV din anul 1995, privind secretul de stat şi secretul de serviciu;

e)     efectuează activităţile definite prin Ltv. Paragraful 13., literele b) – d);

f)      se îngrijeşte de conservarea şi restaurarea materialului arhivistic deteriorat sau pe cale de a se distruge, execută sau pune să fie executate copii de siguranţă despre acestea, respectiv despre materialul arhivistic de importanţă deosebită;

g)    în cadrul diviziunii muncii ştiinţifice, ia parte la publicarea materialului arhivistic păstrat de ea.

(2) Materialului păstrat de Oficiul Istoric i se aplică regulile din Ltv., cu abaterile prevăzute în prezenta lege:

a) asupra documentelor păstrate de Oficiul Istoric nu se aplică prevederile Paragrafului 6., Paragrafului 12., Paragrafului 22., alineatul (1), Paragrafului 23, precum şi a Paragrafului 28 din Ltv, iar cele ale Paragrafului 24. trebuie aplicate în modul prevăzut de prezenta lege.

b) documentele enumerate în Paragraful 25/A alineatul (1) pot fi casate doar după intrarea lor în fondul Oficiului Istoric, cu permisiunea arhivei de origine. Informaţii cuprinse în documente pot fi şterse doar în cazul în care instanţa ordonă astfel, pe parcursul procedurii de protecţie a secretelor, respectiv, dacă persoana în cauză cere acest lucru, conform Paragrafului 25/G alineatul (3) din prezenta lege.

 Paragraful 25/G. – (1) Persoana în cauză poate lua la cunoştinţă informaţiile referitoare la ea, aflate în documentele administrate de Oficiul Istoric. În documentele prezentate, orice dată aptă de a identifica o altă persoană trebuie făcută ilizibilă.

(2) Persoana în cauză îşi poate exercita dreptul de corectare a informaţiilor referitoare la ea din documentele prezentate prin conexarea la documentul original lăsat neatins, a unei note, care cuprinde informaţiile corecte.

(3) După data de 30 iunie 2000, orice persoană care figurează în documentele administrate de Oficiul Istoric, indiferent de motivele pentru care apare acolo, poate cere ştergerea informaţiilor personale. Nu se pot şterge informaţii personale din documente considerate conform dispoziţiilor Ltv. ca fiind de valoare perenă, dar persoana în cauză, prin declaraţie scrisă, poate interzice pe o durată de maximum 90 de ani de la naşterea  informaţiei, cercetare prevăzută în alineatul (4) a acelei informaţii, care a fost realizată prin mijloace, respectiv metode de informare secrete şi care nu se referă la activitatea publică, socială, politică a persoanei în cauză sau – dacă persoana în cauză a acţionat în domeniul de competenţă al unui organ de stat – nu este o dată personală legată de atribuţiile ei.

(4) Asupra cercetării informaţiilor personale din documentele păzite de Oficiul Istoric se aplică prevederile Paragrafului 24. din Ltv, cu următoarele abateri:

a) informaţia personală, realizată prin mijloace sau metode de informare secrete nu poate fi cercetată nici dacă această informaţie nu a fost calificată în virtutea Ttv., respectiv dacă publicarea ei nu este interzisă de vreo dispoziţie legală, cu excepţia situaţiilor când:

- cercetarea poate fi efectuată şi cu o copie anonimizată, realizată pe cheltuiala cercetătorului,

- s-a împlinit termenul de interzicere a cercetării, stabilit de persoana în cauză conform alineatului (3), respectiv, în absenţa unei interdicţii, s-au împlinit condiţiile prevăzute de Paragraful 24. alineatul (1) din Ltv.,

- persoana în cauză, respectiv după moartea acesteia, oricare moştenitor sau membru de familie autorizează cercetarea,

- data se referă la apariţia publică, respectiv activitatea socială, politică a persoanei în cauză ori este o informaţie personală, legată de atribuţiile de serviciu ale unei persoane care a acţionat în domeniul de competenţă al unui organ de stat, iar de la crearea informaţiei au trecut 15 ani, cu condiţia ca respectiva informaţie să fie necesară scopului ştiinţific al cercetării şi au fost realizate prevederile Paragrafului 24., alineatele (3) şi (4) din Ltv;

b) informaţiile prevăzute în Paragraful 2., punctul (2) din Avtv, pe o perioadă de 90 de ani de la intrarea în vigoare a legii, pot fi cercetate doar cu permisiunea persoanei în cauză, respectiv după moartea acesteia, cu permisiunea oricărui moştenitor sau membru de familie, cu excepţia informaţiilor referitoare la antecedente penale;

c) informaţiile necalificate sau a căror publicare nu este interzisă de lege pot fi, de asemenea, cercetate şi publicate numai după împlinirea termenelor prevăzute de Paragraful 24, alineatul (1) din Ltv., dacă ele conţin numele şi informaţiile naturale de identificare a ofiţerilor „strict conspiraţi”, respectiv a persoanelor din reţelele fostelor organe de securitatea statului şi a predecesoarelor lor.

(5) Nu se pot autoriza cercetări, într-o perioadă de 30 de ani de la intrarea în vigoare a legii, cu excepţia celor prevăzute în alineatul (4) şi în Paragraful 25/F, alineatul (3). În afara studierii documentelor, prevăzute de Paragraful 25/G alineatul (1), respectiv în afara furnizării de informaţii prevăzute de Paragraful 25/F alineatul (1), punctul b), studiul documentelor, respectiv furnizarea de informaţii din ele, poate avea loc doar pentru instanţă sau autoritatea de urmărire penală, după caz, în cadrul unor proceduri judecătoreşti referitoare la realizarea drepturilor legale a persoanelor în cauză, respectiv în cadrul procedurilor penale puse în mişcare pentru infracţiuni ce pot fi sancţionate cu privare de libertate pe o durată mai mare de cinci ani şi care nu au fost prescrise. Cu excepţiile de mai sus, din arhivele Oficiului Istoric nu pot fi transmise sau publicate informaţii şi nici nu pot fi scoase din ţară.

(6) Pe baza avizului anterior al Parlamentului, respectiv al comisiei de specialitate ori, în cazuri ce necesită măsuri urgente, cu informarea lor ulterioară, serviciile de siguranţă naţională, Ministerul Apărării Patriei, Ministerul de Interne şi colaboratorii organelor acestora pot consulta documentele, dacă acest lucru este necesar pentru executarea îndatoririlor legale în scopul apărării siguranţei naţionale, a apărării patriei sau a prevenirii unor infracţiuni.

 Paragraful 25/H. – (1) Documentele elaborate înainte de 1980, supuse prevederilor Paragrafului 25/A alineatul (1), trebuie păstrate separat după efectuarea controlului privind apărarea secretului prevăzut în Paragraful 28., alineatul (2) din Ttv. şi trebuie transmise Oficiului Istoric în termen de 60 de zile de la începerea funcţionării acesteia.

(2) Documentele elaborate după data prevăzută în alineatul (1), supuse prevederilor Paragrafului 25/A., alineatul (1), trebuie transmise Oficiului Istoric în termen de 60 de zile de la efectuarea controlului privind apărarea secretului prevăzut în Paragraful 28., alineatul (2) din Ttv., dar nu mai târziu de 28 februarie 2000.

(3) Pe parcursul transferului de documente către Oficiul Istoric trebuie asigurate condiţiile de funcţionare a comisiei prevăzute în Paragraful 5.

(4) Nu pot fi transmise Oficiului Istoric acele documente care, împreună, conţin informaţiile prevăzute în Paragraful 25/A alineatul 1, respectiv informaţiile necesare organelor transmiţătoare pentru desfăşurarea continuă şi netulburată a activităţilor prevăzute de dispoziţiile legale, în cazul în care separaţia tehnică ar face imposibilă refacerea documentului în starea lui iniţială.

(5) Documentele elaborate pe parcursul activităţii comisiei – inclusiv documentele elaborate de Tribunalul Capitalei pe parcursul procedurii prevăzute de Paragraful 19. – după rămânerea definitivă a deciziei trebuie transmise Oficiului Istoric continuu, dar cel târziu până la data de 31 decembrie 2000.

 Paragraful 26. – Membrilor cu statut „strict conspirat” ai Diviziei III (securitatea statului) din cadrul MI şi a predecesoarelor acesteia nu li se pot acorda veniturile suplimentare, cu considerarea pensiilor de serviciu stabilite pe baza relaţiilor de serviciu. Această dispoziţie nu atinge dreptul la pensie bazat pe raporturi de muncă.

 Paragraful 27. – (1) Cu excepţiile prevăzute în alineatul (2), această lege intră în vigoare la 1 iulie 1994.

(2) În ceea ce priveşte paragrafele 5 – 9, precum şi controlul membrilor comisiei stabilite conform Paragrafului 5., Paragraful 1. intră în vigoare la data promulgării legii.

(3) Această lege – cu excepţia Paragrafelor 24 – 26 – îşi pierde valabilitatea la 20 iunie 2000,

(4) În perioada de activitate a legii, în cazul celor ce îndeplinesc în mod repetat funcţii prevăzute în Paragraful 2, dacă controlul lor a fost efectuat mai devreme, acest control nu trebuie efectuat în cazul unei noi sesizări. În acest caz, comisia solicită persoanei controlate să demisioneze sau să-şi ceară eliberarea din funcţie pe baza deciziei anterioare. În privinţa măsurii de publicare a deciziei, comisia aplică termenele prevăzute în Paragrafele 18 şi 20, adaptate la situaţie.

(5) Controlul celor ce îndeplinesc funcţii prevăzute în Paragraful 2, la intrarea în vigoare a Legii LXVII din anul 1996, trebuie efectuat în decurs de un an de la intrarea în vigoare, iar controlul celor ce ocupă o funcţie după această dată trebuie efectuat după începerea activităţii lor.

1994. évi XXIII. törvény

egyes fontos, valamint közbizalmi és közvélemény-formáló tisztségeket betöltő személyek ellenőrzéséről és a Történeti Hivatalról

Az Országgyűlés a demokratikus államélet tisztaságának előmozdítása érdekében a következő törvényt alkotja:

1. § Ellenőrizni kell, hogy a 2. §-ban meghatározott személyek

a) hivatásos - nyílt vagy "szigorúan titkos" - állományú tisztként teljesítettek-e szolgálatot a volt BM III/III-as Csoportfőnökségnél, a budapesti vagy a megyei rendőr-főkapitányságok III/III-as osztályainál, illetve elődeiknél (a Magyar Államrendőrség Budapesti Főkapitányság Politikai Rendészeti Osztálya, a Magyar Államrendőrség Államvédelmi Osztályának, a Belügyminisztérium Államvédelmi Hatóságának, az Államvédelmi Hatóságnak a "Belső reakció" elhárításával foglalkozó szervezeti egységei, a Belügyminisztérium IV. Belső reakció elhárítási osztálya, a Belügyminisztérium Politikai Nyomozó Főosztály V. Belső reakció elleni harc osztálya); vagy

b) végeztek-e az a) pontban felsorolt szervek részére érdemi tevékenységet, azaz

- aláírták-e a hálózati feladatok vállalására vonatkozó nyilatkozatot, és adtak-e jelentést, illetve

- kaptak-e e szervezetektől illetményt, prémiumot, kedvezményt, és aláírtak-e hálózati feladatok vállalására vonatkozó nyilatkozatot, vagy adtak-e jelentést, illetve

- szerepelnek-e az a) pontban felsorolt szervek hálózati nyilvántartásában, és kaptak-e e szervezetektől illetményt, prémiumot, kedvezményt, vagy adtak-e jelentést, vagy

c) teljesítettek-e szolgálatot 1956-1957-ben karhatalmi alakulatban;

d) betöltöttek-e olyan politikai vagy állami tisztséget, amelyben az a) pontban meghatározott szervek feladatkörébe tartozó adatokról döntéseikhez tájékoztatást kaptak;

e) tagjai voltak-e a Nyilaskeresztes Pártnak.

1/A. § (1) E törvény alkalmazása szempontjából:

1. iraton és nyilvántartáson (a továbbiakban együtt: irat) a köziratokról, a közlevéltárakról és a magánlevéltári anyag védelméről szóló 1995. évi LXVI. törvény (a továbbiakban: Ltv.) 3. §-ának c) pontjában meghatározott iratot kell érteni;

2. érintett: minden olyan személy, akinek személyes adata a törvény hatálya alá tartozó iratokban bármilyen jogcímen szerepel;

3. megfigyelt személy: az a személy, akiről a 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) pontjában meghatározott szervezetek célzottan, nyílt vagy titkos információgyűjtés során adatokat gyűjtöttek;

4. hivatásos alkalmazott: az a személy, aki az e törvény hatálya alá tartozó szervezetekkel hivatásos szolgálati viszonyban állt, ideértve a "szigorúan titkos" állományú munkatársakat is;

5. hálózati személy: az a személy, aki az e törvény hatálya alá tartozó szervezetek számára a megfigyelt személyekről jelentést adott;

6. harmadik személy: minden más személy, akiről az e törvény hatálya alá tartozó szervezetek adatokat kezeltek;

7. hozzátartozó: a házastárs (amennyiben a házasság az irat keletkezésekor és az érintett halálakor is fennállt), az egyeneságbeli rokon, az örökbefogadott, a mostoha- és nevelt gyermek, az örökbefogadó, a mostoha- és nevelőszülő, a testvér.

(2) Minden egyes adattal kapcsolatosan külön kell megállapítani azt, hogy az érintett megfigyelt személynek, hivatásos alkalmazottnak, hálózati személynek vagy harmadik személynek minősül-e. Az érintett jogállását annak vizsgálata alapján kell megállapítani, hogy az adat felvétele milyen célt szolgált.

2. § (1) Az 1. §-ban meghatározott ellenőrzés - a (2) bekezdésben meghatározottak kivételével - az Országgyűlés vagy a köztársasági elnök előtt eskütételre kötelezett, illetve az Országgyűlés által megválasztott, valamint a (3) bekezdés 14-22. pontjában felsorolt személyekre terjed ki.

(2) Az ellenőrzés nem terjed ki azokra az (1), (3) és (5) bekezdésben meghatározott tisztséget betöltő személyekre, akik 1972. február 14. napja után születtek.

(3) Az (1) bekezdésben meghatározott személyek ellenőrzését az alábbi sorrend szerint kell elvégezni:

1. az országgyűlési képviselők,

2. a köztársasági elnök,

3. a Kormány tagjai,

4. az Állami Számvevőszék elnöke, alelnökei,

5. az állampolgári jogok országgyűlési biztosa és helyettese, a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosa, az adatvédelmi biztos,

6. az Alkotmánybíróság tagjai,

7. a Legfelsőbb Bíróság elnöke,

8. a Legfőbb Ügyész,

9. az államtitkárok,

10. a Legfelsőbb Bíróság elnökhelyettese,

11. a Legfőbb Ügyész helyettesei,

12. a Magyar Nemzeti Bank elnöke, alelnökei, a Jegybank Tanács tagjai,

13. a Gazdasági Versenyhivatal elnöke, alelnökei,

14. a Magyar Távirati Iroda Részvénytársaság vezérigazgatója és igazgatói,

15. a Magyar Rádió Részvénytársaság, a Magyar Televízió Részvénytársaság, a Duna Televízió Részvénytársaság elnökei, alelnökei, valamint valamennyi további - az 1996. évi I. törvény 2. §-ának 31. pontja szerinti - műsorszolgáltató elnöke és alelnöke, illetve annak megfelelő vezető tisztségviselői,

16. a rádiózásról és televíziózásról szóló 1996. évi I. törvény 2. §-ának 31. pontja szerinti műsorszolgáltatók azon főszerkesztői, főszerkesztő-helyettesei, szerkesztői és rovatvezetői, akik a politikai közvélemény alakítására közvetve vagy közvetlenül befolyást gyakorolnak,

17. az országos, regionális, megyei és helyi terjesztésű közéleti lapok azon főszerkesztői, főszerkesztő-helyettesei, szerkesztői, olvasószerkesztői, rovatvezetői, valamint főmunkatársai, akik a politikai közvélemény alakítására közvetve vagy közvetlenül befolyást gyakorolnak,

18. az arra illetékes hatóság által nyilvántartott, magyar honosságú, legalább országosan elérhető internetes hírszolgáltatók azon főszerkesztői, továbbá hírkiadási joggal felruházott helyettesei, illetőleg megbízottai, akik a politikai közvélemény alakítására közvetve vagy közvetlenül befolyást gyakorolnak,

19. az állami költségvetési támogatásra jogosult pártok megyei és országos elnökségének tagjai, vagy annak megfelelő vezető testületi tisztségviselők,

20. a hivatásos bírák,

21. az ügyészek,

22. az 1-21. pontokban fel nem sorolt (1) bekezdés szerinti személyek.

(4) E törvény alkalmazásában

a) országos, regionális, megyei és helyi terjesztésű közéleti lapok: azok a napi, heti és havi lapok, amelyek gazdasági, társadalmi, politikai és kulturális kérdésekben alkalmasak a politikai közvélemény formálására,

b) befolyás gyakorlása: az 1986. évi II. törvény 20. § e) pontja szerinti minden olyan tájékoztatás, amely közvetve vagy közvetlenül alkalmas a politikai közvélemény formálására.

(5) A Történeti Hivatal elnökének és helyettesének ellenőrzését a kinevezésüket megelőzően kell elvégezni.

3. § Az ellenőrzést a 2. § (3) bekezdése azonos pontjában meghatározott tisztségek vonatkozásában az ellenőrzés alá vont személyek nevének alfabetikus sorrendje szerint az 5. §-ban meghatározott bizottság által összeállított, személyazonosításra alkalmas névsor alapján kell lefolytatni.

4. §

5. § (1) Az ellenőrzést két vagy több, a 18. § (4) bekezdése szerinti igazolások kiállítását egy - három bíróból álló - bizottság hajtja végre. A bizottságok a Legfelsőbb Bíróság elnökének egyetértésével, az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága által jelölt és az Országgyűlés által határozott időre megválasztott bírákból állnak.

(2) A bizottság tagjának akadályoztatása esetén az (1) bekezdésben meghatározott eljárás szerint az Országgyűlés új tagot választ. Az akadályoztatás elmúltával az új bizottsági tag megbízatása megszűnik.

(3) A bizottság tagjává való jelöléshez az érintett bíró hozzájárulása szükséges.

(4) A bizottság tagjává megválasztott bíró nem ítélkezhet, szolgálati viszonya a megválasztás időpontjától a tagság megszűnéséig szünetel. A szünetelés időtartama szolgálati időnek minősül.

(5) A bizottság tagjává megválasztott bíró megbízatásának megszűnése esetén a bíró az Országos Igazságszolgáltatási Tanácshoz benyújtott kérelmében köteles nyilatkozni arról, hogy

a) bíróságra történő beosztását kéri-e, vagy

b) bírói tisztségéről lemond.

(6) Ha a bíró úgy nyilatkozott, hogy a bíróságra történő beosztását kéri, és a bírói tisztség megszűnésének a bíró jogállásáról és javadalmazásáról szóló törvény szerinti feltételei nem állnak fenn, a bírót az Igazságügyi Minisztériumba beosztott bíróra vonatkozó rendelkezések szerint, de legalább megyei bírói munkakörbe kell beosztani.

(7) Az egyes fontos, valamint közbizalmi és közvéleményformáló tisztségeket betöltő személyeket ellenőrző bizottság, a központi költségvetés Országgyűlés fejezetének "Országgyűlés Hivatali szervei" alcímen belül szerepel. A bizottság tagjának munkavégzési jogviszonyára a köztisztviselők jogállásáról szóló 1992. évi XXIII. törvényt (a továbbiakban: Ktv.) kell alkalmazni úgy, hogy a bizottság tagját az éves költségvetési törvényben meghatározott illetményalap tizenkétszeresének megfelelő havi díjazás és az alapszabadságon felül tizenöt munkanap pótszabadság illeti meg. A bizottság tagjaival kapcsolatos munkáltatói jogokat az Országgyűlés elnöke gyakorolja.

(8) A bizottság tagjai függetlenek és csak a törvénynek vannak alárendelve. A bizottság tagja bíróság vagy más hatóság előtt nem vonható felelősségre az e megbízatása gyakorlása során közölt tény vagy vélemény miatt, ez azonban nem mentesít a titokvédelemre és a személyes adatok védelmére vonatkozó jogszabályok megtartásának kötelezettsége alól.

6. § (1) A bizottság tagjává csak olyan bíró jelölhető, aki nem végzett az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet és nem vett részt olyan ítélet hozatalában, amelyet az 1956-os népfelkeléssel összefüggő elítélések orvoslásáról szóló 1989. évi XXXVI. törvény, az 1945 és 1963 közötti törvénysértő elítélések semmissé nyilvánításáról szóló 1990. évi XXVI. törvény és az 1963 és 1989 között elkövetett egyes állam és közrend elleni bűncselekmények miatt történt elítélések semmissé nyilvánításáról szóló 1992. évi XI. törvény alapján semmissé nyilvánítottak.

(2) A bíró jelölése előtt köteles írásban nyilatkozni arról, hogy végzett-e az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet, illetőleg részt vett-e az (1) bekezdés szerinti ítélet hozatalában.

7. § A bizottság tagjává jelölt bíró ellenőrzését az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága hajtja végre.

8. § (1) Az e törvény szerinti ellenőrzést az 1. §-ban meghatározottakra vonatkozó adatokat tartalmazó iratok alapján kell lefolytatni.

(2) A bizottság, valamint a 7. §-ban foglalt ellenőrzés során az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága a titokvédelemre és a személyes adatok védelmére vonatkozó jogszabályok megtartásával, minden egyéb korlátozástól mentesen vizsgálhatja az ellenőrzött személyek tekintetében a Történeti Hivatalban kezelt, valamint a Történeti Hivatalnak történő átadásáig az 1990. február 14-én lezárt és a Belügyminisztériumban őrzött iratokat, illetőleg azokból adatszolgáltatás teljesítését kérheti.

(3) A belügyminiszter, a honvédelmi miniszter és a polgári nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatokat irányító tárca nélküli miniszter a hatáskörébe, illetőleg a felügyelete vagy irányítása alá tartozó szervek által kezelt iratokból adatszolgáltatást, betekintést köteles biztosítani a bizottság, valamint az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága részére az ellenőrzés lefolytatásának céljára az ellenőrzés alá vont személyek 1. §-ban meghatározott adatainak és iratainak tekintetében.

(4) A bizottság, illetőleg az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága az ellenőrzés alá vont vagy tanúként meghallgatni kívánt személy személyazonosságának és lakcímének megállapítása céljából név- és lakcím adatokat igényelhet a (3) bekezdésben meghatározott iratokból, illetőleg a polgárok személyi adatainak és lakcímének nyilvántartásából.

(5) A bizottság és az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága az ellenőrzés alá vont személy tekintetében az ellenőrzés lefolytatása céljából bármely, az 1. §-ban meghatározottakra vonatkozó iratot is vizsgálhat.

(6) A bizottság tagjai jogosultak megismerni mindazokat a minősített adatokat, amelyek a 2. §-ban felsorolt személyek 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységére vonatkoznak és az ilyen adatokat tartalmazó iratokba - a minősített adat jogszabályok szerinti megőrzésének és védelmének kötelezettségével - betekinthetnek. A bizottság által tanúként meghallgatott személy számára - az ellenőrzéshez szükséges adatokra vonatkozóan - az államtitok megőrzésének kötelezettsége alóli felmentést a minősítő nem tagadhatja meg.

9. §

10. § (1) A bizottság eljárása során - ha e törvény másként nem rendelkezik - az államigazgatási eljárás általános szabályairól szóló 1957. évi IV. törvény rendelkezéseit kell alkalmazni.

(2) A bizottság az ellenőrzés megkezdéséről írásban, haladéktalanul értesíti az ellenőrzés alá vont személyt, egyben tájékoztatja az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységére utaló adatokról, illetőleg arról, hogy ilyen adat nem merült fel.

(3) Az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységre utaló adatokról tájékoztató értesítésben a bizottság az ellenőrzés alá vont személlyel közli, hogy az értesítést legkevesebb 15 nappal követő időpontban a bizottság előtt álláspontjának előadása céljából megjelenhet, illetőleg azt írásban benyújthatja. Ebben az esetben az ellenőrzés alá vont személy a bizottság értesítésében meghatározott időpontig a bizottságtól 15 napon belüli újabb időpontot kérhet a személyes megjelenésre, illetőleg álláspontjának írásbeli benyújtására, melynek elmulasztása jogvesztéssel jár.

(4) Az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységre utaló adatok felmerüléséről szóló nemleges tájékoztató értesítésben a bizottság az ellenőrzés alá vont személlyel közli, hogy álláspontjának előadása céljából 15 napon belül a bizottság előtti személyes megjelenését kérheti, valamint, hogy ilyen kérelme hiányában a bizottság a rendelkezésre álló adatok alapján zárt ülésen hozza meg a 14. § szerinti döntését.

(5) Az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységre utaló adatokról tájékoztató értesítéssel megindult eljárásban, továbbá ha az ellenőrzés alá vont személy a bizottság előtti személyes megjelenését kérte, de ennek ellenére a bizottság előtt nem jelenik meg és álláspontját írásban sem nyújtja be a (3) bekezdésében meghatározott időpontig, a bizottság a rendelkezésre álló adatok alapján zárt ülésen hozza meg a 14. § szerinti döntését.

11. § (1) Ha az ellenőrzés alá vont személy igazolja, hogy nem tölti be a 2. §-ban meghatározott tisztséget vagy tisztségéről lemondott, illetőleg felmentését kezdeményezte, az ellenőrzést azonnal meg kell szüntetni. Az ellenőrzés megszüntetéséről a bizottság az ellenőrzés alá vont személyt haladéktalanul tájékoztatja.

(2)

12. §

13. § A bizottság ülése zárt, azon a bizottság tagjain kívül csak az ellenőrzés alá vont személy, valamint írásban meghatalmazott képviselője, illetőleg a bizottság által a 10. § (2)-(3) bekezdése szerint megállapított időpontra beidézett személy vehet részt.

14. § A bizottság az ellenőrzés eredményeként döntésében megállapítja, hogy az ellenőrzött személy végzett-e az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet.

15. § A bizottság a döntésében feltünteti azokat az adatokat, amelyekre a döntést alapítja és azt haladéktalanul közli az ellenőrzött személlyel.

16. § A bizottság a döntését titkos szavazással, szótöbbséggel hozza.

17. § A bizottság a működésének egyéb szabályait maga állapítja meg.

18. § (1) Ha a bizottság döntése szerint az ellenőrzött személy végzett az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet, a bizottság felszólítja tisztségéről 30 napon belül való lemondásra, illetőleg felmentése kezdeményezésére, egyben tájékoztatja arról, hogy ellenkező esetben döntését a 30. napot követő 15. nap elteltével nyilvánosságra hozza. A bizottság felhívja továbbá az ellenőrzött személy figyelmét arra, hogy a döntés ellen bírósághoz fordulhat, és a döntés hatályon kívül helyezését kérheti. Ha az ellenőrzött személy a bizottság döntése ellen bírósághoz fordult, akkor a perben a bíróság soron kívül jár el. A tárgyalást - ha egyéb intézkedésre nincs szükség - legkésőbb a keresetlevélnek a bírósághoz érkezésétől számított 30. napra kell kitűzni. A döntésben foglaltak tekintetében a személyhez fűződő jogok megsértése miatt nincs helye bírósági eljárásnak.

(2) Ha az ellenőrzött személy az (1) bekezdés szerinti felszólítást tartalmazó döntés, illetőleg a döntés ellen benyújtott keresetet elutasító jogerős ítélet közlésétől számított 30 napon belül tisztségéről nem mond le, vagy felmentését nem kezdeményezi, a bizottság a 30. napot követő 15. nap elteltével döntését nyilvánosságra hozatal céljából a Magyar Közlöny személyi részében és a Magyar Távirati Iroda útján közzéteszi.

(3) A bizottság által nyilvánosságra hozott adatok közérdekű adatok, amelyek megismeréséhez és terjesztéséhez mindenkinek joga van.

(4) Bármely

- ügyvéd,

- közjegyző,

- egyházi személy, valamint

- a 2. § (3) bekezdésének 16-18. pontjaiban szereplő műsorszolgáltatók, közéleti lapok, internetes hírszolgáltatók azon munkatársa, aki az ott meghatározott tisztségek egyikét sem tölti be;

kérelmére igazolást kaphat arról, hogy az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet nem végzett.

(5) Az igazolás igénylésére nem jogosultak az 1972. február 14. napja után született személyek.

(6) Az igazolás kiadása iránti eljárást a kérelmek beérkezésének sorrendjében kell lefolytatni. Egyebekben az igazolások kiadása során az ellenőrzésre vonatkozó szabályok szerint kell eljárni, az igazolást kérő személyre pedig e törvénynek az ellenőrzött személyre vonatkozó rendelkezéseit kell alkalmazni.

(7) Ugyancsak az ellenőrzésre vonatkozó szabályok szerint jár el a bizottság, ha eljárása során megállapítja, hogy az igazolást kérő személy végzett az 1. §-ban meghatározott tevékenységet.

19. § (1) Az ellenőrzött személy a döntéssel szemben annak közlésétől számított 15 napon belül a Fővárosi Bíróságnál keresettel élhet.

(2) A bírósági eljárásra a közigazgatási határozatok bírósági felülvizsgálatára vonatkozó szabályok (Pp. XX. fejezet) az irányadók.

(3)

(4) A kereset benyújtása a döntés nyilvánosságra hozatalára halasztó hatályú.

(5)

(6) A bíróság a jogerős ítéletet közli a bizottsággal.

(7) A bíróság az eljárást zárt tárgyaláson folytatja le.

20. § (1) Ha az ellenőrzött személyt a bizottság felszólítja tisztségéről való lemondásra vagy felmentése kezdeményezésére, de a döntés közlésétől számított 30 napon belül, illetőleg a 19. § szerinti bírósági eljárás esetében a keresetet elutasító jogerős ítélet közlésétől számított 30 napon belül az ellenőrzött személy tisztségéről lemond vagy felmentését kezdeményezi és ennek megtörténtéről hitelt érdemlő módon a 30 napot követő 15 napon belül tájékoztatja a bizottságot, az nem hozza nyilvánosságra a döntést.

(2) A bizottság nem hozza nyilvánosságra döntését, ha azt a 19. § szerinti bírósági eljárás során hozott jogerős ítélet hatályon kívül helyezte.

21-22. §

23. § (1) A bizottság az eljárása során keletkezett iratokat, a döntés, valamint a jogerős bírósági ítélet egy-egy példányát, továbbá az ellenőrzött személy tisztségéről való lemondásának, illetőleg felmentése kezdeményezésének megtörténtét tanúsító iratokat a döntés, illetőleg az ítélet jogerőre emelkedésétől számított 30 napon belül átadja a Történeti Hivatalnak, amely azt az e törvényben foglalt szabályok szerint őrzi és kezeli.

(2) A bizottság eljárásának alapjául szolgáló iratokat - az (1) bekezdésben meghatározott időpont után - vissza kell adni az iratokat szolgáltató szervnek, amely azt a továbbiakban a rá vonatkozó szabályok szerint kezeli.

(3) Az e törvény 1. §-ában meghatározottakra vonatkozó iratok nem selejtezhetők.

24. § A bizottság működése, továbbá ezzel összefüggésben az iratok vizsgálata, illetőleg az adatszolgáltatás teljesítése során a 8. §-ban meghatározott szerveknél felmerülő költségekhez szükséges pénzügyi fedezetről a központi költségvetésben kell gondoskodni.

25. §

25/A. § (1) A Történeti Hivatal állami szaklevéltár, önálló központi költségvetési szerv, amely a központi költségvetés szerkezeti rendjében önálló fejezet.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal jogosult átvenni és megőrizni

a) a volt BM III/III-as Csoportfőnökség, a budapesti vagy a megyei rendőr-főkapitányságok III/III-as osztályai, illetve elődei (a Magyar Államrendőrség Budapesti Főkapitányság Politikai Rendészeti Osztálya, a Magyar Államrendőrség Államvédelmi Osztályának, a Belügyminisztérium Államvédelmi Hatóságának, az Államvédelmi Hatóságnak a "Belső reakció" elhárításával foglalkozó szervezeti egységei, a Belügyminisztérium IV. Belső reakció elhárítási osztálya, a Belügyminisztérium Politikai Nyomozó Főosztály V. Belső reakció elleni harc osztálya), valamint a volt BM Külügyi Osztály, Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Osztálya, Belbiztonsági Osztály és a volt BM Határőrség Felderítő Osztály, a volt Állambiztonsági Operatív Nyilvántartó Osztály iratait, ha azok 1996. július hó 31-én a Belügyminisztérium, a Honvédelmi Minisztérium és szerveik vagy a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok törvényben meghatározott feladatai ellátása céljából már nem voltak szükségesek;

b) a volt BM III. Főcsoportfőnökség és elődei egyéb olyan iratait, valamint a volt HM MNVK Felderítő Csoportfőnökség és elődei azon iratait, amelyek 1996. július hó 31-én a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok törvényben meghatározott feladatainak ellátása céljából - adattartalmukra tekintettel - már nem voltak kezelhetők;

c) a volt BM III. Főcsoportfőnökség és elődei, a HM MNVK Felderítő Csoportfőnökség és elődei egyéb, az a)-b) pontok hatálya alá nem tartozó levéltári anyagait;

d) az 1945. január 1. és 1960. április 1. között magyar hatóság határozata alapján végrehajtott, zárt táborszerű fogva tartás (internálás, kényszermunka), közbiztonsági őrizet, kényszerlakhely kijelölés (kitelepítés) irataiból a Belügyminisztériumban kialakított gyűjteményt;

e) a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok levéltári anyagait;

f) az egyes fontos, valamint közbizalmi és közvéleményformáló tisztségeket betöltő személyeket ellenőrző bizottság eljárása során keletkezett iratokat.

(3) A Történeti Hivatal működésére az Ltv. szabályait az e törvényben meghatározott eltérésekkel kell alkalmazni.

25/B. § (1) A Történeti Hivatal élén elnök áll.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal elnökét és elnökhelyettesét a miniszterelnök javaslatára a köztársasági elnök nevezi ki, illetőleg menti fel. A kinevezés előtt a miniszterelnök által jelölt személyeket meghallgatja az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági, az Emberi jogi, kisebbségi és vallásügyi, valamint a Kulturális és sajtó bizottsága. A megbízás 7 évre szól és csak egyszer hosszabbítható meg.

(3) A Történeti Hivatal elnökének és elnökhelyettesének megbízatása megszűnik, ha

a) a megbízatási ideje lejár,

b) lemond,

c) meghal,

d) a miniszterelnök javaslatára a köztársasági elnök felmenti.

(4) Felmentésnek van helye, ha az elnök (elnökhelyettes)

a) tisztségére méltatlanná vagy alkalmatlanná vált,

b) az összeférhetetlenségi okot nem jelentette be, vagy nem szüntette meg.

(5) Tisztségére méltatlannak kell tekinteni az elnököt (elnökhelyettest), ha a bíróság jogerős ítéletével szándékos bűncselekmény elkövetésében bűnösségét megállapította.

(6) Tisztségére alkalmatlannak lehet tekinteni az elnököt (elnökhelyettest), ha

a) munkaköri feladatait egészségi okból 90 napon túl folyamatosan nem tudja ellátni,

b) feladatainak neki felróható okból nem tesz eleget.

25/C. § (1) Nem lehet a Történeti Hivatal elnöke (elnökhelyettese) az, aki a kinevezés időpontját megelőző tíz évben a Kormány tagja, államtitkár, párt országos szervének tisztségviselője vagy alkalmazottja volt. Nem lehet a Történeti Hivatal elnöke (elnökhelyettese) az sem, aki a volt BM III. Főcsoportfőnökség és elődei alkalmazásában állt, vagy azok jelentéseit megkapta, illetve e szervek hálózati személye volt, valamint tagja volt az 1956-57-es karhatalmi alakulatoknak, illetve a Nyilaskeresztes Pártnak.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal elnöke (elnökhelyettese) a tudományos, az oktatói, a művészeti, a szerzői és szabadalmi jogi védelem alá eső, továbbá lektori, szerkesztői tevékenységre irányuló megbízási jogviszony kivételével más megbízást nem fogadhat el, kereső foglalkozást nem folytathat, nem lehet gazdasági társaság vezető tisztségviselője, felügyelő bizottság tagja.

(3) Az összeférhetetlenségi ok keletkezését haladéktalanul be kell jelenteni a miniszterelnöknek. Az összeférhetetlenségi okot a kinevezéstől, illetőleg a keletkezésétől számított 30 napon belül meg kell szüntetni.

25/D. § (1) A Történeti Hivatal elnöke saját, valamint az elnökhelyettes munkaidő-beosztását, illetőleg szabadságát maga állapítja meg.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal elnökére egyebekben a közigazgatási államtitkárokra, elnökhelyettesére a helyettes államtitkárokra vonatkozó szabályokat kell megfelelően alkalmazni azzal, hogy a munkáltatói jogokat az e törvényben meghatározott eltérésekkel a miniszterelnök gyakorolja.

(3) A Történeti Hivatal munkatársaira a Ktv. rendelkezéseit kell alkalmazni.

25/E. § (1) A Történeti Hivatal elnöke a Hivatal tevékenységéről évente beszámol az Országgyűlésnek.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal elnöke feladat- és hatáskörében az államtitokról és a szolgálati titokról szóló 1995. évi LXV. törvény szabályai szerint minősítésre jogosult.

25/F. § (1) A Történeti Hivatal feladata:

a) biztosítja - az e törvényben foglalt korlátokkal - az érintettek számára a róluk nyilvántartott adatok megismeréséhez való joguk gyakorlását;

b) gondoskodik az 5. §-ban meghatározott bizottságnak, az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottságának (7. §), illetőleg a bíróságnak az e törvényben meghatározott eljárás lefolytatásához szükséges adatok és iratok szolgáltatásáról;

c) az e törvényben foglalt feltételekkel biztosítja a kutatási tevékenység folytatását;

d) az államtitokról és a szolgálati titokról szóló 1995. évi LXV. törvény (a továbbiakban: Ttv.) alapján minősített adatok vonatkozásában gondoskodik a titokvédelmi szabályok betartásáról;

e) ellátja az Ltv.-ben meghatározott feladatokat.

f)-g)

(2) A Történeti Hivatalban őrzött levéltári anyagra az Ltv. szabályait az e törvényben meghatározott eltérésekkel kell alkalmazni:

a) a Történeti Hivatalban tárolt iratokra nem terjednek ki az Ltv. 6. §-ának és 28. §-ának rendelkezései;

b) a 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokra nem terjednek ki az Ltv. 22. §-a (1) bekezdésének és 23. §-ának rendelkezései, és az Ltv. 24. §-át az e törvényben meghatározott módon kell alkalmazni;

c) a 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratok csak a Történeti Hivatalba való kerülésük után selejtezhetők. Az iratokban adat csak akkor törölhető, ha azt bíróság az adatvédelmi eljárás során elrendelte, illetve a törlést az érintett a 25/G. § (4) bekezdése szerint kéri.

(3) A 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban - beleértve a belső használatra készült, valamint döntés-előkészítést tartalmazó levéltári anyagot is - bármely természetes személy, szükség esetén az azokról készült másolatok segítségével, korlátozás nélkül kutathat, kivéve

a) a személyes adatok megismerését és tanulmányozását;

b) a Ttv. alapján államtitokká vagy szolgálati titokká minősített adatokat, valamint

c) azokat az adatokat, amelyek megismerését törvény egyéb okból korlátozza.

25/G. § (1) A 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban szereplő megfigyelt vagy harmadik személy a rá vonatkozó adatokat megismerheti. A bemutatott iratokon a más személy azonosítására alkalmas adatokat felismerhetetlenné kell tenni, kivéve

a) ha az irat keletkezésekor jogszabály lehetővé tette számára, hogy az adott iratot teljes terjedelemben (személyes adatokkal együtt) megismerje,

b) a személyes érintkezéseket rögzítő vagy leíró adatokat (pl. személyes találkozásról, beszélgetésről gyűjtött adatok),

c) a nyilvános vagy a közönség részére nyitva álló rendezvényeken rögzített, közszereplésekkel kapcsolatos adatokat.

(2) A megfigyelt vagy harmadik személy halálát követően az iratok megismerésére jogosult az elhunyt hozzátartozója, kivéve, ha ezt az elhunyt írásban megtiltotta vagy azt törvény kizárja. Az iratok megismerésére jogosult továbbá az a személy is, akit a megfigyelt vagy harmadik személy halála előtt erre írásban feljogosított.

(3) A 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban szereplő hivatásos alkalmazott és hálózati személy a rá vonatkozó adatokat megismerheti. A bemutatott iratokon a más személy azonosítására alkalmas adatokat felismerhetetlenné kell tenni.

(4) Az érintett az iratokban szereplő adatai tekintetében helyesbítési jogát az eredeti adat változatlanul hagyása mellett a helyes adatot tartalmazó feljegyzésnek az irathoz történő csatolásával érvényesítheti.

(5) A 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban bármilyen jogcímen szereplő személy 2004. június 30-át követően kérheti személyes adatának törlését. Nem törölhető az Ltv. szerinti maradandó értékű iratokban lévő személyes adat, azonban az érintett - legfeljebb az adat keletkezésétől számított 90 évre - írásos nyilatkozatban megtilthatja annak a személyes adatának a kutatását, amelyet titkos információgyűjtő eszközök, illetve módszerek felhasználásával rögzítettek, kivéve, ha az

a) valamely nyilvános szereplésére, közéleti, politikai tevékenységére vonatkozik vagy

b) - ha az érintett valamely állami szerv hatáskörében eljáró személy volt - a feladatkörével összefüggő személyes adata.

25/H. § (1) A 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a)-b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban lévő, a jelen § (2) bekezdésében meghatározott adatok körén kívül eső, az érintett magánéletére vonatkozó személyes adat akkor sem kutatható, ha az adatot a Ttv. alapján egyébként nem minősítették vagy megismerését törvény nem korlátozza, kivéve

a) ha a kutatás - a kutató költségére - anonimizált másolattal is megvalósítható,

b) ha az érintett által a 25/G. § (5) bekezdés szerint meghatározott kutatási tilalom határideje letelt, illetve ennek hiányában az Ltv. 24. §-ának (1), (3) és (4) bekezdése szerinti feltételek teljesültek,

c) ha az érintett, illetőleg annak halálát követően hozzátartozója a kutatáshoz hozzájárult.

(2) Az érintett nyilvános közszereplésére, illetve közéleti tevékenységére, politikai szándékára és véleményére vonatkozó vagy valamely állami szerv hatáskörében eljáró személynek a feladatkörével összefüggő személyes adata tudományos célból kutatható, ha az adat keletkezésétől már 15 év eltelt, és az Ltv. 24. §-ának (3)-(4) bekezdésében foglaltak megvalósultak.

(3) A személyes adatok védelméről és a közérdekű adatok nyilvánosságáról szóló 1992. évi LXIII. törvény (a továbbiakban: Avtv.) 2. §-ának 2. pontjában meghatározott adatok - a büntetett előéletre vonatkozó adatok kivételével - 1996. július hó 31-ét követő 90 évig csak az érintett, illetőleg annak halála után hozzátartozójának engedélyével kutathatók. Nem szükséges az érintett, illetve annak halála után hozzátartozójának engedélye a kutatáshoz, ha az adatok a történelmi események megismeréséhez szükségesek, és az Ltv. 24. §-ának (3)-(4) bekezdésében foglaltak megvalósultak.

(4) Nem jogosult a hozzátartozó azon iratok kutatásához való hozzájárulásra, amelyek vonatkozásában nem rendelkezik iratmegismerési jogosultsággal.

(5) Nem minősített adat esetén, illetve ha az adat nyilvánosságra hozatalát törvény nem tiltja vagy korlátozza, csak

a) az Ltv. 24. §-ának (1) bekezdése szerinti határidők letelte után hozhatók nyilvánosságra a 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének a), b) és d) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban lévő azon személyes adatok, amelyek az állambiztonsági szervek és elődeik "szigorúan titkos" állományú (tevékenységüket állambiztonsági szerven kívül, fedéssel végző) tisztjeinek, illetve hálózati személyeinek nevét, természetes személyazonosító adatait tartalmazzák;

b) az Ltv. 24. §-ának (1) bekezdése szerinti határidők letelte után kutathatók és hozhatók nyilvánosságra a 25/A. § (2) bekezdésének c) és e) pontjaiban meghatározott iratokban lévő személyes adatok.

(6) Az iratokban az (1)-(4) bekezdésben és a 25/F. § (3) bekezdésében foglalt kutatáson kívül - 1996. július hó 31-től számított 30 évig - kutatás nem engedélyezhető. Az iratokba a 25/G. § (1) és (2) bekezdése szerinti betekintésen és a 25/F. § (1) bekezdésének b) pontja szerinti adatszolgáltatás teljesítésén túl csak az érintettek törvényes jogainak érvényesítésével kapcsolatos bírósági és más hatósági eljárások, valamint az ötévi vagy ezt meghaladó szabadságvesztéssel büntetendő bűncselekményekkel kapcsolatos büntetőeljárások esetén engedélyezhető betekintés, illetve azokból adatszolgáltatás a bíróság, az eljáró hatóság, illetve a nyomozó hatóság számára.

(7) A Történeti Hivatal az őrizetében lévő, a törvény 25/A. § (2) bekezdés a)-b) és d) pontjában meghatározott olyan levéltári anyagot, melynek megismerését törvény nem korlátozza, kiállítás céljából más szerv számára meghatározott időre kikölcsönözheti. A kölcsönzési kérelem a törvény keretei között másolattal is teljesíthető.

(8) A (6) és (7) bekezdésben foglalt eseteket kivéve a Történeti Hivatal irattári és levéltári, a 25/A. § (2) bekezdés a)-b) és d) pontjában meghatározott iratállományából sem adat, sem irat nem továbbítható, nem hozható nyilvánosságra, és az ország területéről nem vihető ki. Az Ltv. 24/A. § (3) bekezdése alapján kötött adatvédelmi szerződés hatálya ezen iratokra akkor terjed ki, ha erről a szerződés - az iratok pontos felsorolásával - kifejezetten rendelkezik.

(9) A nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok, a Honvédelmi Minisztérium, a Belügyminisztérium és szerveik munkatársai a 25/A. § (2) bekezdés a)-b) pontjában meghatározott iratokban lévő személyes adatokba az Országgyűlés illetékes bizottságának előzetes jóváhagyása után, illetve különösen gyors intézkedést követelő esetekben utólagos tájékoztatásával tekinthetnek be, ha az a nemzetbiztonság, a honvédelem vagy a bűnmegelőzés érdekében törvényben előírt feladataik ellátása céljából szükséges.

25/I. § (1) A természetes személyek, jogi személyek és a jogi személyiséggel nem rendelkező szervezetek kötelesek a birtokukban lévő, a törvény 25/A. § (2) bekezdés a)-b) és d) pontjában meghatározott iratokat (másodpéldányokat és egyéb másolatokat is) a Történeti Hivatal számára bejelenteni, és a Történeti Hivatal kérésére azt átadni. Az átadási kötelezettség nem terjed ki a saját tulajdonú vagy jogszabály felhatalmazása alapján birtokolt iratokra.

(2) A Történeti Hivatal őrzésébe került egyéb, természetes személy tulajdonában álló iratokat - a szükséges másolatok elkészítését követően - a tulajdonos vagy halálát követően örököse számára kérésre át kell adni. Amennyiben az irat más dokumentumoktól fizikailag nem választható szét, másolati példányt kell kiadni. Maradandó értékű irat esetében a Történeti Hivatal - a tulajdonos egyetértésének hiányában is - kezdeményezheti az irat védetté nyilvánítását. Ebben az esetben az irat csak a védetté nyilvánítási eljárás lezárását követően adható át a tulajdonosnak.

(3) A Történeti Hivatalnak való iratátadás során az egyes fontos, valamint közbizalmi és közvélemény-formáló tisztségeket betöltő személyeket ellenőrző bizottság működésének feltételeit biztosítani kell.

(4) Nem adhatók át a Történeti Hivatal részére azok az iratok, amelyek együttesen tartalmazzák a 25/A. § (2) bekezdés a) vagy b) pontjában meghatározott adatokat, valamint az átadó szervek jogszabályban meghatározott feladatai folyamatos és zavartalan teljesítéséhez szükséges kezelhető adatokat, amennyiben ezek technikai szétválasztása csak az irat eredeti állapotban történő helyreállításának lehetetlenné válásával lenne megvalósítható. Ebben az esetben az iratokat őrző szervezet az e törvényben foglalt feltételek mellett biztosítja az adatmegismerést és kutatást.

(5) Az egyes fontos, valamint közbizalmi és közvélemény-formáló tisztségeket betöltő személyeket ellenőrző bizottság tevékenysége során keletkezett iratokat az eljárás jogerős befejezése után folyamatosan, de legkésőbb 2004. december 31-ig kell a Történeti Hivatalnak átadni. A 19. § szerinti eljárás során a Fővárosi Bíróságnál keletkezett iratokat az eljárás jogerős lezárását követő 30 napon belül kell a Történeti Hivatalnak átadni.

(6) A más közlevéltárban vagy nyilvános magánlevéltárban őrzött olyan iratot, amely szerves részét képezi a Történeti Hivatal illetékességi körébe tartozó iratoknak, a szükséges másolat elkészítését követően a Történeti Hivatalnak kell átadni. Amennyiben az irat más dokumentumoktól fizikailag nem választható szét, másolati példányt kell kiadni.

(7) A Történeti Hivatal megőrzésébe került olyan iratot, amely más szerv már közlevéltárban vagy nyilvános magánlevéltárban őrzött irattári anyagának szerves részét képezi, és nem tartozik a Történeti Hivatal illetékességébe tartozó iratok körébe, a Történeti Hivatal - a szükséges másolatok elkészítését követően - az irattári anyagot őrző levéltárnak adja át. Amennyiben az irat más dokumentumtól fizikailag nem választható szét, másolati példányt kell kiadni.

26. § A Belügyminisztérium volt III. (állambiztonsági) Főcsoportfőnöksége és jogelődjei "szigorúan titkos" állományának tagjai részére a szolgálati viszony alapján megállapított szolgálati nyugellátás figyelembevételével a kiegészítő jövedelem nem folyósítható. Ez a rendelkezés nem érinti a munkaviszonyon alapuló nyugellátási jogosultságot.

27. § (1) Ez a törvény a (2) bekezdésben foglalt kivétellel 1994. július 1-jén lép hatályba.

(2) A törvény 5-9. §-a és az 5. § szerinti bizottság tagjának ellenőrzése tekintetében az 1. §-a a kihirdetése napján lép hatályba.

(3) A törvény 1. §-a, 2-25. §-a, a 27. § (2), (4) és (5) bekezdése 2004. június 30-án hatályát veszti. Ezzel egyidejűleg a törvény címe "A Történeti Hivatalról"-ra változik.

(4) A törvény hatálya alatti időszakban a 2. §-ban foglalt tisztséget ismételten betöltők esetében, ha ellenőrzésük korábban már megtörtént, a 3. § szerinti újbóli megkeresés esetén azt nem kell ismét lefolytatni. Ez esetben a bizottság a korábbi döntése alapján szólítja fel az ellenőrzött személyt a tisztségéről való lemondásra vagy felmentése kezdeményezésére. A bizottság a döntés nyilvánosságra hozatalára a 18. § és a 20. § értelemszerű alkalmazásával a felszólítás közlésétől számított határidővel intézkedik.

(5) A 2. §-ban foglalt tisztségeket az 1996. évi LXVII. törvény hatálybalépésekor betöltők ellenőrzését a hatálybalépést követő egy éven belül, az azt később betöltők esetében a hivatalba lépést követően kell lefolytatni.

Decision 31/2003 (VI. 4.) AB

 IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

On the basis of petitions seeking a posterior examination of the unconstitutionality of a statute and the elimination of an unconstitutional omission of legislative duty, the Constitutional Court has – with dissenting opinions by dr. István Kukorelli and dr. János Strausz, Judges of the Constitutional Court – adopted the following

decision:

 1. The Constitutional Court holds that the text “indirectly or” in items 16, 17, and 18 of Section 2 para. (3) of Act XXIII of 1994 on Checking Persons Holding Certain Key Positions and Positions of Public Trust, and Persons Shaping Public Opinion, and on the Historical Archive Office are unconstitutional and are accordingly annulled.

 Section 2 para. (3) items 16, 17, and 18 shall remain in force as follows:

 “16 Those editors-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief, editors, and section editors of broadcasting companies as per Section 2 item 31 of Act I of 1996 on Radio and Television who have a direct influence upon shaping political public opinion,

17 Those editors-in-chief, deputy editors-in-chief, editors, reading editors, section editors, and senior contributors of nationwide, regional, county and local newspapers dealing with public affairs who have a direct influence upon shaping political public opinion,

18 Those editors-in-chief, and their deputies or agents authorised to issue news, of Hungarian-resident internet news providers with at least nationwide access, and registered by the competent authorities, who have a direct influence upon shaping political public opinion,”

2. The Constitutional Court rejects the petitions aimed at the establishment of the unconstitutionality and the annulment of other provisions in items 16, 17, and 18 of Section 2 para. (3) of Act XXIII of 1994 on Checking Persons Holding Certain Key Positions and Positions of Public Trust, and Persons Shaping Public Opinion, and on the Historical Archive Office.

3. The Constitutional Court rejects the petitions aimed at the establishment of the unconstitutionality and the annulment of items 15, 19, and 20 of Section 2 para. (3) as well as Section 2 para. (4) item b) of Act XXIII of 1994 on Checking Persons Holding Certain Key Positions, Positions of Public Trust or Persons Engaged in Shaping the Public Opinion, and on the Historical Archive Office.

4. The Constitutional Court rejects the petitions aimed at the elimination of an omission of legislative duty in respect of Section 1 item e), Section 2 para. (3), Section 2 para. (3) items 16 to 18, and Section 18 para. (4) of Act XXIII of 1994 on Checking Persons Holding Certain Key Positions and Positions of Public Trust, and Persons Shaping Public Opinion, and on the Historical Archive Office.

5. The Constitutional Court rejects the petition aimed at the establishment of an omission by the Parliament of its legislative duty by having failed to adopt a statute providing for the national security screening of all judges and public prosecutors, and by not providing for the removal of the “agents of Department III/III” from the courts and public prosecutors’ offices.

6. The Constitutional Court refuses the petition challenging the whole of Act XXIII of 1994 on Checking Persons Holding Certain Key Positions and Positions of Public Trust, and Persons Shaping Public Opinion, and on the Historical Archive Office.

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES MIJOVIĆ AND GYULUMYAN

In the present case, which concerns the right to free elections, the majority of the judges have found no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Having gone through the facts of this case, we, to our regret, were unable to follow the majority of the judges for the following reasons.

In the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia a Latvian politician was disqualified from standing for election on account of her former membership of the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL), which during the time of the USSR was a regional branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In March 1990, as a member of that political party, Tatjana Ždanoka went on to become a member of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia. After the restoration of Latvia’s independence, on 23 August 1991 the CPL was declared unconstitutional, with a stipulation that persons who had participated in the activities of the CPL after 13 January 1991 would be ineligible to stand for political office.

By a decision of the Central Electoral Commission, the applicant was ruled ineligible to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. Her exclusion was based on her former membership of the Communist Party of Latvia.

She complained that her right to stand for election had been infringed as a result of her disqualification.

Although we are aware that this case concerns very sensitive circumstances, we consider that it was not the Court’s task to take sides in the historical and political controversies, but rather to examine the legality of the applicant’s ineligibility in the context of punitive measures – in other words, to assess whether the lack of a fixed duration for the applicant’s ineligibility was appropriate in view of the (temporary) nature of punitive measures.

The Court reiterated that States Parties to the Convention had a wide margin of appreciation in their internal legal orders in subjecting the right to vote and to stand for election to prescribed conditions, and that is something we completely agree with.

We have no difficulties in accepting the legitimacy of a punitive measure, since we cannot exclude the possibility that the restriction in issue could have been justified and proportionate during the first few years after the restoration of Latvia’s independence. It is commonly accepted that certain restrictions may be necessary in newly established and vulnerable democratic regimes (just as the requirement of proportionality is), and this approach has been developed by the Court in addressing a number of clearly defined questions. Additionally, it has been established that the law of each and every State Party to the Convention should be sufficiently clear to allow individuals to foresee such restrictions and to be aware of the way in which their rights will be limited (see Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, ECHR 2000-V).

On the other hand, we strongly believe that such restrictive measures should be temporary in order to be proportionate. In this case the restriction imposed on the applicant seems permanent in that it is of indefinite duration and will continue until legislation putting an end to it is adopted. More than ten years after its initial concerns, we cannot accept that the Latvian Parliament still believes that former CPL members are a threat to democracy. And if this is so, if former members of the CPL were and still are a real threat and danger to democracy, why has the Parliament failed to enact legislation providing for their permanent ineligibility?

We consider that the Latvian Parliament should have decided to impose a time-limit on these restrictions since such limitations on the right to free elections, as we have already mentioned, should exist only for a specific period, a period of vulnerability for a newly established regime. On that basis, we believe that the ineligibility procedure introduced as a result of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation was not sufficient, since it did not allow the courts to assess whether a person represented a real threat and danger to democracy. On the other hand, the very same Constitutional Court in its judgment of 30 August 2000 urged the legislature to periodically re-examine the need to maintain the disputed measure.

Furthermore, the applicant had never been convicted of a criminal offence, she was not one of the fifteen members of Parliament who were removed from their seats and there was no evidence that she herself had committed any acts aimed at undermining the new regime.

Having regard to all the above, we strongly believe that the permanent restrictions on standing for election to the Latvian Parliament imposed on the applicant on account of her former membership of the Latvian Communist Party violated her right to free elections.

In the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Mr     C.L. Rozakis, President,
          Mr     P. Lorenzen,
          Mr     G. Bonello,

          Mrs   F. Tulkens,
          Mr     E. Levits,
          Mr     A. Kovler,
          Mr     V. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 6 May 2004,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 58278/00) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court on 20 January 2000 under Article 34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms Tatjana Ždanoka (“the applicant”).

2.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that her disqualification from standing for election to the Latvian Parliament and to municipal councils, imposed on account of her active participation within the Communist Party of Latvia after 13 January 1991, infringed her rights as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

3.  The application was assigned to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First Section (Rule 52 § 1).

4.  By a decision of 6 March 2003 the Chamber declared the application partly admissible.

5.  The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 7 April 2003 the applicant submitted her claim for just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention). On 12 May 2003 the Government submitted their observations on that claim. On 24 July 2003 the applicant clarified and expanded her claim for just satisfaction. The Government replied on 4 September 2003.

6.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 15 May 2003 (Rule 59 § 3).

 There appeared before the Court:

(a)   for the Government
Ms    I. Reine,                                                                                   Agent,
Ms    I. Freimane,                                                                         Adviser;

(b)  for the applicant
Mr    W. Bowring, barrister,                                                        Counsel.

 The Court heard addresses by Mr Bowring and Ms Reine. Ms Ždanoka, the applicant, was also present at the hearing.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A.  The historical context and the background to the case

1.  The Soviet period

7.  In 1971 the applicant, who at the material time was a mathematics student at the University of Latvia, joined the Communist Party of Latvia (hereafter “the CPL”). This organisation was in reality a regional branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter “the CPSU”), the USSR's single ruling party.

From 1972 to 1990 the applicant worked as a lecturer at the University of Latvia. Throughout this period she was a member of the CPL's university branch.

8.  From 1988 onwards there was considerable social pressure in Latvia, as in several other countries of central and eastern Europe, for democratisation of political life and restoration of state independence, which in Latvia's case had been lost in 1940.

9.  In March 1990 the applicant was elected to the Supreme Council (Augstākā Padome) of the “Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia” (hereafter “the Latvian SSR”) as a representative for the Pļavnieki constituency in Riga. She subsequently joined the CPL's local branch. In April 1990 this branch selected her to attend the CPL's 25th Congress, where she was elected to the party's Central Committee for Supervision and Audit. According to copies of that Committee's minutes, the applicant was a member of a sub-committee responsible for supervising the implementation of decisions and activities arising from the CPL's programme.

10.  At the same congress, a group of delegates expressed their disagreement with the CPL's general policy, which remained loyal to the Soviet Union and the CPSU, was opposed to any democratisation of public life and sought to maintain the status quo. These delegates publicly announced their withdrawal from the CPL and established a new party, the “Independent Communist Party”, which immediately declared its support for Latvian independence and for a multi-party political system. The applicant did not join the dissident delegates and remained within the CPL.

2.  Latvia's declaration of independence

11.  On 4 May 1990 the Supreme Council adopted a Declaration on the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia, which declared Latvia's incorporation into the USSR unlawful and void and restored legal force to the fundamental provisions of the Latvian Constitution (Satversme) of 1922. However, paragraph 5 of the Declaration introduced a transition period, aimed at a gradual restoration of genuine State sovereignty as each institutional tie with the USSR was severed. During that transition period, various provisions of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR would remain in force. A special governmental commission was given responsibility for negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Russo-Latvian Peace Treaty of 11 August 1920.

The above-mentioned Declaration was adopted by 139 out of a total of 201 Supreme Council members, with one abstention. 57 members of the “Līdztiesība” parliamentary bloc (“Equal Rights”, in reality the CPL group), including the applicant, did not vote. On the same day, 4 May 1990, the Central Committee of the CPL adopted a resolution strongly criticising the Declaration and calling on the President of the Soviet Union to intervene.

12.  On 7 May 1990 the Supreme Council selected the government of the Independent Republic of Latvia.

3.  The events of January and March 1991

13.  The parties dispute the events of January and March 1991. According to the Government, on 12 January 1991 the Soviet army launched military operations against the government of independent Lithuania, which had been formed in the same way as the Latvian government. Several persons were killed in the course of those events. Against this background, an attempted coup was also launched in Latvia. On 13 January 1991 the Plenum of the CPL Central Committee called for the resignation of the Latvian government, the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the assumption of full powers by the Latvian Committee of Public Safety (Vislatvijas Sabiedriskās glābšanas komiteja), set up on the same date by several organisations, including the CPL. On 15 January 1991 this committee announced that the Supreme Council and the government were stripped of their respective powers and declared that it was assuming full powers. After causing the loss of several lives during armed confrontations in Riga, this attempted coup failed.

14.  The applicant contested the version of events put forward by the Government. In her opinion, the Soviet army's aggression against the Lithuanian government and people was not a proven fact; in this connection, she submitted a copy of a Russian newspaper article which claimed that it had been the Lithuanian independence supporters themselves, rather than Soviet soldiers, who fired into the crowd, with the aim of discrediting the Soviet army. The applicant also claimed that, at the material time, a series of public demonstrations had been held in Latvia to protest against the increase in food prices ordered by the government; those demonstrations were thus the main reason for the events of January 1991. Finally, the applicant argued that, in their respective statements of 13 and 15 January 1991, the Plenum of the CPL's Central Committee and the Committee of Public Safety had not only called for or announced the removal of the Latvian authorities, but had also stated that early elections would be held for the Supreme Council.

15.  On 3 March 1991 a national vote was held on Latvian territory. According to the Government, this was a genuine national referendum; the applicant argues that it was a simple consultative vote. Electors had to reply to a question worded as follows: “Do you support a democratic and politically independent Republic of Latvia?” According to figures supplied by the Government, 87.5 % of all residents registered on the electoral roll voted: 73.6 % of them responded in the affirmative to the question posed. The applicant contests the above-mentioned turnout rate and thus the very legitimacy of the plebiscite.

4.  The events of August and September 1991

16.  On 19 August 1991 there was an attempted coup in Moscow. The self-proclaimed “National State of Emergency Committee” declared that Mr Gorbachev, President of the USSR, was suspended from his duties, declared itself the sole ruling authority and imposed a state of emergency “in certain regions of the USSR”.

17.  On the same day, 19 August 1991, the Central Committee and the Riga Committee of the CPL declared their support for the National State of Emergency Committee and set up an “operational group” to provide assistance to it. According to the Government, on 20 August 1991 the CPL, the “Līdztiesība” parliamentary bloc and various other organisations signed and disseminated an appeal called “Godājamie Latvijas iedzīvotāji!” (“Honourable residents of Latvia!”), urging the population to comply with the requirements of the state of emergency and not to oppose the measures imposed by the National State of Emergency Committee in Moscow. According to the applicant, the CPL's participation in all those events has not been proved; in particular, the members of the “Līdztiesība” bloc were taking part in parliamentary debates over two consecutive days and were not even aware that such an appeal was to be issued.

18.  This coup also ended in failure. On 21 August 1991, the Latvian Supreme Council enacted a constitutional law on the state status of the Republic of Latvia and proclaimed the country's immediate and absolute independence. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of 4 May 1990, concerning the transition period, was repealed.

19.  By a decision of 23 August 1991 the Supreme Council declared the CPL unconstitutional. The following day, the party's activities were suspended and the Minister of Justice was instructed “to investigate the unlawful activities of the CPL and to put forward ... a motion on the possibility of authorising its continued operations”. On the basis of the Minister of Justice's proposal, the Supreme Council ordered the party's dissolution on 10 September 1991.

20.  In the meantime, on 22 August 1991, the Supreme Council set up a parliamentary committee to investigate the involvement of members of the “Līdztiesība” bloc in the coup. On the basis of that committee's final report, the Supreme Council revoked fifteen members' right to sit in parliament on 9 July 1992; the applicant was not one of those concerned.

E.  Subsequent developments

21.  In February 1993 the applicant became chairperson of the “Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia” (“Kustība par sociālo taisnīgumu un līdztiesību Latvijā”), which later became a political party, “Līdztiesība” (“Equal rights”).

22.  On 5 and 6 June 1993 parliamentary elections were held in accordance with the restored Constitution of 1922. For the first time since Latvian independence had been regained, the population elected the Parliament (Saeima), which took over from the Supreme Council. It was at that point that the applicant's term of office as a member of parliament expired. As a result of the Latvian authorities' refusal to include her on the residents' register as a Latvian citizen, she was unable to take part in those elections, in the following parliamentary elections, held in 1995, or in the municipal elections of 1994. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, the courts recognised her Latvian nationality in January 1996, instructing the authorities to register her as such and to supply her with the appropriate documents.

B.  The 1997 municipal elections

23.  On 25 January 1997 the “Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia” submitted to the Riga Electoral Commission a list of ten candidates for the forthcoming municipal elections of 9 March 1997. The applicant was one of those candidates. In line with the requirements of the Municipal Elections Act, she signed the list and attached a written statement confirming that she was not one of the persons referred to in section 9 of that Act. Under the terms of the Act, individuals who had “actively participated” (darbojušās) in the CPSU, the CPL and several other named organisations after 13 January 1991 were not entitled to stand for office.

In a letter sent on the same day, 25 January 1997, the applicant informed the Electoral Commission that she had been a member of the CPL's Pļavnieki branch and of its Central Committee for Supervision and Audit until 10 September 1991, date of the CPL's official dissolution. However, she argued that the restrictions mentioned above were not applicable to her, since they were contrary to Articles 2 and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

24.  By a decision of 11 February 1997 the Riga Electoral Commission registered the list submitted by the applicant. At the elections of 9 March 1997 this list obtained four of the sixty seats on Riga City Council (Rīgas Dome). The applicant was one of those elected.

C.  The 1998 parliamentary elections

25.  With a view to participating in the parliamentary elections of 3 October 1998, the “Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia” formed a coalition with the Party of National Harmony (Tautas Saskaņas partija), the Latvian Socialist Party (Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija) and the Russian Party (Krievu partija). The four parties formed a united list entitled “Party of National Harmony”. The applicant appeared on this list as a candidate for the constituencies of Riga and Vidzeme.

On 28 July 1998 the list was submitted to the Central Electoral Commission for registration. In accordance with the requirements of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the applicant signed and attached to the list a written statement identical to the one she had submitted prior to the municipal elections. As she had done for the 1997 elections, she likewise sent a letter to the Central Electoral Commission explaining her situation and arguing that the restrictions in question were incompatible with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

26.  On 29 July 1998 the Central Electoral Commission suspended registration of the list on the ground that the applicant's candidacy did not meet the requirements of the Parliamentary Elections Act. Not wishing to jeopardise the entire list's prospects of being registered, the applicant withdrew her candidacy, after which the list was immediately registered.

D.  The procedure for determining the applicant's participation in the CPL

27.  By a letter of 7 August 1998 the President of the Central Electoral Commission asked the State Procurator General to examine the legitimacy of the applicant's election to the Riga City Council.

28.  By a decision of 31 August 1998, a copy of which was sent to the Central Electoral Commission, the Procurator General's Office (Ģenerālprokuratūra) noted that the applicant had not committed any action defined as an offence in the Criminal Code. The decision stated that, although the applicant had provided false information to the Riga Electoral Commission regarding her participation in the CPL, there was nothing to prove that she had done so with the specific objective of misleading the Commission. In that connection, the Procurator's Office considered that the statement by the applicant, appended to the list of candidates for the elections of 9 March 1997, was to be read in conjunction with her explanatory letter of 25 January 1997.

On 14 January 1999 the General Procurator's Office applied to the Riga Regional Court for a finding that the applicant had participated in the CPL after 13 January 1991. The Procurator's Office attached the following documents to its submission: the applicant's letter of 25 January 1997; the minutes of the meeting of 26 January 1991 of the CPL's Central Committee for Supervision and Audit; the minutes of the joint meeting of 27 March 1991 of the Central Committee for Supervision and Audit and the municipal and regional committees for supervision and audit; the appendices to those minutes, indicating the structure and composition of the said committee and a list of the members of the Audit Committee at 1 July 1991.

29.  Following adversarial proceedings, the Riga Regional Court allowed the request by the Procurator's Office in a judgment of 15 February 1999. It considered that the submitted documents clearly attested to the applicant's participation in the party's activities after the critical date, and that the evidence provided by the applicant was insufficient to refute this finding. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's arguments to the effect that she was only formally a member of the CPL and that she did not participate in the meetings of its Central Committee for Supervision and Audit, and that accordingly she could not be held to have “acted”, “been a militant” or “actively participated” (darboties) in the party's activities.

30.  The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Civil Division of the Supreme Court. On 12 November 1999 the Civil Division began examining the appeal. At the oral hearing, the applicant submitted that the content of the above-mentioned minutes of 26 January and 27 March 1991, referring to her by name, could not be held against her since on both those dates she had been carrying out her duties in the Latvian Supreme Council and not in the CPL. After hearing evidence from two witnesses who stated that the applicant had indeed been present at the Supreme Council, the Division suspended examination of the case in order to enable the applicant to submit more cogent evidence in support of her statements, such as a record of parliamentary debates or minutes of the “Līdztiesība” parliamentary bloc's meetings. However, as the above-mentioned minutes had not been preserved by the Parliamentary Record Office, the applicant was never able to produce such evidence.

By a judgment of 15 December 1999 the Civil Division dismissed the applicant's appeal. It stated that the evidence gathered by the Procurator's Office was sufficient to conclude that the applicant had taken part in the CPL's activities after 13 January 1991. The Division further noted that the CPL's dissolution had been ordered “in accordance with the interests of the Latvian State in a specific historical and political situation” and that the international conventions relied on by the applicant allowed for justified limitations on the exercise of electoral rights.

31.  Following the Civil Division's judgment, enforceable from the date of its delivery, the applicant was disqualified from electoral office and lost her seat as a member of Riga City Council.

32.  The applicant applied to the Senate of the Supreme Court to have the Civil Division's judgment quashed. She stressed, inter alia, the disputed restriction's incompatibility with Article 11 of the Convention. By a final order of 7 February 2000 the Senate declared the appeal inadmissible. In the Senate's opinion, the proceedings in question were limited to a single strictly-defined objective, namely a finding as to whether or not the applicant had taken part in the CPL's activities after 13 January 1991. The Senate concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to analyse the legal consequences of this finding, on the ground that this was irrelevant to the finding itself. In addition, the Senate noted that any such analysis would involve an examination of the Latvian legislation's compatibility with constitutional and international law, which did not come within the final appeal court's jurisdiction.

E.  The 2002 parliamentary elections

33.  The next parliamentary elections took place on 5 October 2002. With a view to taking part in those elections, the “Līdztiesība” party, chaired by the applicant, formed an alliance entitled “For Human Rights in a United Latvia” (“Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā”, abbreviated to PCTVL) with two other parties, the Party of National Harmony and the Socialist Party. The alliance's electoral manifesto expressly referred to the need to abolish the restrictions on the electoral rights of persons who had been actively involved in the CPL after 13 January 1991.

34.  In spring 2002 the Executive Council of the “Līdztiesība” party put forward the applicant as a candidate in the 2002 elections; the Council of the PCTVL alliance approved this nomination. Shortly afterwards, however, on 16 May 2002, the outgoing Parliament dismissed a motion to repeal section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act (see paragraph 47 below). The alliance's council, which was fully aware of the applicant's situation and feared that her candidacy would prevent registration of the PCTVL's entire list, changed its opinion and decided not to include her name on the list of candidates. The applicant then decided to submit a separate list containing only one name, her own, entitled “Party of National Harmony”.

35.  On 23 July 2002 the PCTVL electoral alliance submitted its list to the Central Electoral Commission. In all, it contained the names of 77 candidates for Latvia's five constituencies. On the same date the applicant asked the Commission to register her own list, for the constituency of Kurzeme alone. As she had done for the 1998 elections, she attached to her list a written statement to the effect that the disputed restrictions were incompatible with the Constitution and with Latvia's international undertakings. On 25 July 2002 the Commission registered both lists.

36.  By a decision of 7 August 2002 the Central Electoral Commission, referring to the Civil Division's judgment of 15 December 1999, removed the applicant from its list. In addition, having noted that the applicant had been the only candidate on the “Party of National Harmony” list and that, following her removal, there were no other names, the Commission decided to cancel the registration of that list.

37.  At the elections of 5 October 2002 the PCTVL alliance's list obtained 18.94 % of the vote and won twenty-five seats in Parliament.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A.  Provisions regarding Latvia's state status

38.  The operative provisions of the Declaration of 4 May 1990 on the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia read as follows:

“The Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR decides:

(1)  in recognition of the supremacy of international law over the provisions of national law, to consider illegal the Pact of 23 August 1939 between the USSR and Germany and the subsequent liquidation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Latvia through the USSR's military aggression on 17 June 1940;

(2)  to declare null and void the Declaration by the Parliament [Saeima] of Latvia, adopted on 21 July 1940, on Latvia's integration into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(3)  to restore the legal effect of the Constitution [Satversme] of the Republic of Latvia, adopted on 15 February 1922 by the Constituent Assembly [Satversmes sapulce], throughout the entire territory of Latvia. The official name of the Latvian state shall be the REPUBLIC of LATVIA, abbreviated to LATVIA;

(4)  to suspend the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia pending the adoption of a new version of the Constitution, with the exception of those articles which define the constitutional and legal foundation of the Latvian State and which, in accordance with Article 77 of the same Constitution, may only be amended by referendum, namely:

Article 1– Latvia is an independent and democratic republic.

Article 2 – The sovereign power of the State of Latvia is vested in the Latvian people.

Article 3 – The territory of the State of Latvia, as established by international agreements, consists of Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale.

Article 6 – The Parliament (Saeima) shall be elected in general, equal, direct and secret elections, based on proportional representation.

Article 6 of the Constitution shall be applied after the restoration of the state and administrative structures of the independent Republic of Latvia, which will guarantee free elections;

(5) to introduce a transition period for the re-establishment of the Republic of Latvia's de facto sovereignty, which will end with the convening of the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia. During the transition period, supreme power shall be exercised by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia;

(6)  during the transition period, to accept the application of those constitutional and other legal provisions of the Latvian SSR which are in force in the territory of the Latvian SSR when the present Declaration is adopted, in so far as those provisions do not contradict Articles 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia.

Disputes on matters relating to the application of legislative texts will be referred to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia.

During the transition period, only the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia shall adopt new legislation or amend existing legislation;

(7)  to set up a commission to draft a new version of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia that will correspond to the current political, economic and social situation in Latvia;

(8)  to guarantee social, economic and cultural rights, as well as universally recognised political freedoms compatible with international instruments of human rights, to citizens of the Republic of Latvia and citizens of other States permanently residing in Latvia. This shall apply to citizens of the USSR who wish to live in Latvia without acquiring Latvian nationality;

(9)  to base relations between the Republic of Latvia and the USSR on the Peace Treaty of 11 August 1920 between Latvia and Russia, which is still in force and which recognises the independence of the Latvian State for all time. A governmental commission shall be set up to conduct the negotiations with the USSR.”

39.  The operative provisions of the Constitutional Law of 21 August 1991 on the State Status of the Republic of Latvia (Konstitucionālais likums “Par Latvijas Republikas valstisko statusu”) state:

“The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia decides:

(1)  to declare that Latvia is an independent and democratic republic in which the sovereign power of the State of Latvia belongs to the Latvian people, the state status of which is defined by the Constitution of 15 February 1922;

(2)  to repeal paragraph 5 of the Declaration of 4 May 1990 on the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia, establishing a transition period for the de facto restoration of the Republic of Latvia's state sovereignty;

(3)  until such time as the occupation and annexation is ended and Parliament is convened, supreme state power in the Republic of Latvia shall be fully exercised by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia. Only those laws and decrees enacted by the supreme governing and administrative authorities of the Republic of Latvia shall be in force in its territory;

(4)  this constitutional law shall enter into force on the date of its enactment.”

B.  The status of the CPSU and the CPL

40.  The role of the CPSU in the former Soviet Union was defined in Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR (1977) and in Article 6 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR (1978), which were worded along identical lines. Those provisions stated:

“The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and of all state organizations and public organisations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically-substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism.

All party organisations shall function within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR.”

41.  The Supreme Council's decision of 24 August 1991 on the suspension of the activities of certain non-governmental and political organisations was worded as follows:

“On 20 August 1991 the Internationalist Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives, the Republican Council of War and Labour Veterans, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia and the Central Committee of the Latvian Union of Communist Youth issued a proclamation informing the Republic's population that a state of emergency had been decreed in Latvia and encouraging all private individuals to oppose those who did not submit to the orders of the National State of Emergency Committee. In so doing, the above-mentioned organisations ... declared their support for the organisers of the coup d'état and encouraged other individuals to do the same.

The actions of those organisations are contrary to Articles 4, 6 and 49 of the Latvian Constitution, which state that Latvian citizens are entitled to form parties and other associations only if their objectives and practical activities are not aimed at the violent transformation or overturn of the existing constitutional order... and that associations must observe the Constitution and legislation and act in accordance with their provisions.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia decrees:

1. The activities of the Communist Party of Latvia [and of the other above-mentioned organisations] are hereby suspended...”

42.  The relevant parts of the Supreme Council's decision of 10 September 1991 on the dissolution of the above-mentioned organisations read as follows:

“... In May 1990 the Communist Party of Latvia, the Internationalist Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives and the Republican Council of War and Labour Veterans set up the Committee for the Defence of the Constitution of the USSR and the Latvian SSR and the Rights of Citizens, which was renamed the Latvian Committee of Public Safety on 25 November 1990...

On 15 January 1991 the Latvian Committee of Public Safety declared that it was seizing power and dissolving the Supreme Council and the Government of the Republic of Latvia.

 In August 1991 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia [and the other above-mentioned organisations] supported the coup...

Having regard to the preceding, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia decrees:

1. The Communist Party of Latvia [and the other above-mentioned organisations], together with the coalition of these organisations, the Latvian Committee of Public Safety, are hereby dissolved on the ground that they have acted against the Constitution;...

2. Former members of the Communist Party of Latvia [and of the other above-mentioned organisations] are informed that they are entitled to associate within parties and other associations whose objectives and practical activities are not aimed at the violent transformation or overthrow of the existing constitutional order, and which are not otherwise contrary to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Latvia ...”

C.  The electoral legislation

1.  Substantive provisions

43.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution (Satversme) of the Republic of Latvia, adopted in 1922 and amended by the Law of 15 October 1998, are worded as follows:

Article 9

“All citizens of Latvia who enjoy full civic rights and who have reached the age of 21 on the day of the elections may be elected to Parliament.

Article 64

Legislative power lies with the Parliament [Saeima] and with the people, in the conditions and to the extent provided for by this Constitution.

Article 91

All persons in Latvia shall be equal before the law and the courts. Human rights shall be exercised without discrimination of any kind.

Article 101

All citizens of Latvia are entitled to participate, in accordance with the law, in the activities of the State and of local government...”

44.  The relevant provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act (Saeimas vēlēšanu likums) of 25 May 1995 provide:

Section 4

“All Latvian citizens who have reached the age of 21 on the date of the elections may be elected to Parliament, on condition that they are not concerned by one of the restrictions provided for in section 5 of the present law.

Section 5

The following may not stand as candidates in elections or be elected to Parliament: ...

(6) persons who actively participated [darbojušās] after 13 January 1991 in the CPSU (CPL), the Internationalist Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans or the Latvian Committee of Public Safety, or in their regional committees; ...

section 11

The following documents must be appended to the list of candidates: ...

(3) a signed declaration by each candidate on the list confirming that he or she meets the requirements of section 4 of this Act and that he or she is not concerned by section 5(1) – (6) of the present Act; ...

section 13

“... 2. Once registered, the candidate lists are definitive, and the Central Electoral Commission may make only the following corrections:

1) removal of a candidate from the list, where: ...

(a) the candidate is not a citizen enjoying full civic rights (sections 4 and 5 above); ...

3. ... [A] candidate shall be removed from the list on the basis of a statement from the relevant authority or of a court decision. The fact that the candidate: ...

(6) actively participated after 13 January 1991 in the CPSU (CPL), the Internationalist Front of Workers of the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans or the Latvian Committee of Public Safety, or in their regional committees, shall be attested by a judgment of the relevant court; ...”

45.  The Law of 13 January 1994 on elections to municipal councils and city councils (Pilsētas domes un pagasta padomes vēlēšanu likums) contains similar provisions to the provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act cited above. In particular, section 9(5) is identical to section 5(6) of that Act.

2.  Procedural provisions

46.  The procedure for obtaining a judicial statement attesting to an individual's participation or non-participation in the above-mentioned organisations is governed by Chapter 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civilprocesa kodekss), which was inserted by a Law of 3 September 1998 and is entitled “Examination of cases concerning the attestation of restrictions on electoral rights”. The provisions of that chapter read as follows:

Article 233-1

“A request for a statement of restriction on electoral rights may be submitted by the prosecutor...

The request must be submitted to the court in whose territorial jurisdiction is situated the home of the person in respect of whom the attestation of a restriction on electoral rights is requested.

The request may be submitted where an electoral commission has registered a list of candidates which includes ... a citizen in respect of whom there is evidence that, subsequent to 13 January 1991, he or she actively participated in the CPSU (in the CPL).... A request concerning a person included in the list of candidates may also be submitted once the elections have already taken place.

The request must be accompanied by a statement from the electoral commission confirming that the person in question has stood as a candidate in elections and that the list in question has been registered, as well as by evidence confirming the allegations made in the request.”

Article 233-3

After examining the request, the court shall give its judgment:

(1) finding that, after 13 January 1991, the person concerned did actively participate in the CPSU (in the CPL) ...;

(2) declaring the request ill-founded and dismissing it ...”

D.  Proposals to repeal the disputed restrictions

47.  The Parliamentary Elections Act was enacted on 25 May 1995 by the first Parliament elected after the restoration of Latvia's independence, otherwise known as the “Fifth Legislature” (the first four legislatures having operated between 1922 and 1934). The following legislature (the Sixth), elected in October 1995, examined three different proposals seeking to repeal section 5(6) of the above-mentioned Act. At the plenary session of 9 October 1997, the three proposals were rejected by large majorities after lengthy debates. Likewise, on 18 December 1997, during a debate on a proposal to restrict section 5(6), the provision's current wording was confirmed. Elected in October 1998, the following legislature (the Seventh) examined a proposal to repeal section 5(6) at a plenary session on 16 May 2002. After lengthy discussions, the majority of members of parliament refused to accept the proposal.

Finally, the Eighth Legislature, elected in October 2002, examined a similar proposal on 15 January 2004. It was also rejected.

F. The Constitutional Court's judgment of 30 August 2000

48.  In a judgment of 30 August 2000 in case no. 2000-03-01, the Constitutional Court (Satversmes tiesa) found that the restrictions imposed by section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and section 9(5) of the Municipal Elections Act were compatible with the Latvian Constitution and with Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

In that judgment, adopted by four votes to three, the Constitutional Court first reiterated the general principles laid down in the settled case-law of the Convention institutions in applying Article 14 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It further held:

“... 4. The argument that the provisions complained of, forbidding certain Latvian citizens from standing as candidates or being elected to Parliament and municipal councils, discriminate against them on the basis of their political allegiance, is without foundation.... The impugned provisions do not provide for a difference in treatment on the basis of an individual's political convictions (opinions) but for a restriction on electoral rights for having acted against the re-established democratic order after 13 January 1991...

Accordingly, Parliament limited the restrictions to the degree of each individual's personal responsibility [individuālās atbildības pakāpe] in carrying out those organisations' objectives and programmes, and the restriction on the right to be elected to Parliament or to a municipal council ... is related to the specific individual's activities in the respective ... associations.

In itself, formal membership of the above-mentioned organisations cannot serve as a basis for preventing an individual from standing as candidate or being elected to Parliament....

Consequently, the impugned provisions are directed only against those who attempted, subsequent to 13 January 1991 and in the presence of the army of occupation, to re-establish the former regime through active participation [ar aktīvu darbību]; on the other hand, they do not affect persons who have differing political convictions (opinions). The tendency of certain courts to concentrate solely on the finding of the fact of formal membership and not to evaluate the person's behaviour is inconsistent with the objectives sought by Parliament in enacting the provision in issue...

6. ...Given that those organisations' objectives were linked to the overthrow of the existing state regime [pastāvošās valsts iekārtas graušana], they were essentially unconstitutional...

Consequently, the aim of the restrictions on passive electoral rights is to protect the democratic state order, national security and territorial integrity of Latvia. The impugned provisions are not directed against pluralism of ideas in Latvia or against a person's political opinions, but against those who, through their active participation, have attempted to overthrow the democratic state order.... The exercise of human rights may not be directed against democracy as such...

The substance and effectiveness of law is demonstrated in its ethical nature [ētiskums]. A democratic society has a legitimate interest in requiring loyalty to democracy from its political representatives. In establishing restrictions, the candidates' honour and reputation is not challenged, in the sense of personal legal protection [personisks tiesisks labums]; what is challenged is the worthiness of the persons in question to represent the people in Parliament or in the relevant municipal council. These restrictions concern persons who were permanent agents of the occupying power's repressive regime, or who, after 13 January 1991, participated in the organisations mentioned in the impugned provisions and actively fought against the re-established Latvian Constitution and State...

The argument ... that democratic state order must be protected against individuals who are not ethically qualified to become representatives of a democratic state at political or administrative level ... is well-founded...

...The removal from the list of a candidate who was involved in the above-mentioned organisations is not an arbitrary administrative decision; it is based on an individual judgment by a court. In accordance with the law, evaluation of individual responsibility comes under the jurisdiction of the courts....

7. ...In order to determine whether the measure applied, namely the restrictions on passive electoral rights, is proportionate to the objectives being pursued, namely the protection, firstly, of democratic state order and, secondly, of the national security and integrity of the Latvian State, it is necessary to assess the political situation in the country and other related circumstances. Parliament having evaluated the historical and political circumstances of the development of democracy on several occasions ... the Court does not consider that at this stage there would be grounds for challenging the proportionality between the measure applied and its aim.

However, Parliament, by periodically examining the political situation in the State and the necessity and merits of the restrictions, should decide to establish a time-limit on these restrictions ... since such limitations on passive electoral rights may exist only for a specific period.”

49.  Three of the Constitutional Court's seven judges who examined the above-mentioned case issued a dissenting opinion in which they expressed their disagreement with the majority's conclusions. Referring, inter alia, to the judgments in Vogt v. Germany of 26 September 1995 (Series A no. 323) and Rekvényi v. Hungary (GC, no. 25390/94, ECHR 1999-III), they argued that the disputed restrictions could be more extensive with regard to civil servants than to elected representatives. According to those judges, Latvia's democratic regime and institutional system had become sufficiently stable in the years since 1991 for individuals who had campaigned against the system ten years previously no longer to represent a real threat to the State. Consequently, the restriction on those persons' electoral rights was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

THE LAW

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTION

50.  In their letter of 11 February 2004 the Government informed the Court that the European Parliament Elections Act (Eiropas Parlamenta vēlēšanu likums), which was enacted by the Latvian Parliament on 29 January 2004 and entered into force on 12 February 2004, did not contain a provision similar to section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act. Consequently, the applicant was free to stand as a candidate in the elections to the European Parliament, which were to be held on 12 June 2004. The Government argued that, as a supra-national legislature, the European Parliament ought to be considered as a “higher” legislative body than the Latvian Parliament, and that “the applicant will be able to exercise her passive electoral rights effectively at an even higher level than that foreseen at the outset”.

The Government acknowledged that no amendments had so far been made to the laws on parliamentary and municipal elections, so that the disputed restriction remained in force and the applicant remained disqualified from standing for Parliament and for municipal councils. However, they did not consider that this fact was really material to the outcome of the case. Latvia's accession to the European Union in spring 2004 marked the culmination of the transition period, i.e., the country's journey from a totalitarian to a democratic society, and the members of parliament had been aware of this. The Government also argued that the periodic re-consideration of the disputed provisions constituted a stable parliamentary practice (see paragraph 47 above) and that the restrictions complained of by the applicant were provisional in nature.

Against that background, the Government considered that the dispute at the origin of the present case had been resolved, and that the application should be struck out of the list in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention.

51.  The applicant disagreed. She acknowledged that she was entitled to stand in the European elections and that she intended to do so; however, this fact did not resolve the dispute. The applicant emphasised that the restrictions contained in the laws on parliamentary and local elections were still in force and that it was not at all certain that they would be repealed in the near future, especially since a large number of members of parliament seemed to favour their continued inclusion in the statute book. She also pointed out that the circumstances of the present case were very different from those in all the cases where the Court had indeed applied Article 37 § 1 (b). In short, the dispute had not been resolved and there was no reason to strike out the application.

52.  In the Court's view, the question posed here is whether the applicant has in fact lost her status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. In that connection, the Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him or her of victim status unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, for example, Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36; Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 142, ECHR 2000-IV; and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (dec.), no. 48787/99, 4 July 2001). In the present case, the Court notes that the legislative provisions impugned by the applicant remain in force, and that she is still disqualified from standing both for Parliament and for municipal councils. As to the parliamentary practice referred to by the Government, this hardly suffices to affect the applicant's status as a “victim”, since future repeal of the disputed restrictions is merely hypothetical and without any certainty. In any event, any such repeal would not negate the measures already taken against the applicant, namely the prohibition on her participation in the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002 and the forfeiture of her seat as Riga city councillor in 1999.

In so far as the Government refer to the opportunity for the applicant to take part in the European elections, the Court recognises that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable (see Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, §§ 39-44 and 48-54, ECHR 1999-I). However, the fact that a person is entitled to stand for election to the European Parliament does not release the State from its obligation to respect his or her rights under Article 3 with regard to the national parliament.

53.  In sum, the Latvian authorities have neither recognised nor, even less, redressed the violations alleged by the applicant. She remains a “victim” of those alleged violations, the dispute is far from being resolved, and there is accordingly no reason to apply Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention.

Accordingly, the Government's objection must be dismissed.

IV.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

54.  The applicant complained that her disqualification from standing for election to Parliament on the ground that she had actively participated in the CPL after 13 January 1991 constituted a violation of her right to stand as candidate in parliamentary elections. This right is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

A.  The parties' submissions

1.  The applicant

55.  The applicant considered that the reasons given for her disqualification should be examined in the light of the principles and conclusions identified by the Court in the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey judgment of 30 January 1998 (Reports 1998-I, pp. 21-22, §§ 45-46). In her opinion, the impact of her disqualification, on herself and on her comrades, was comparable to the dissolution of the Communist Party in the above-mentioned case. Equally, the applicant argued that the limitations on the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 were to be analysed in the same way as the restrictions on the freedom of assembly and association authorised by Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. Consequently, the reasoning in the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment, adopted under Article 11 of the Convention, was applicable mutatis mutandis to her case.

56.  The applicant disputed the Government's arguments derived from the CPL's participation in the events of January and August 1991 and from the need to defend “an effective democracy”. Firstly, she contested the allegations regarding the CPL's allegedly totalitarian and dangerous nature. In that connection, she quoted from the party's official programme, adopted in April 1990, which advocated “constructive cooperation between different political forces favourable to the democratic transformation of society” and “a society based on the principles of democracy [and] humanism”. Equally, referring to the proceedings of the CPL's 25th Congress, the applicant argued that the party had had no intention at that time of restoring the former totalitarian communist regime.

Furthermore, the applicant denied the Government's submissions regarding the CPL's alleged illegality. She pointed out that the CPL was declared unconstitutional only on 23 August 1991 and that the party's activities had remained perfectly legal until that date, including during the period after the events of January 1991.

57.  Secondly, the applicant argued that membership of the CPL did not in itself suffice to prove a lack of loyalty towards Latvia. Indeed, of the 201 members of the Supreme Council, 106 had originally been members of the CPL and the division of members of parliament into two main camps had been based solely on their attitude to the Declaration of Independence and not on whether they had been members of that party.

Equally, the applicant considered that the CPL could not be accused of having attempted to overthrow the democratic regime. With regard to the events of January 1991, she repeated her own version of events, according to which there had been no attempt to usurp power. In this connection, she submitted a copy of the appeal by the CPL's parliamentary group, published on 21 January 1991, which denied that the Party had been involved in organising the armed incursions and deploring “political provocation ... aimed at ... misleading world opinion”. In any event, the applicant emphasised that she herself had never been a member of the Committee of Public Safety. As to the events of 19 August 1991, the applicant submitted that there was evidence exculpating the CPL.

58.  In any event, the applicant considered that the Republic of Latvia's ambiguous constitutional status during the period in question was an important factor to be taken into consideration under this point. In that connection, she noted that the Declaration of 4 May 1990 had established a transition period so that institutional links with the USSR could be gradually broken off. In reality, it had been a period of diarchy, during which Soviet and Latvian constitutional and legislative texts, and even some Soviet and Latvian institutions, coexisted and functioned in parallel throughout the national territory. The applicant acknowledged that the Constitutional Law of 21 August 1991 had ended the transition period; however, she submitted that it was impossible to declare null and void the very existence of that period. Since the legitimacy of the institutions which were then functioning in Latvian territory was not clearly established, one could not correctly speak of a coup d'état.

59.  Equally, the CPL could not be criticised for having taken a pro-Soviet and anti-independence attitude during the transition period. Whilst acknowledging that the CPL and she herself had declared their firm support for a Latvia which enjoyed greater sovereignty but remained an integral part of the USSR, the applicant observed that, at the material time, there was a very wide range of opinions on the ways in which the country should develop politically, even amongst those members of parliament who supported independence in principle. In addition, leaders of foreign States had also been divided on this subject: some had been very sceptical about the liberation of the Baltic states and had preferred to adopt an approach of non-interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. In short, in supporting one of the possible avenues for development, the CPL had in fact exercised its right to pluralism of political opinions, which was inherent in a democratic society.

60.  The applicant considered ill-founded and unsubstantiated the Government's argument that to allow persons who had been members of the CPL after 13 January 1991 to become members of Parliament would be likely to compromise national security. She pointed out that the impugned restriction had not existed until 1995 and that, in the first parliamentary elections following restoration of the 1922 Constitution, three individuals in the same position as herself had been elected to parliament. In those circumstances, the applicant could not see how her election could threaten national security such a long time after the facts held against her.

61.  In any event, the applicant considered that the criteria identified in the Court's case-law with regard to the political loyalty of civil servants could not be applied to current or potential members of a national parliament.

62.  In so far as the Government referred to the Constitutional Court's judgment of 30 August 2000, the applicant referred to the dissenting opinion signed by three of the seven judges who had examined the case, finding that the disputed restriction was disproportionate. The applicant endorsed the arguments put forward by those three judges, particularly the contention that the Latvian democratic system had become sufficiently strong for it no longer to fear the presence within its legislative body of persons who had campaigned against the system ten years previously.

63.  With regard to the Constitutional Court's restrictive interpretation of the electoral law, which presupposed evaluation of the individual responsibility of each person concerned, the applicant argued that nothing in her personal conduct justified the disputed measure, since she had never attempted to restore the totalitarian regime or overthrow the legitimate authorities. On the contrary, she had campaigned for democratisation and for reform within the CPSU, the CPL and society as a whole.

64.  The applicant also argued that nothing in her personal conduct since the alleged facts justified the restriction on her electoral rights. Thus, subsequent to January 1990, she had campaigned in a non-governmental organisation, “Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja” (“Latvian Committee for Human Rights”), and had co-chaired that organisation until 1997. Working within the committee, she had become very well known for her activities in providing legal assistance to thousands of individuals; she had helped to promote respect for human rights in Latvia and she had been responsible for implementing three Council of Europe programmes.

65.  Finally, and contrary to the Government's submissions, the applicant considered that the disputed restriction was not provisional. In that connection, she pointed out that, although Parliament had indeed re-examined the electoral law before each election, this re-examination had always resulted in an extension rather than a reduction in the number of circumstances entailing disqualification. Consequently, it had to be acknowledged that the disqualification of individuals who had been active within the CPL after 13 January 1991 was likely to continue. The measure reduced electoral rights to the point of impairing their very essence, and the free expression of the opinion of the people had been impeded in the present case.

2.  The Government

66.  The Government began by submitting a long description of the historical events related to the restoration of Latvian state independence. In particular, they referred to the following facts, which they considered common knowledge and not open to dispute:

(a)  Having failed to obtain a majority on the Supreme Council in the democratic elections of March 1990, the CPL and the other organisations listed in section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act decided to take the unconstitutional route and set up a Committee of Public Safety, which attempted to usurp power and to dissolve the Supreme Council and the legitimate government. Such actions were contrary not only to Article 2 of the 1922 Constitution, which stated that sovereign power was vested with the people, but also to Article 2 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, which conferred authority to act on behalf of the people on elected councils (soviets) alone.

(b)  The Central Committee of the CPL provided financial support to the special unit of the Soviet police which was entirely responsible for the fatal incidents of January 1991 (see paragraph 13 above); at the same time, the Committee of Public Safety publicly expressed its support for this militarised body.

(c)  During the coup of 19 August 1991 the Central Committee of the CPL openly declared its support for the “National State of Emergency Committee”, set up an “operational group” with a view to providing assistance to it and published an appeal calling on the public to comply with the regime imposed by this self-proclaimed and unconstitutional body.

67.  In support of the above arguments, the Government submitted a copy of the Supreme Court's judgment of 27 July 1995, which found Mr A.R. and Mr O.P., former senior officials in the CPL, guilty of attempting to overthrow the legitimate authorities by violent means. In substance, this judgment established the above-mentioned events as historical facts.

68.  The Government acknowledged that Parliament was not part of the “civil service” in the same way as the police or the armed forces. However, they considered that Parliament was a “public service” since, in enacting legislation, members of parliament were participating directly in the exercise of powers conferred by public law. Consequently, in the Government's opinion, the criteria identified by the Court under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention with regard to restrictions on the political activity of civil servants were applicable by analogy to candidates for office and elected representatives.

69.  With regard to the aim pursued by the impugned restriction, the Government observed that the disqualification from standing for election applied to those persons who had been active within organisations which, following the proclamation of an independent republic, had openly turned against the new democratic order and had actively sought to restore the former totalitarian communist regime. It was consequently necessary to exclude those persons from exercising legislative authority since, having failed to respect democratic principles in the past, there was no guarantee that they would now exercise their authority in accordance with such principles. In other words, the disqualification from standing for election was justified by the need to protect effective democracy, to which all of society was entitled, against a possible resurgence of communist totalitarianism. Relying on Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 September 1998 (Reports 1998-VI, p. 2395, § 52), the Government argued that the disputed disqualification was preventative in nature and did not require the factual existence of dangerous and undemocratic actions on the part of those persons. Referring also to the above-mentioned Rekvényi judgment (particularly § 41), the Government considered that the principle of a “democracy capable of defending itself” was compatible with the Convention, especially in the context of the post-communist societies of central and eastern Europe.

70.  Furthermore, the Government were of the view that the above-mentioned Vogt judgment could not be relied upon in support of the applicant's submissions. Mrs Vogt's activities within the German Communist Party had been legal activities within a legal organisation. In contrast, in the present case, the enactment on 4 May 1990 of the Declaration on the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia had created a new constitutional order, of which that Declaration had become the basis. Accordingly, during the period from 4 May 1990 to 6 June 1993, the date on which the 1922 Constitution was fully re-established, any action against the said Declaration or against the state system founded by it had to be considered unconstitutional and consequently illegal. The Government also disputed the applicant's assertion regarding the existence of a constitutional diarchy during the events of 1991.

71.  In addition, the Government argued that the impugned restriction had the aim of protecting the State's independence and national security. Referring in that connection to the resolutions adopted in April 1990 by the CPL's 25th Congress, the Government noted that that party had always been hostile to the restoration of Latvia's independence and that one of its main aims had been to keep the country inside the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Government considered that the very existence of a State Party to the Convention was threatened in the instant case, and that granting access to the bodies of supreme State power to individuals who were hostile to that State's independence would be likely to compromise national security.

72.  The Government were of the opinion that the restriction in question was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In that connection, they emphasised that the impugned disqualification was not applicable to all those individuals who had officially been members of the CPL after 13 January 1991, but only to those who had “acted” or “actively participated” in the party's operations after the above-mentioned date, i.e. to persons who, in their administrative or representative functions, had threatened Latvia's democratic order and sovereignty. This restrictive interpretation of the electoral legislation had in fact been imposed by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 30 August 2000.

73.  The Government considered that, in the present case, the applicant's hostile attitude to democracy and to Latvia's independence had been clear since the CPL's 25th Congress, during which she chose not to align herself with the dissident progressive delegates, opting instead to remain with those who supported the “hard line” Soviet policy (see paragraph 10 above). Equally, the Government asserted that the Central Committee for Supervision and Audit had a leading position in the CPL's internal structure and that the applicant was a member of a sub-committee responsible for supervising implementation of the party's decisions and policies. The majority of decisions taken by CPL bodies reflected an extremely hostile attitude to the re-establishment of a democratic and independent republic. In that connection, the Government referred once again to the statement issued by the CPL's Central Committee on 13 January 1991, establishing the Committee of Public Safety and aimed at usurping power; however, they admitted that the applicant herself had not been present at the Central Committee's meeting on that date. In short, according to the Government, as one of those responsible for supervising implementation of the CPL's decisions, the applicant could not have failed to oppose an independent Latvia during the period in question.

The Government submitted that, although the applicant's position within the CPL sufficed in itself to demonstrate her active involvement with that party's activities, the courts had nonetheless based their reasoning on the degree of her personal responsibility rather than on a formal finding regarding her status in the party's organisational structure.

74.  In the Government's opinion, the applicant's current conduct continued to justify her disqualification. Supporting their argument with numerous press articles, they submitted that the applicant's political activities were part of a “carefully scripted scenario” aimed at harming Latvia's interests, moving it away from the European Union and NATO and bringing it closer to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Government referred to certain critical statements recently made by the applicant about the State's current policy towards the Russian-speaking minority and the new Language Act; they also criticised the applicant's role in the organisation of public meetings on the dates of former Soviet festivals.

75.  Finally, and still with regard to the proportionality of the disputed measure, the Government pointed out that, since the reinstatement of the 1922 Constitution, each successive parliament had examined the need to maintain the disqualification of individuals who had been active members of the CPSU or the CPL after 13 January 1991; that periodic re-examination thus constituted an established parliamentary practice. In those circumstances, the Government reiterated their argument that the restriction in question was provisional in nature. For the same reason, the restriction could not be regarded as an impairment of the very essence of electoral rights.

76.  In view of all of the above, the Government considered that the applicant's disqualification from standing for election was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and that there had therefore been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the instant case.

B. The Court's assessment

1.  Establishment of the facts of the case

77.  The Court observes, in the first place, that a number of facts in the present case are disputed between the parties. Thus, the applicant contests the Government's version of events with regard to the origins and nature of the first coup attempt in January 1991, the plebiscite of March 1991 and the CPL's collaboration with the perpetrators of the second attempted coup in August 1991 (see paragraphs 13-17, 57 and 66 above). In that connection, the Court wishes to reiterate that, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, its task is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. In so doing, it has to satisfy itself that the national authorities based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts and that they committed no arbitrary acts (see, for example, the judgments in Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, § 39, ECHR 1999-VIII; Vogt v. Germany, cited above, p. 26, § 52 (iii); and Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, p. 1256, § 44). The Court also considers that it must abstain, as far as possible, from pronouncing on matters of purely historical fact, which do not come within its jurisdiction; however, it may accept certain well-known historical truths and base its reasoning on them (see Marais v. France, Commission decision of 24 June 1996, DR 86, p. 184, and Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX).

In the present case, the Court finds no indication of arbitrariness in the way in which the Latvian courts evaluated the relevant facts. In particular, it notes that the CPL's participation in the events of 1991 has been established by a Supreme Court judgment in the context of a criminal case (see paragraph 67 above). Equally, the Court does not have any reason to dispute the findings of fact made by the Riga Regional Court and the Civil Division of the Supreme Court with regard to the events of 1991 and the applicant's personal participation in the CPL's activities (see paragraphs 29-30 above). Moreover, the Court has no information at its disposal which would permit it to suspect the Latvian authorities of having distorted in any way the historical facts concerning the period in question.

2.  The general principles established by the case-law of the Convention institutions

(a)  Democracy and its protection in the Convention system

78.  The Court recalls at the outset that democracy constitutes a fundamental element of “European public order”. That is apparent, firstly, from the Preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very clear connection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of human rights. The Preamble goes on to affirm that European countries have a common heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law. This common heritage consists in the underlying values of the Convention; thus, the Court has pointed out on many occasions that the Convention was in fact designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. In other words, democracy is the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it (see, among many other examples, the above-mentioned United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey judgment, pp. 21-22, § 45; Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos.  41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 86, ECHR 2003-II; and, lastly, Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 89, to be published in ECHR 2004).

79.  However, it cannot be ruled out that a person or a group of persons will rely on the rights enshrined in the Convention or its Protocols in order to attempt to derive therefrom the right to conduct what amounts in practice to activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention; any such destruction would put an end to democracy. It was precisely this concern which led the authors of the Convention to introduce Article 17, which provides: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention” (see Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires”: Official Report of the Consultative Assembly, 1949, pp. 1235-1239). Following the same line of reasoning, the Court considers that no one should be authorised to rely on the Convention's provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society (see Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 99).

80.  Consequently, in order to guarantee the stability and effectiveness of a democratic system, the State may be required to take specific measures to protect it. Thus, in the above-cited Vogt judgment, with regard to the requirement of political loyalty imposed on civil servants, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the concept of a “democracy capable of defending itself” (loc. cit., pp. 25 and 28-29, §§ 51 and 59). It has also found that pluralism and democracy are based on a compromise that requires various concessions by individuals, who must sometimes be prepared to limit some of their freedoms so as to ensure the greater stability of the country as a whole (see Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 99). The problem which is then posed is that of achieving a compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society on the one hand and protecting individual rights on the other (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, cited above, p. 18, § 32). Every time that a State intends to rely on the principle of “a democracy capable of defending itself” in order to justify interference with individual rights, it must therefore carefully evaluate the scope and consequences of the measure under consideration, to ensure that the aforementioned balance is achieved.

81.  Finally, with regard to the implementation of measures intended to defend democratic values, the Court has stated in its Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey judgment, cited above (loc. cit., § 102):

“The Court considers that a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for democracy is sufficiently established and imminent. The Court accepts that where the presence of such a danger has been established by the national courts, after detailed scrutiny subjected to rigorous European supervision, a State may 'reasonably forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention's provisions, before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the country's democratic regime'”.

(b)  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1

82.  The Court points out that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 implies the personal rights to vote and to stand for election. Although those rights are important, they are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for “implied limitations”. In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see also the following judgments: Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 52; Gitonas and Others v. Greece of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, pp. 1233-1234, § 39; Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, p. 2384, § 75; and Labita v. Italy, cited above, § 201). In that connection, and in the light of the pre-eminence of democracy in the Convention system, the Court considers that it must adhere to the same criteria applied with regard to the interference permitted by Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention: the only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to spring from “democratic society” (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-cited judgments in the cases of United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey pp. 21-22, § 45, and Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, § 86).

In any event, like all the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, Article 3 must be interpreted in the light of the principle of the effectiveness of rights inherent in the entire Convention system: this Article must be applied in such a way as to make its stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002‑II).

83.  The Court further points out that the States enjoy considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules on the status of members of parliament, including the criteria for declaring them ineligible. Although they have a common origin in the need to ensure both the independence of elected representatives and the freedom of electors, these criteria vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State; the multiplicity of situations provided for in the constitutions and electoral legislation of numerous member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of possible approaches in this area. For the purposes of applying Article 3, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned. However, the State's margin of appreciation in this regard is limited by the obligation to respect the fundamental principle of Article 3, namely “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see the above-cited judgments in the cases of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, pp. 23-24, § 54, and Podkolzina v. Latvia, § 33).

84.  The Court notes that the former Commission was required on several occasions to consider whether the decision to withdraw an individual's active and passive election rights on account of his or her previous activities constituted a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. In practically all those cases, the Commission found that it did not. Thus, in the cases of X. v. the Netherlands (no. 6573/74, Commission decision of 19 December 1974, DR 1, p. 88) and X. v. Belgium (no. 8701/79, Commission decision of 3 December 1979, DR 18, p. 250), it declared inadmissible applications from two persons who had been convicted following the Second World War of collaboration with the enemy or “uncitizenlike conduct” and, on that account, permanently deprived of the right to vote. In particular, the Commission considered that “the purpose of legislation depriving persons convicted of treason of certain political rights and, more specifically, the right to vote [was] to ensure that persons who [had] seriously abused, in wartime, their right to participate in the public life of their country are prevented in future from abusing their political rights in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state or the foundations of a democratic society (see the above-cited X. v. Belgium decision, loc. cit.). Equally, in the case of Van Wambeke v. Belgium (no. 16692/90, decision of 12 April 1991), the Commission declared inadmissible, on the same grounds, an application from a former member of the Waffen-SS, convicted of treason in 1945, who complained that he had been unable to take part in the elections to the European Parliament in 1989.

Finally, in the case of Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (applications nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Commission decision of 11 October 1979, DR 18, p. 187), the Commission declared inadmissible two applications concerning the refusal to allow the applicants, who were the leaders of a proscribed organisation with racist and xenophobic traits, to stand for election. On that occasion, the Commission referred to Article 17 of the Convention, noting that the applicants “intended to participate in these elections and to avail themselves of the right [concerned] for a purpose which the Commission [had] found to be unacceptable under Article 17” (loc. cit.).

3.  Application of those principles to the present case

(a)  Do the criteria concerning the political activities of public servants apply to members of parliament?

85.  According to the Government, the applicant's disqualification from standing for election must be analysed in the light of the same criteria and general principles applied to members of the civil and military forms of public service. In that connection, the Court points out that it has on several occasions acknowledged the legitimacy of restrictions on the political activities of police officers, civil servants, judges and other persons in State service who exercise public authority (see the following above-cited judgments: Rekvényi v. Hungary, §§ 41 and 46, and Vogt v. Germany, pp. 28-29, § 58, as well as Briķe v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47135/99, 29 June 2000). However, in the cases cited above, the individuals subjected to the contested restrictions belonged to the executive or the judiciary, and the Court accepted that it was particularly important to maintain their political neutrality so as to ensure that all citizens received equal and fair treatment that was not vitiated by political considerations. In contrast, the present case concerns the legislature, which functions in accordance with fundamentally different principles. In protecting “the free expression of the opinion of the people”, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is actually based on the idea of political pluralism; neither a parliament nor an individual member of parliament may, by definition, be “politically neutral”.

Consequently, and assuming that a certain “duty of loyalty” also exists on the part of parliamentarians, the Court is of the opinion that it cannot be identical or even similar to that required of members of the public service.

(b) Did the applicant's disqualification from standing for election pursue a legitimate aim?

86.  The Court points out that, as a general rule, in assessing the limitations imposed by States on the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, it takes a similar approach to that applied in analysing interference within the meaning of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention (see paragraph 82 above). However, in contrast to the situation with regard to those four provisions, the Court is not bound by an exhaustive list of “legitimate aims” with regard to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1; thus, in the above-cited Podkolzina judgment, it recognised the legitimacy of the State's “interest ... in ensuring that its own institutional system functions normally” (loc. cit., § 34). Having regard to the respondent Government's margin of appreciation, the Court accepts that the impugned measure pursues at least three legitimate aims referred to by the Government: protection of the State's independence, protection of the democratic order and protection of national security.

(c)  Is the restriction proportionate to the aim which it pursues?

87.  It remains to be determined whether the measure in question is proportionate to the legitimate aims mentioned above. In the light of the Government's observations, the Court considers that this form of disqualification from standing for election may serve a double function and may be analysed in two ways: as a punitive measure, i.e. as a sanction for having demonstrated uncitizenlike conduct in the past, but also as a preventative measure, where the applicant's current conduct is likely to endanger democracy and where his or her election could create an immediate threat to the State's constitutional system. The Court will examine each of these two aspects in turn.

i. The punitive aspect

88.  With regard, firstly, to the punitive aspect, the Court acknowledges its legitimacy. However, it considers that, generally speaking, the measure in question must remain temporary in order to be proportionate. The Court is unable to agree with the Government's argument that the applicant's disqualification from standing for election was merely “temporary” or “provisional” in nature. Admittedly, the disqualification cannot be described as “life-long”, in that it has not been expressly stated that the situation will never change; nonetheless, in the Court's opinion, the restriction is indeed permanent, in that it is of indefinite duration and will continue until the relevant legislation is repealed.

Admittedly, in several cases brought before it (see paragraph 84 above) the former Commission found that instances of permanent disqualification were proportionate. However, in all of those cases, the applicants had been convicted of particularly grievous criminal offences, such as war crimes or high treason; in contrast, in the present case, the applicant's activities have not given rise to any criminal penalties.

ii.  The preventative aspect

89.  As to the preventative aspect of the disqualification from standing for election, the Court notes that the Government's submissions may be summarised in the form of two main arguments. Firstly, it may be deduced that in 1991 the applicant committed acts of such seriousness that they remain in themselves sufficient to justify her disqualification, even in the absence of specific actions by her at the present time. Secondly, the Government submits that the applicant's current conduct also justifies the disputed measure.

α – The applicant's conduct in 1991

90.  As to the first argument, the Court notes at the outset that the reference date chosen by the Latvian legislature is not 23 August 1991, the date on which the CPL was declared unconstitutional, but 13 January 1991, the date of the first coup d'état supported by that party. The Government submit that the CPL was to be considered illegal from the latter date. The Court cannot accept that argument. It points out that, when examining compliance with the “lawfulness” criterion in respect of the interference provided for in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, it has on numerous occasions stated that any restrictive provision must be “foreseeable”, this requirement being closely linked to the principle of legal certainty (see, most recently, Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, to be reported in ECHR 2004). Yet, according to the information available to the Court, no legislation explicitly or even implicitly prohibited the operations of the CPL or of the CPSU prior to August 1991. Consequently, in becoming involved or participating actively in those organisations during the period in question, the applicant could not reasonably have foreseen the adverse consequences that might arise in the future. Accordingly, she cannot be accused of having been active in an illegal association (see Vogt v. Germany, cited above, p. 30, § 60, in fine).

91.  The Court further observes that it is not its role to rule on the historical controversy between the parties concerning the events of 1991. As it noted above (paragraph 77), the Government's version of the facts seems neither arbitrary nor unreasonable; in particular, the Court considers that the totalitarian and anti-democratic nature of the ruling communist parties in the States of central and eastern Europe prior to 1990 is a well-known historical reality (see, mutatis mutandis, Rekvényi v. Hungary, cited above, §§ 41 and 47). Equally, to the extent that the applicant refers to the CPL's official programme and to its alleged moves towards democratisation after 1990 (see paragraph 56 above), the Court points out that a political party's constitution and programme cannot be taken into consideration as the only criterion in determining its objectives and intentions. The political experience of the Contracting States has shown that in the past political parties with aims contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy have not revealed such aims in their official publications until after taking power. For that reason, the Court has always noted that it cannot be ruled out that the programme of a political party may conceal objectives and intentions different from those that it proclaims; to verify that it does not, the content of the programme must be compared with the actions of the party's leaders and members and the positions they defend (see Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, § 101; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, p. 27, § 58; and Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, pp. 1257‑1258, § 48, all cited above).

92.  That being so, the Court does not exclude the possibility that the impugned restriction could have been justified and proportionate during the first years after the re-establishment of Latvia's independence. It is undeniable that the authorities of a newly-established State are best placed to evaluate the risk of “fall-out” from a totalitarian political regime from which the country concerned has just freed itself and to assess the need for preventative measures. In those circumstances, the Court accepts that to bar from the legislature persons who had held positions within the former regime's ruling body and who had also actively supported attempts to overthrow the new democratic system may be a legitimate and balanced solution, without it being necessary to look into the applicant's individual conduct; such a measure would be fully compatible with the concept of a “democracy capable of defending itself” relied on by the Government. After a certain time, however, this ground is no longer sufficient to justify the preventative aspect of the restriction in question; it then becomes necessary to establish whether other factors, particularly an individual's personal participation in the disputed events, continue to justify his or her ineligibility. Furthermore, the Court notes that this principle was, in essence, acknowledged by the Latvian Constitutional Court in its judgment of 30 August 2000, encouraging the legislature to re-examine periodically the need to maintain the disputed measure (see paragraph 48 above).

93.  The Court notes that, according to the disqualification mechanism introduced by the Latvian electoral legislation, the courts' jurisdiction is strictly limited to a factual finding of participation or non-participation by the person concerned in CPL or CPSU activities subsequent to the above-mentioned date; it does not imply the power to draw the legal consequences of such participation, which are already laid down by the legislation. Consequently, and having regard to the interpretation of the term “active participation” given by the Constitutional Court, the courts have only limited powers to assess the real danger posed to the current democratic order by each individual. In the Court's opinion, such inflexibility is striking, in that it deprives the national courts of jurisdiction to rule on whether the disputed disqualification remains proportionate over time. Accordingly, the Court must itself examine whether the applicant's conduct more than ten years ago still constitutes sufficient justification for barring her from standing in parliamentary elections.

94.  The Court notes firstly that, unlike certain other persons (see paragraph 67 above), the applicant has never been convicted of a criminal offence in connection with her activities within the CPL. Secondly, it notes that in August 1991 a special committee of the Supreme Council was instructed to investigate the participation of certain members of parliament in the second coup d'état, but that the applicant was not one of the fifteen members of parliament who were removed from their seats following this investigation (see paragraph 20 above). The Court therefore concludes that no sufficiently serious misconduct on the applicant's part had been proven.

It is true that, in its judgment of 30 August 2000, the Constitutional Court imposed a restrictive interpretation of section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, emphasising that the restriction in question had been “limited... to the degree of each individual's personal responsibility” and that it was “directed only against those who attempted ... to re-establish the former regime through active participation”. However, although the documents in the case file show that the applicant held an important post within the CPL and that she took part in meetings of that party's governing bodies, none of the evidence produced by the Government proves that she herself committed specific acts aimed at destroying the Republic of Latvia or at restoring the former system. Furthermore, the Government themselves acknowledge that the applicant was absent from the meeting of the CPL's Central Committee on 13 January 1991 at which the party decided to participate in the creation of the Committee of Public Safety; nor has it been contended that the applicant was a member of that committee.

95.  Finally, the Court notes that the disputed restriction was not inserted in the electoral law until 1995 and did not exist at the time of the previous elections in 1993. That being so, it questions why parliament, if it considered that former active members of the CPSU and the CPL were so dangerous for democracy, did not enact a similar provision in 1993 – scarcely two years after the events complained of – but waited until the following elections. In addition, the applicant alleges - and this has not been denied by the Government - that three persons who were in the same position as the applicant were elected to parliament in the 1993 elections (see paragraph 60 above), without this entailing any adverse consequences for the State.

96.  Consequently, in the light of the observations and information submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that the applicant's individual conduct in 1991 was not sufficiently serious to justify her disqualification from standing for office at present.

β – The applicant's current conduct

97.  The question remains of the applicant's current conduct. In that connection the Court points out that, as a general rule, its scrutiny must be based on the domestic authorities' disputed decisions and the legal grounds on which those authorities relied, and that it is unable to take into account alternative legal grounds suggested by the respondent Government in order to justify the measure in question if those grounds are not reflected in the decisions of the competent domestic authorities (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 103, to be reported in ECHR 2003). As the Court has noted above, the procedure for disqualification introduced by the Parliamentary Elections Act is very firmly focused on the past and does not allow for sufficient evaluation of the current threat posed by the persons concerned. Consequently, the Court considers it expedient to examine whether the Government's arguments concerning the post-1991 period could justify the applicant's disqualification from standing for election.

98.  The Court notes that the accusations levelled at the applicant by the Government concern mainly the fact of defending and disseminating ideas which are diametrically opposed to the Latvian authorities' official policy and which are unpopular among a large proportion of the population (see paragraph 74 above). However, the Court points out that there is no democracy without pluralism. On the contrary, it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organised and those which offend, shock or disturb a section of the population (see, mutatis mutandis, Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 39 and 41). A person or an association may promote a change in the law or even the legal and constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles (see Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, cited above, § 98). In the present case, there is no factual evidence before the Court enabling it to conclude that the applicant has failed to comply with either of those conditions.

With regard, firstly, to the ideas advocated by the applicant concerning the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and the legislation on language matters, the Court discerns no evidence of anti-democratic leanings or incompatibility with the fundamental values of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, no. 26482/95, § 45, 12 November 2003). The same conclusion is inescapable as regards the means used by the applicant to attain her political objectives. In particular, she has never been accused of having been secretly active within the CPL after the latter's dissolution, let alone of having sought to re-establish that party in its previous totalitarian form. As regards the various activities criticised by the Government, the Court notes that they are not prohibited by the Latvian legislation, and that the applicant has never been investigated for or convicted of any offence. In sum, the Government have not supplied information about any specific act by the applicant capable of endangering the Latvian State, its national security or its democratic order.

4.  Conclusion

99.  Having regard to all the above, the Court concludes that the permanent disqualification from standing for election to the Latvian Parliament imposed on the applicant on account of her activities within the CPL after 13 January 1991 is not proportionate to the legitimate aims which it pursued and curtails the applicant's electoral rights to such an extent as to impair their very essence, and that its necessity in a democratic society has not been established. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in this case.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

100.  The applicant considers that her disqualification from standing for election to Parliament or to municipal councils also amounts to a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. In so far as they are relevant to the present case, these Articles provide:

Article 10

“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers ...

2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...”

Article 11

“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association...

2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

A.  The parties' submissions

1.  The applicant

101.  The applicant acknowledged that the interference in issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Articles 10 § 2 and 11 § 2 of the Convention. However, referring to the dissenting opinion by the minority of Constitutional Court judges, she argued that section 5(6) of the Parliamentary Elections Act was disproportionate. Equally, the applicant considered that the Government's submissions concerning the legitimate aim pursued by the measure in question and its proportionality were unsubstantiated; in particular, she maintained that neither the Rekvényi judgment, cited above, nor Article 17 of the Convention could be used to support the Government's position in the present case.

2.  The Government

102.  The Government acknowledged that the restriction in issue amounts to an interference with the applicant's enjoyment of her rights as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. However, they considered that this interference complied with the requirements of the second paragraph of each of those Articles.

103.  In the first place, the Government submitted that the impugned interference was “prescribed by law”. Secondly, with regard to the aims pursued by the disputed measure, the Government referred to their submissions under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, they alleged that the interference pursued legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security and of the rights of others to an effective political democracy.

104.  The Government were also of the opinion that the impugned measure was “necessary in a democratic society”. They argued that the measure had to be considered in the light of the country's historical and political context and bearing in mind the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the States in this regard. In that connection, the Government reiterated the arguments already submitted with regard to the applicant's complaints under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, to the effect that the applicant's disqualification from standing for election should be assessed using the same criteria as for restrictions on the political activities of civil servants and other public-sector employees (see paragraph 68 above). In particular, the Government argued that the opposing conclusions as to the existence of a violation of Articles 10 and 11 reached by the Court in the above-mentioned Vogt and Rekvényi cases were due to the objective difference in the level of political development in the two countries concerned. Thus, the existence of a “pressing social need” was not demonstrated in Germany's stable democratic system, while such a need did exist in Hungary, a newly democratic State going through a transitional period; the situation in Latvia resembled that of Hungary in many respects.

Finally, the Government pointed out that the impugned restriction was limited to the official position of member of parliament, and did not prohibit the applicant from expressing her political opinions or from being active within a party. Accordingly, the restriction was applied in such a way as to ensure a distinction between private and official activities. In short, the interference in question was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.

105.  In the alternative, the Government relied on Article 17 of the Convention, prohibiting the abuse of individual rights under the Convention. In so far as this part of the application concerned the applicant's participation in the CPL, Article 17 prevented the applicant from availing herself of the rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

B. The Court's assessment

106.  In the present case, the parties agreed that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicant's right to freedom of association within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention, and that that interference was “prescribed by law”. The Court sees no reason to decide otherwise. It points out that such interference cannot be justified under Article 11 except where it had a legitimate aim or aims under paragraph 2 and was “necessary in a democracy society” in order to achieve these aims.

107.  The Court considers that the impugned measure may be considered to have pursued at least one of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Convention: the protection of “national security” (see paragraph 86 above).

108.  As to the proportionality of the disputed measure, the Court points out that the adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 11 § 2, does not imply the same flexibility as terms such as “acceptable”, “reasonable” or “appropriate”; “necessity” always implies “a pressing social need” (see, among other authorities, Vogt v. Germany, cited above, p. 26, § 52 (ii)). In that connection, the Court refers to the findings it has just reached with regard to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It points out that the party of which the applicant was an active member could not be said to have been “illegal” at the material time (see paragraph 90 above) and that the Government have provided no information about any specific act by the applicant aimed at destroying the newly-restored Republic of Latvia or its democratic order (see paragraph 94).

In so far as the Government refer to the Court's case-law concerning restrictions on the political activities of civil servants, members of the armed forces, members of the judiciary or other members of the public service, the Court points out that the criteria established by its case-law with regard to those persons' political loyalty cannot as such be applied to the members of a national parliament (see paragraph 85 above). The Court finds no cause to arrive at a different conclusion with regard to members of local councils, who are also elected by the people in accordance with the principles of pluralist democracy and are likewise responsible for taking political decisions. In summary, the second sentence of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, authorising “lawful restrictions” with regard to “members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State” does not apply to members of parliament or to members of the elected bodies of local authorities.

109.  In so far as the Government rely on Article 17 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the purpose of this provision is to prevent the principles laid down by the Convention from being exploited for the purpose of engaging in any activity or performing any act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Preda and Dardari v. Italy (dec.), nos. 28160/95 and 28382/95, ECHR 1999-II). In particular, one of the main objectives of Article 17 is to prevent totalitarian or extremist groups from justifying their activities by referring to the Convention. However, in the present case, the applicant's disqualification from standing for election is based on her previous political involvement rather than on her current conduct, and the Court has just found that her current public activities do not reveal a failure to comply with the fundamental values of the Convention (see paragraph 98 above). In other words, there is no evidence before the Court that would permit it to suspect the applicant of attempts to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. In this area, there is a clear distinction between the present case and the Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek case, cited above, in which the applicants' conviction and the annulment of their electoral list were based on their real and specific conduct at the material time, or the German Communist Party and Others v. Germany case (no. 250/57, Commission's report of 20 July 1957, Yearbook 1, pp. 222-225), in which the dissolution of the applicant party was based on the views expressed in its programme, which were contrary to democracy. Accordingly, the Court considers that Article 17 of the Convention is not applicable in the present case.

110.  It follows that the applicant's disqualification from standing for election to Parliament and local councils on account of her active participation in the CPL, maintained more than a decade after the events held against that party, is disproportionate to the aim pursued and, consequently, not necessary in a democratic society. There has therefore been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.

111.  The Court considers that the finding of a violation of Article 11 renders it unnecessary for the Court to rule separately on compliance with the requirements of Article 10 in this case.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

112.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Pecuniary damage

113.  The applicant pointed out that, when the Civil Affairs Division of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 15 December 1999, she lost her seat as a Riga City Councillor (see paragraph 31 above), and thus the salary that she received in that capacity. After December 1999 and until the following municipal elections, held in March 2001, she was replaced by another member of her party whose name followed hers on the relevant electoral list and who thus obtained the applicant's seat, which had fallen vacant. That new councillor received a net salary of 1,690.50 lati (LVL) for 2000 and a net salary of LVL 546 for the first three months of 2001; in support of those figures, the applicant supplied copies of her replacement's tax declarations. The applicant claimed that these were the exact amounts that she would have received had she not been removed from her seat. She thus submitted that she had sustained real pecuniary damage in the shape of loss of earnings, the total amount of which was LVL 2,236.50 (or about 3,450 euros (EUR)).

114.  The Government argued that, according to the Court's settled case-law, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was not applicable to municipal elections. Consequently, there was no link between the violation alleged by the applicant and the pecuniary damage she claimed to have sustained.

115.  The Court acknowledges that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is inapplicable to local elections. However, it has also just found a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, on account of both the applicant's disqualification from standing for Parliament and her removal from her post as Riga City Councillor. In leaving the municipal council, the applicant sustained genuine pecuniary damage (see, in particular, Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 2), nos. 25144/94, 26149/95 to 26154/95, 27100/95 and 27101/95, § 56, ECHR 2002-IV). Given that the Government did not dispute the accuracy of the amounts claimed by the applicant, the Court considers that it can accept them. It therefore decides to award the applicant LVL 2,236.50 under this head.

B. Non-pecuniary damage

116.  The applicant claimed EUR 75,000 by way of compensation for the anguish, humiliation and practical disadvantages that she suffered as a result of her removal from her municipal seat and the impossibility of standing as candidate in two subsequent parliamentary elections. As an example, she argued that in January 2002 she had won an open competition for the post of chairperson of a municipal committee for property privatisation; however, following a virulent press campaign against her, in which her reputation was attacked, Riga City Council refused to endorse the competition's results and to appoint her to that post. The applicant was convinced that this event was directly linked to the violations of her fundamental rights under the Convention.

117.  The Government argued that the poor esteem in which the applicant was held by a large part of Latvian society was due solely to her political activities in the past. Accordingly, it was her own conduct which had ruined her reputation and her career, and her misadventures were completely unrelated to the domestic courts' impugned decisions. In any event, the Government considered that the amount claimed by the applicant was excessive, regard being had in particular to the standard of living and the level of income in Latvia at present. Consequently, they submitted that the finding of a violation would in itself constitute sufficient redress for any non-pecuniary damage that the applicant might have suffered.

In the event of the Court deciding to award the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the Government asked that it be formulated in lati, the Latvian national currency, rather than in euros.

118.  Like the Government, the Court considers that no direct causal link has been shown between the violations found and Riga City Council's refusal to endorse the results of the competition in January 2002. However, it cannot deny that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage as a result of being prevented from standing as a candidate in the parliamentary election and of being removed from her post as city councillor (see, mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina v. Latvia, cited above, § 52). Consequently, deciding on an equitable basis and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court awards her EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

C. Costs and expenses

119.  The applicant requested reimbursment of the costs incurred in preparation and presentation of her case before the Court. She claimed the following sums, which she wished to receive in euros:

a)  LVL 1,000 in respect of fees for Mr A. Ogurcovs, the Latvian lawyer who represented her before the Latvian courts. The applicant submitted no invoices in substantiation of this claim; she claimed that Mr Ogurcovs had lost all the invoices when moving office. However, she considered this sum to be reasonable, having regard to the fees for legal aid payable in Latvia;

b)   a total of 12,100 pounds sterling (GBP), exclusive of value-added tax, for 121 hours of work by Mr W. Bowring, the applicant's lawyer, GBP 3,500 of which corresponded to 35 hours of work subsequent to the hearing on 15 May 2003;

c)  LVL 60.60 in respect of the costs of the applicant's correspondence with the Court and GBP 117.77 under the same head for the period subsequent to 7 April 2003;

d)  GBP 475.31 in respect of travel and subsistence costs for the applicant and Mr Bowring, to enable them to attend the hearing in Strasbourg on 15 May 2003.

120.  The Government questioned the evidence submitted in support of the majority of the sums claimed by the applicant. Thus, they emphasised that, in the absence of supporting documents, there was no evidence that Mr Ogurcovs had provided the alleged services. With regard to Mr Bowring, the only costs acknowledged by the Government were the costs for correspondence with the Court and a part of the travel and subsistence costs. As to Mr Bowring's fees, the Government submitted a video recording of a television programme in which the applicant had taken part; during that programme, the applicant replied to one of the presenter's questions by stating that “Mr Bowring [was her] friend” and that she “ha[d] not paid him anything”. In those circumstances, the Government stated that the bills submitted by Mr Bowring were nothing but bogus documents drafted solely for the purposes of the proceedings pending before the Court; consequently, they objected to reimbursement of those fees. In the alternative, the Government argued that the total amount claimed by the applicant was excessive, and asked that the amount of any award for costs and expenses be expressed in lati.

121.  In reply to the Government's arguments, the applicant confirmed the validity of the bills issued by Mr Bowring. She explained that she had indeed paid him nothing to date; however, their contract stipulated that, in the event of a favourable decision by the Court, she would be obliged to pay him the totality of the invoiced sums. According to the applicant, this was a very widespread practice in legal representation, including before the Court. Contrary to the Government's request, the applicant urged the Court to express the amount awarded in euros rather than in lati.

122.  The Court reiterates that, to be entitled to an award of costs and expenses under Article 41 of the Convention, the injured party must have genuinely “incurred” or “sustained” them (see, among many other authorities, Eckle v. Germany (Article 50), judgment of 21 June 1983, Series A, no. 65, p. 11, § 25). However, this principle must be interpreted in the light of the overall objectives pursued by Article 41. The Court has accepted that the high costs of proceedings may of themselves constitute a serious impediment to the effective protection of human rights, and that it would be wrong for the Court to give encouragement to such a situation in its decisions awarding costs under Article 41 (see Bönisch v. Austria (Article 50), judgment of 2 June 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 9, § 15). In those circumstances, reimbursement of fees cannot be limited only to those sums already paid by the applicant to his or her lawyer; indeed, such an interpretation would discourage many lawyers from representing less prosperous applicants before the Court. In any event, the Court has always awarded costs and expenses in situations where the fees remained, at least in part, payable by the applicant (see, for example, Kamasinski v. Austria, judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 168, p. 47, § 115; Koendjbiharie v. the Netherlands, judgment of 25 October 1990, Series A, 185-B, p. 42, § 35; and Iatridis v. Greece [GC] (just satisfaction), no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 2000-XI). In the present case, there is nothing to suggest that the bills drawn up by Mr Bowring are bogus or that the applicant has decided not to pay them.

123.  The Court further reiterates that, in order to be reimbursed, the costs must relate to the violation or violations found and must be reasonable as to quantum. In addition, Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court provides that itemised particulars must be submitted of all claims made under Article 41 of the Convention, together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part (see, for example, Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, § 154, 28 November 2002). Equally, the Court may award the injured party payment not only of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, but also those incurred before the domestic courts to prevent or rectify a violation found by the Court (see Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no. 26103/95, § 45, ECHR 1999-I, and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 86, ECHR 2000-V).

In the present case, the Court considers that, in the absence of the relevant vouchers, it cannot allow the request for reimbursement of Mr Ogurcovs's fees. As to Mr Bowring's bills, it observes that several references are fairly general and do not substantiate the specific nature of the legal services rendered. In any event, the overall sum claimed by the applicant in respect of costs and expenses is somewhat excessive. On the other hand, the Court does not deny that the case was very complex, which had an undoubted bearing on the costs of preparing the application. Finally, it notes that the applicant and her lawyer attended the hearing on 15 May 2003 without having first obtained legal aid. In those circumstances, and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 10,000 to cover all heads of costs taken together. To this amount is to be added any value-added tax that may be chargeable (see Lavents v. Latvia, cited above, § 154).

C.  Default interest

124.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Dismisses unanimously the Government's preliminary objection that the applicant was not a victim;

 2.  Holds by five votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

 3.  Holds by five votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, and that it is not necessary to examine separately the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention;

 4.  Holds by five votes to two

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

i.  LVL 2,236.50 (two thousand two hundred and thirty-six lati and fifty santimi) for pecuniary damage;

(i)  EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), to be converted into Latvian lati at the rate applicable on the date of settlement, for non-pecuniary damage;

iii.  EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), to be converted into Latvian lati at the rate applicable on the date of settlement, for costs and expenses;

iv.  any tax that may be payable on the above sums;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5.  Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 17 June 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

  Søren Nielsen                                                                    Christos Rozakis
       Registrar                                                                                President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting opinions of Mr Bonello and Mr Levits are annexed to this judgment.

C.L.R.
E.F.

In the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

          Mr     L. Wildhaber, President,
          Mr     C.L. Rozakis,
          Mr     J.-P. Costa,
          Sir     Nicolas Bratza,
          Mr     B.M. Zupančič,
          Mr     L. Loucaides,
          Mr     R. Türmen,
          Mr     J. Casadevall,
          Mr     A.B. Baka,
          Mr     R. Maruste,
          Mr     J. Borrego Borrego,
          Mrs   E. Fura-Sandström,
          Mrs   A. Gyulumyan,
          Ms     L. Mijović,
          Mr     D. Spielmann,
          Ms     R. Jaeger, judges,
          Mrs   J Briede, ad hoc judge,
and Mr T.L. Early, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 1 June 2005 and 15 February 2006,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 58278/00) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms Tatjana Ždanoka (“the applicant”), on 20 January 2000.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr W. Bowring, a lawyer practising in Colchester, the United Kingdom. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Reine, of the Foreign Ministry.

3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that her disqualification from standing for election to the Latvian Parliament and to municipal elections infringed her rights as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

4.  The application was assigned to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5.  On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First Section (Rule 52 § 1).

6.  By a decision of 6 March 2003 a Chamber of the First Section declared the application partly admissible.

7.  On 17 June 2004, following a hearing on the merits (Rule 59 § 3), a Chamber of the First Section, composed of Mr C.L. Rozakis, President, Mr P. Lorenzen, Mr G. Bonello, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mr E. Levits, Mr A. Kovler, Mr V. Zagrebelsky, judges, and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar, delivered a judgment in which it held, by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 11 of the Convention, and that it was not necessary to examine separately the applicant’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention. The Chamber also decided, by five votes to two, to award compensation for pecuniary damage in the amount of 2,236.50 Latvian lati (LVL), non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 10,000 euros (EUR), and legal costs and expenses in the amount of EUR 10,000. The separate dissenting opinions of Mr G. Bonello and Mr E. Levits were annexed to the judgment.

8.  On 17 September 2004 the Government requested, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. A panel of the Grand Chamber accepted this request on
10 November 2004.

9.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

10.  A hearing before the Grand Chamber took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 June 2005 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a)  for the Government
Ms    I. Reine,                                                                                   Agent,
Mr    E. Plaksins,                                                                         Counsel;

(b)  for the applicant
Mr    W. Bowring,                                                                       Counsel.

 The Court heard addresses by Mr Bowring and Ms Reine.

 4.  The Court’s observations in conclusion

132.  The Latvian authorities’ view that even today the applicant’s former position in the CPL, coupled with her stance during the events of 1991 (see, in particular, paragraphs 123-124 above), still warrant her exclusion from standing as a candidate to the national Parliament, can be considered to be in line with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The impugned statutory restriction as applied to the applicant has not been found to be arbitrary or disproportionate. The applicant’s current or recent conduct is not a material consideration, given that the statutory restriction in question relates only to her political stance during the crucial period of Latvia’s struggle for “democracy through independence” in 1991.

133.  While such a measure may scarcely be considered acceptable in the context of one political system, for example in a country which has an established framework of democratic institutions going back many decades or centuries, it may nonetheless be considered acceptable in Latvia in view of the historico-political context which led to its adoption and given the threat to the new democratic order posed by the resurgence of ideas which, if allowed to gain ground, might appear capable of restoring the former regime.

134.  The Court therefore accepts in the present case that the national authorities of Latvia, both legislative and judicial, are better placed to assess the difficulties faced in establishing and safeguarding the democratic order. Those authorities should therefore be left sufficient latitude to assess the needs of their society in building confidence in the new democratic institutions, including the national Parliament, and to answer the question whether the impugned measure is still needed for these purposes, provided that the Court has found nothing arbitrary or disproportionate in such an assessment. In this respect, the Court also attaches weight to the fact that the Latvian Parliament has periodically reviewed section 5(6) of the 1995 Act, most recently in 2004. Even more importantly, the Constitutional Court has carefully examined, in its decision of 30 August 2000, the historical and political circumstances which gave rise to the enactment of the law in Latvia, finding the restriction to be neither arbitrary nor disproportionate at that point in time, i.e. nine years after the events in question (see paragraphs 61-63 above).

135.  It is to be noted that the Constitutional Court observed in its decision of 30 August 2000 that the Latvian Parliament should establish a time-limit on the restriction. In the light of this warning, even if today Latvia cannot be considered to have overstepped its wide margin of appreciation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, it is nevertheless the case that the Latvian Parliament must keep the statutory restriction under constant review, with a view to bringing it to an early end. Such a conclusion seems all the more justified in view of the greater stability which Latvia now enjoys, inter alia, by reason of its full European integration
(see paragraph 51 above). Hence, the failure by the Latvian legislature to take active steps in this connection may result in a different finding by the Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, § 60; see also the follow-up judgment to that case, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, §§ 71-93, ECHR 2002-VI).

136.  The Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

137.  The applicant complained that her disqualification from standing for election to the national Parliament as well as municipal councils amounted to a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Insofar as relevant, these Articles provide:

Article 10

“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers...

2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...”

Article 11

“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association ...

2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

A.  The Chamber’s judgment

138.  The Chamber considered that there had been a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights, in breach of Article 11 of the Convention. The Chamber also considered that it was not required to rule on the applicant’s complaints under Article 10.

B.  The parties’ submissions

1.  The applicant

139.  The applicant acknowledged that the interference in question was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Articles 10 § 2 and 11 § 2 of the Convention. However, she considered that the Government’s submissions concerning the legitimacy of the aims pursued by the impugned measure and their respect for the principle of proportionality were unsubstantiated. In particular, neither the Rekvényi judgment cited above, nor Article 17 of the Convention supported the Government’s position in the present case.

2.  The Government

140.  The Government maintained that the interference complied with the requirements of the second paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11 and that the impugned measure was “necessary in a democratic society”.

C.  The Court’s assessment

141.  The Court considers in the circumstances of the case that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is lex specialis, and no separate examination of the applicant’s complaints is warranted under Article 11. Nor can the Court find any argument that would require a separate examination of the applicant’s complaints about her inability to stand for election from the point of view of Article 10.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Dismisses, unanimously, the Government’s preliminary objection;

 2.  Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

 3.  Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicant’s complaints under Article 11 of the Convention;

 4.  Holds, unanimously, that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicant’s complaints under Article 10 of the Convention.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 16 March 2006.

                                                                                 Luzius Wildhaber
                                                                                        President
  T.L. Early
Deputy to the Registrar

Letonia a facut recurs si, in martie 2006, instanta superioara a intors decizia (cu 13 la patru). Iar motivatia e cu totul remarcabila: Curtea recunoaste ca o asemenea interdictie ar fi cu greu acceptabila intr-o tara cu traditie democratica, dar ca poate fi acceptabila in Letonia, date fiind conditiile istorice care au dus la adoptarea lustratiei si date fiind amenintarile la adresa noii democratii. Si fraza-cheie: „Curtea accepta in acest caz ca autoritatile nationale din Letonia sint intr-o pozitie mai buna sa evalueze dificultatile intimpinate in stabilirea ordinii democratice.“ Constatind ca legea nu are in sine un caracter permanent, ci a fost prelungita repetat de Parlament, Curtea sfatuieste Letonia sa revada si sa reevalueze periodic necesitatea mentinerii lustratiei.

.  La loi sur l’évaluation du comité pour la sécurité d’Etat de l’URSS (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) et des activités désormais exercées par les anciens employés permanents de l’organisation (Įstatymas dėl SSRS valstybės saugumo komiteto (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) vertinimo ir šios organizacijos kadrinių darbuotojų dabartinės veiklos) (« la loi sur le KGB ») a été adoptée le 16 juillet 1998 par le Parlement lituanien (Seimas) et promulguée par le président de la République. Elle est ainsi libellée en ses articles pertinents :

Article 1
Reconnaissance du comité pour la sécurité d’Etat de l’URSS
comme organisation criminelle

« Le comité pour la sécurité d’Etat de l’URSS (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB – ci‑après « le CSE ») est reconnu comme une organisation criminelle ayant commis des crimes de guerre, des génocides et des actes de répression, de terreur et de persécution politique sur le territoire de la Lituanie pendant l’occupation de celle-ci par l’URSS. »

Article 2
Restrictions aux activités désormais exercées
par les anciens employés permanents du CSE

« Pendant une période de dix ans à compter de la date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, les anciens employés du CSE ne seront pas autorisés à travailler comme agents de l’Etat ou fonctionnaires pour les services du gouvernement, des collectivités locales ou de la défense, pour le service de la sécurité d’Etat, la police, le parquet, les tribunaux ou le service diplomatique, les douanes, les organes de contrôle de l’Etat et autres autorités contrôlant des institutions publiques, comme avocats et notaires, employés de banques et d’autres institutions de crédit, à des projets économiques stratégiques, dans des sociétés de sécurité (structures), dans d’autres sociétés (structures) fournissant des services de détective, dans les systèmes de communications ou dans le système éducatif comme professeurs, éducateurs ou chefs d’établissement[ ;] ils ne pourront pas non plus occuper de poste requérant le port d’armes. »

Article 3
Exceptions aux restrictions

« 1.  Les restrictions prévues à l’article 2 ne sont pas appliquées aux anciens employés permanents du CSE qui, pendant qu’ils travaillaient pour ce dernier, n’ont enquêté que sur ses affaires pénales, et ont cessé toute activité pour le CSE au plus tard le 11 mars 1990.

2.  Le centre de recherche sur le génocide et la résistance du peuple lituanien et le service de la sécurité d’Etat peuvent [recommander au moyen d’] une requête motivée qu’aucune des restrictions prévues dans la présente loi ne soit appliquée aux anciens employés permanents du CSE qui, dans les trois mois à compter de la date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, se signaleront au service de la sécurité d’Etat et fourniront toutes les informations dont ils disposent (...) au sujet du travail qu’ils ont effectué pour le CSE et de leurs relations actuelles avec les anciens employés et agents du CSE. Une décision sera prise à ce sujet par une commission composée de trois personnes nommées par le président de la République. Aucun des employés du centre de recherche sur le génocide et la résistance du peuple lituanien ou du service de la sécurité d’Etat ne peut être désigné pour faire partie de cette commission, dont le règlement doit être confirmé par le président de la République. »

Article 4
Procédure de mise en œuvre de la loi

« La procédure de mise en œuvre de la loi est régie par [une loi spéciale]. »

Article 5
Entrée en vigueur de la loi

« La présente loi entre en vigueur le 1^er janvier 1999. »

25.  A la suite de l’examen par la Cour constitutionnelle de la compatibilité de la loi sur le KGB avec la Constitution (paragraphe 28 ci-dessous), l’article 3 de cette loi fut amendé le 5 mai 1999 en sorte que même les personnes ayant travaillé pour le KGB après le 11 mars 1990 pussent bénéficier des exceptions prévues à l’article 3 de ladite loi.

In the case of Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

          Mr     B.M. Zupančič, President,
          Mr     J. Hedigan,
          Mr     J.-P. Costa,
          Mrs   M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
          Mr     V. Zagrebelsky,
          Mr     E. Myjer,
          Mr     David Thór Björgvinsson, judges,
and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 March 2005,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in applications (nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Lithuanian nationals, Mr Raimundas Rainys (“the first applicant”) and Mr Antanas Gasparavičius (“the second applicant”), on 19 January 2001 and 31 July 2001 respectively.

2.  The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by
Mr A. Paškauskas, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent,
Mrs D. Jočienė, of the Ministry of Justice.

3.  The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had lost their jobs and that their employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application of the Law on the Evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Present Activities of Permanent Employees of the Organisation, in breach of Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the Convention.

4.  The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mr P. Kūris, the judge elected in respect of Lithuania, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr J.-P. Costa to sit as the judge elected in respect of Lithuania (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).

5.  By a decision of 22 January 2004 the Court joined and declared the cases partly admissible.

6.  The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).

7.  On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). The case was assigned to the newly composed Third Section (Rule 52 § 1).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8.  The first applicant, Mr Raimundas Rainys, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. The second applicant,
Mr Antanas Gasparavičius, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1945 and lives in Kretinga.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A.  The first applicant

9.  From 1975 to October 1991 the first applicant was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Security Service (hereinafter the “KGB”). Thereafter he found employment as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company.

10.  On 17 February 2000 two authorities - the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People - jointly concluded that the applicant was subject to the restrictions imposed under Article 2 of the Law on the Evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Present Activities of Permanent Employees of the Organisation (hereinafter “the Act”, see paragraph 22 below). The conclusion confirmed that the applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer” as construed by the Act. As a result, on 23 February 2000 he was dismissed from his job at the telecommunications company.

11.  The applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, arguing that his dismissal under Article 2 of the Act and the resultant inability to find employment were unlawful.

12.  On 29 June 2000 the Higher Administrative Court found that the conclusion of 17 February 2000 had been substantiated, and that the applicant was subject to the restrictions imposed under Article 2 of the Act.

13.  On 5 September 2000 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal.

14.  The applicant has been unemployed since 26 February 2002.

B.  The second applicant

15.  From 1971 until October 1991 the second applicant worked at the KGB. Thereafter he started practising as a barrister.

16.  On an unspecified date in 2000, the Lithuanian State Security Department and the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People jointly concluded that the applicant had the status of a “former KGB officer”, and that he was thereby subject to the restrictions imposed under Article 2 of the Act. On 12 June 2000 the Bar informed him that he would be disbarred pursuant to that law.

17.  The applicant brought an administrative action, claiming that his dismissal from the Bar would be unlawful. While the applicant did not contest the fact that he had worked for the KGB even following the declaration of Lithuanian independence on 11 March 1990, he submitted that thereafter he had worked as an informer for the authorities of independent Lithuania. Furthermore, throughout his time at the KGB the applicant had allegedly only worked with cases concerning purely criminal investigations, not political persecutions. In the applicant's view, he had been entitled to be exempted from the employment restrictions, in accordance with Article 3 of the Act.

18.  On 21 February 2001 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claim. The court found that he had indeed worked with criminal investigations while at the KGB, but that he had remained employed there until his retirement in October 1990. The court held that the exceptions in Article 3 of the Act were not applicable to the applicant, given that he did not end his employment with the KGB immediately after Lithuania's declaration of independence on 11 March 1990.

19.  Upon the applicant's appeal, on 16 May 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld this decision. The court reiterated that the applicant was not entitled to be exempted under Article 3 of the Act, as he had not ended his KGB employment immediately after 11 March 1990. Moreover, there was no plausible evidence attesting that thereafter the applicant had worked at the KGB as an agent of the authorities of independent Lithuania.

20.  As a result of the proceedings on 29 May 2001 the applicant was disbarred.

21.  He has now found employment in the business field.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

22.  The Law on the Evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Present Activities of Former Permanent Employees of the Organisation (Įstatymas dėl SSRS valstybės saugumo komiteto (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) vertinimo ir šios organizacijos kadrinių darbuotojų dabartinės veiklos) was enacted
on 16 July 1998 by the Seimas (Parliament) and promulgated by the President of the Republic. The Act reads as follows:

Article 1

Recognition of the USSR State Security Committee as a criminal organisation

“The USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB – hereinafter SSC) is recognised as a criminal organisation which committed war crimes, genocide, repression, terror and political persecution in the territory of Lithuania when occupied by the USSR.”

Article 2

Restrictions on the present activities of permanent employees of the SSC

“For a period of 10 years from the date of entry into force of this Law, former employees of the SSC may not work as public officials or civil servants in government, local or defence authorities, the State Security department, the police, prosecution, courts or diplomatic service, customs, State supervisory bodies and other authorities monitoring public institutions, as lawyers and notaries, as employees of banks and other credit institutions, on strategic economic projects, in security companies (structures), in other companies (structures) providing detective services, in communications systems, or in the educational system as teachers, educators or heads of institutions[;] nor may they perform a job requiring a weapon.”

Article 3

Cases in which the restrictions shall not be applied

“1. The restrictions provided for in Article 2 shall not be applied to former permanent employees of the SSC who, while working at the SSC, investigated only criminal cases and who discontinued their work at the SSC not later than 11 March 1990.

2. The Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People and the State Security Department may [recommend by] a reasoned application that no restrictions under this law be applied to former permanent employees of the SSC who, within 3 months of the date of the entry into force of this Law, report to the State Security Department and disclose all information in their possession ... about their former work at the SSC and their current relations with former SSC employees and agents. A decision in this respect shall be taken by a commission of three persons set up by the President of the Republic. No employees of the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People or the State Security Department may be appointed to the commission. The commission's rules shall be confirmed by the President of the Republic.”

Article 4

Procedure for implementation of the Act

“The procedure for implementation of the Act shall be governed by [a special law].”

Article 5

Entry into force of the Act

“This Act shall come into effect on 1 January 1999.”

23.  Following the examination by the Constitutional Court of the compatibility of the Act with the Constitution (see § 28 below), on 5 May 1999 Article 3 of the Act was amended to the effect that even those individuals who had worked for the KGB after 11 March 1990 could be eligible for exceptions under Article 3 of the Act.

24.  On 16 July 1998 a separate law on the implementation of the Act was adopted. According to that law, the Centre for Research into the Genocide and Resistance of the Lithuanian People and the State Security Department were empowered to reach a conclusion on an individual's status as a “former permanent employee of the KGB” for the purposes of the Act.

25.  On 26 January 1999 the Government adopted a list (“the list”) of positions in various branches of the KGB on Lithuanian territory attesting to a person's status as a “former permanent employee of the KGB” (“former KGB officer”) for the purposes of the Act. 395 different positions were listed in this respect.

26.  On 4 March 1999 the Constitutional Court examined the issue of the compatibility of the Act with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court held in particular that the Act had been adopted in order to carry out “security screening” measures on former Soviet security officers, who were deemed to be lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. The Constitutional Court decided that the prohibition on former KGB agents' occupying public posts was compatible with the Constitution. It further ruled that the statutory ban on the holding by former KGB employees of jobs in certain private sectors was compatible with the constitutional principle of a free choice of profession in that the State was entitled to lay down specific requirements for persons applying for work in the most important economic sectors in order to ensure the protection of national security and proper functioning of the educational and financial systems. The Constitutional Court also held that the restrictions under the Act did not amount to a criminal charge against former KGB agents.

27.  While the Act does not specifically guarantee a right of access to a court to contest the security intelligence authorities' conclusion, it was recognised by the domestic courts that, as a matter of practice, a dismissal from employment in the public service on the basis of that conclusion gave rise to an administrative court action (and a further appeal) under the general procedure governing industrial disputes and alleged breaches of personal rights by the public authorities, pursuant to Articles 4, 7, 8, 26, 49, 50, 59, 63 and 64 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, Article 222 of the Civil Code and Article 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as effective at the material time).

III.  RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

28.  Restrictions have been imposed in many post-communist countries with a view to screening the employment of former security agents or active collaborators in the former regimes. In this respect, international human rights bodies have at times found fault with similar legislation where this has lacked precision or proportionality, characterising such rules as discrimination in employment or the exercise of a profession on the basis of political opinion. The possibility of appeal to the courts has been considered a significant safeguard, although not sufficient in itself to make good shortcomings in legislation (see Sidabras and Džiautas, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, 27.7.2004, §§ 30-32, ECHR 2004 -          ...).

29.  Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter provides:

“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to work, the Parties undertake:

...

2) to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon[.]”

This provision, which was retained word for word in the Revised Charter of 1996 (which entered into force with regard to Lithuania on 1 August 2001), has been consistently interpreted by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) as establishing a right not to be discriminated against in employment. The non-discrimination guarantee is stipulated in Article E of the Revised Charter in the following terms:

“The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.”

30.  The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has also adopted a number of relevant international legal instruments. The most pertinent text is ILO Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) of 1958. In its 1996 General Survey, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) restated its interpretation of Convention No. 111, drawing upon examples taken from national law.

A 1996 survey identifies comparable provisions in the national law of a number of European countries.

In Latvia, the State Civil Service Act 2000 and the Police Act 1999 prohibit the employment of persons who worked for or with the Soviet security services. In 2003 the CEACR expressed its dissatisfaction with the above texts in the following terms:

“6.  The Committee recalls that requirements of a political nature can be set for a particular job, but to ensure that they are not contrary to the Convention, they should be limited to the characteristics of a particular post and be in proportion to its labour requirements. The Committee notes that the above established exclusions by the provisions under examination apply broadly to the entire civil service and police rather than to specific jobs, functions or tasks. The Committee is concerned that these provisions appear to go beyond justifiable exclusions in respect of a particular job based on its inherent requirements as provided for under Article 1 (2) of the Convention. The Committee recalls that for measures not to be deemed discriminatory under Article 4, they must be measures affecting an individual on account of activities he or she is justifiably suspected or proven to be engaged in which are prejudicial to the security of the State. Article 4 of the Convention does not exclude from the definition of discrimination measures taken by reason of membership of a particular group or community. The Committee also notes that in cases where persons are deemed to be justifiably suspected of or engaged in activities prejudicial to the security of the State, the individual concerned shall have the right to appeal to a competent body in accordance with national practice.

7.  In the light of the above, the Committee considers the exclusions from being a candidate for any civil service position and from being employed by the police are not sufficiently well defined and delimited to ensure that they do not become discrimination in employment and occupation based on political opinion ...”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14

31.  The applicants complained that the loss of their jobs, respectively, as a private-company lawyer and barrister, and the ban under Article 2 of the Law on the Evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Present Activities of Permanent Employees of the Organisation (“the Act”) on their finding employment in various private-sector spheres until 2009, breached Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.

Article 8 of the Convention reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, ...”

Article 14 states:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.

33.  The applicants contested the Government's submissions. They complained in particular that they had lost their private-sector jobs, and that they had furthermore been deprived of the possibility to seek employment in various private-sector fields until 2009 as a result of their statutory status as “former KGB officers”. The applicants submitted that they had not been given any possibility under the Act either to present their personal cases in the evaluation and establishment of their loyalty to the State, or to avoid the application to them of the employment restrictions prescribed by Article 3 of the Act. In particular, the applicants stressed that they had left the KGB almost a decade before their dismissals. Furthermore, the applicants contended that their jobs in the private sector had not constituted any threat to the national security of Lithuania. However, the domestic courts imposed the employment restrictions solely on the ground of their former employment in the KGB. Finally, the applicants submitted that, as a result of the negative publicity caused by the adoption of the “KGB Act” and its application to them, they had been subjected to daily embarrassment on account of their past.

34.  The Court recalls the case of Sidabras and Džiautas where it found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 8, to the extent that the Act precluded those applicants from employment in the private sector on the basis of their “former KGB officers” status under the Act (loc. cit., §§ 33-62). The present applicants' complaints are very similar, albeit wider: they relate not only to their hypothetical inability to apply for various private-sector jobs until 2009 (as in Sidabras and Džiautas), but they also concern their actual dismissal from existing employment in that sector.

35.  Nevertheless, this extra element does not prompt the Court to depart from the reasoning developed in Sidabras and Džiautas. The applicant's dismissal from their jobs as private-sector lawyers and their current employment restrictions pursuant to the Act constituted a statutory distinction of their status on the basis of their KGB past, affecting directly the applicants' right to respect for their private life. As a result the applicants' complaints fall to be examined under Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8 (loc. cit., §§ 38-50).

36.  As to the justification of this distinction, the Government's main line of argument was that the application of the Act was well balanced in view of the legitimate interest to protect national security of the State, the impugned employment restrictions being imposed on persons such as the applicants by reason of their lack of loyalty to the State. However, the Court emphasises that the State-imposed restrictions on a person's opportunity to find employment with a private company for reasons of lack of loyalty to the State cannot be justified from the Convention perspective in the same manner as restrictions on access to their employment in the public service (loc. cit., §§ 57-58). Moreover, the very belated nature of the Act, imposing the impugned employment restrictions on the applicants a decade after the Lithuanian independence had been re-established and the applicants' KGB employment had been terminated, counts strongly in favour of a finding that the application of the Act vis-à-vis the applicants amounted to a discriminatory measure (loc. cit., § 60). The respondent Government have thus failed to disprove that the applicants' inability to pursue their former professions as, respectively, a lawyer in a private telecommunications company and barrister, and their continuing inability to find private-sector employment on the basis of their “former KGB officer” status under the Act, constitutes a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims sought after (see, mutatis mutandis, Sidabras and Džiautas cited above, §§ 51-62).

37.  Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8.

38.  The Court considers that, since it has found a breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, it is not necessary also to consider whether there has been a violation of Article 8 taken alone (ibid., § 63).

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14

39.  The applicants also complained that the loss of their former jobs and the subsequent employment restrictions under Article 2 of the Act also breached Article 10 of the Convention (which guarantees freedom of expression), and constituted discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention. The Court observes however that in the Sidabras and Džiautas case it found no scope for the application of Article 10 of the Convention, either alone or taken together with Article 14 of the Convention (loc. cit.,
§§ 64-73). The Court finds no basis on which to distinguish the present cases from that conclusion.

40.  The Court finds, for the same reasons as in the Sidabras and Džiautas judgment, that there has been no violation of these provisions.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

41.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Pecuniary damage

42.  The first applicant claimed EUR 40,927.36 in relation to the loss of his former salary at the telecommunications company, following his dismissal on 23 February 2000 until 1 March 2004 (the date on which the applicant's claim was presented to the Court). He requested a further amount, to be determined at the Court's discretion, to compensate for the loss of salary since 1 March 2004, and for his lost career opportunities.

43.  The second applicant claimed EUR 29,069 in pecuniary damages for the loss of his former income as a barrister, following his disbarment, from 29 May 2001 until 1 March 2004 (the date when his claim was presented to the Court). He requested a further amount, to be determined at the Court's discretion, to compensate for the loss of salary since 1 March 2004, and for his lost career opportunities.

44.  The Government considered these claims to be unjustified. In particular, they stated that there was no reasonable link between the violation of the Convention alleged by the applicants and the damage claimed. At the same time, the Government made no comment on the assessment of the applicants' former income, attested by the documents presented by the applicants to the Court.

45.  The Court notes that the applicants lost their former jobs as, respectively, a lawyer in a private telecommunications company and barrister, in view of the application of the Act which the Court has found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention. The loss of employment in turn deprived the applicants of the main source of income, and undoubtedly adversely affected their future career prospects. Hence, there is a direct causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage claimed, which has to be reimbursed in such a way as to restore, as far as possible, the situation existing before the breach (see, mutatis mutandis, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 25.7.2000, § 18, ECHR 2000-IX).

46.  The Court also observes that in the Sidabras and Džiautas case cited above the Court found no violation of the Convention as a result of those applicants' dismissal as State officials. Consequently, the Court's award of just satisfaction in that case concerned pecuniary damage only to the extent that the breach of the Convention had adversely affected those applicants' private-sector career prospects following the dismissal (loc. cit., § 78). However, in the present case the violation found directly related to the applicants' loss of employment as private-sector lawyers, warranting a claim for a substantively higher award for pecuniary damage than that in the Sidabras and Džiautas case.

47.  At the same time, the Court notes that a precise calculation of the sums necessary to make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect of the pecuniary losses suffered by the applicants is prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violations. The greater the interval since the dismissal of the applicants, the more uncertain the damage becomes. Accordingly, the Court considers that the question to be decided is the level of just satisfaction, in respect of both past and future pecuniary loss, which it is necessary to award to each applicant, the matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (see Smith and Grady cited above, §§ 18-19).

48.  As regards the first applicant, the Court notes that he has had apparent difficulties in finding a stable economic activity after his dismissal as a lawyer in a telecommunications company on 23 February 2000. He has been unemployed since 26 February 2002. While it is not for the Court to speculate whether his current unemployment may also be the result of his own fault, the fact remains that his dismissal under the Act instigated his present career difficulties. In fact, to date the first applicant continues to be exposed to various employment restrictions in the private sector pursuant to the impugned domestic legislation. In these circumstances, and on the basis of the assessment of the first applicant's former salary at the telecommunications company as attested by the documents presented by the parties, the Court awards the first applicant EUR 35,000 for pecuniary damage.

49.  While the second applicant has been able to find and retain employment after being disbarred on 29 May 2001, the fact remains that the application of the Act instigated the necessity for him to look for new fields of economic activity in regard to which he may not have been educated or trained as a lawyer. It is also to be noted that to date the Act continues to impose on the second applicant various employment restrictions in the private sector (also see § 48 above). Against this background, and by way of the calculation on the basis of the second applicant's former income as a barrister as attested by the documents submitted to the Court, it awards him EUR 7,500 for pecuniary damage.

B.  Non-pecuniary damage

50.  The first applicant requested EUR 200,000 in non-pecuniary damage. The second applicant claimed EUR 100,000 in this respect.

51.  The Government considered these claims to be exorbitant.

52.  Makings its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each of the applicants EUR 5,000 under this head (see Sidabras and Džiautas cited above, §§ 75-78).

B.  Costs and expenses

53.  The first applicant claimed EUR 10,136.70 for legal costs and expenses. The second applicant asked for EUR 8,721 in this respect.

54.  The Government stated that the claims were excessive.

55.  According to the Court's established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to quantum. In addition, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25701/94, 28.11.2002, § 105).

56.  The Court notes that both applicants have been represented by the same lawyer, Mr Paškauskas, and it is thus not necessary to make two separate awards under this head. Furthermore, it is noted that the applicants have been granted legal aid under the Court's legal-aid scheme, by which the sum of EUR 981 has already been paid to the lawyer.

57.  In view of these considerations, the Court awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 4,000 for legal costs and expenses (see, inter alia, Sidabras and Džiautas cited above, §§ 79-83).

C.  Default interest

58.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8;

 2.  Holds that the Court is not required to rule under Article 8 of the Convention taken on its own;

 3.  Holds that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention;

 4.  Holds that:

(a) the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State on the date of payment:

 (i) EUR 35,000 (thirty five thousand euros) to the first applicant for pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) to the first applicant for non-pecuniary damage;

(iii) EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros) to the second applicant for pecuniary damage;

(iv)  EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) to the second applicant for non-pecuniary damage;

(v) EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros) to the applicants jointly for legal costs and expenses;

(vi) any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

 5.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claims for just satisfaction.

 Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 April 2005, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Vincent Berger                                                               Boštjan M. Zupančič                   Registrar          President

I voted against the finding of the majority that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.

I have some problems in examining the justification of the measures taken in respect of former employees of the KGB in terms of “discrimination”. The principle of non-discrimination, as it is recognised in European constitutions and in international treaties, refers above all to a denial of opportunities on grounds of personal choices in so far as these choices should be respected as elements of someone’s personality, such as religion, political opinion, sexual orientation and gender identity, or, on the contrary, on grounds of personal features in respect of which no choice at all can be made, such as sex, race, disability and age.

Working for the KGB in my opinion does not fall within either of these categories.

While it is true that former KGB employees were treated differently from “other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB” (see paragraph 41 of the judgment), this difference does not come within the scope of Article 14 in so far as it relates to access to particular professions, as the right to a free choice of profession is not guaranteed by the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Thlimmenos [GC], no. 34369/97, § 41, ECHR 2000-IV).

I do agree, however, that the application of the law, which in itself pursued a legitimate aim, was of such a general character that it affected the applicants’ ability to develop relationships with the outside world as protected by Article 8 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-III) to a significant extent and therefore interfered with their private lives. In view of the circumstances of the present applications, such as the fact that the law was applied many years after the applicants had left the KGB and many years after the date of Lithuania’s independence, without any account being taken of the special features of their individual cases, this interference cannot be considered proportionate. Consequently, Article 8 of the Convention has been violated.